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THE CHILDREN WE ABANDON:
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS TO CHILD
WELFARE AND EDUCATION LAWS AS
DENIALS OF EQUAL PROTECTION TO
CHILDREN OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS
JAMES G. DWYER*
The story of children who die because their parents, in obser-
vance of their own religious principles, withhold conventional
medical treatment from them is a familiar one. In this Article,
James G. Dwyer shows that the phenomenon of parents denying
secular benefits to their children for religious reasons goes far
beyond these few highly publicized cases, extending into the realm
of education as well as medical care. Moreover, Dr. Dwyer shows
that the federal and state governments endorse this practice by
statutorily exempting 'religious objector' parents from otherwise
generally applicable compulsory child care and education laws.
He argues that courts addressing such exemptions, in emphasizing
the parents' free exercise rights, have failed to observe that they
infringe upon the children's equal protection rights. These
children, solely because of their parents' beliefs, do not receive the
same legal protections from harm (for instance, inferior health care
and an inferior education) that other groups of children receive.
After describing in detail the types of discrimination that religious
exemptions to child welfare laws inflict upon these children, Dr.
Dwyer considers how each element of an equal protection analysis
would apply to these exemptions. He concludes ultimately that
very few, if any, of the exemptions should survive an equal
protection challenge-a conclusion with radical practical
implications, particularly with regard to the educational system in
this country. Finally, the author discusses the practical
impediments to bringing equal protection claims, especially the fact
that neither the parents nor the children themselves are likely to
raise or support them, and proposes methods by which courts
might nevertheless hear these claims.
* B.A. 1984, Boston College; J.D. 1987, Yale.Law School; Ph.D. 1995, Stanford
University.
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We commonly excuse parents, legally and morally, for inflicting
upon their children what most people would regard as harm, when the
parents act on the basis of religious belief. While states have
prosecuted some parents for causing their children to die by failing to
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obtain necessary medical care, even though the parents had sincere
religious objections to medical care,' these few cases represent only
the most extreme situations and mask a quite widespread but
generally overlooked phenomenon. In numerous areas of the law
relating to children's care and education, certain parents enjoy an
exemption from normal parental legal responsibilities solely because
they have religious beliefs in opposition to the conduct that those
responsibilities would entail. These exemptions and the cultural ethos
that supports them reflect a pervasive social indifference to the
interests of particular groups of children. These children cannot
speak for themselves and have no one to speak for them except the
very parents who want to deny them the benefits and protections that
the law guarantees other children. This Article challenges the legal
comniunity to recognize and address squarely the law's denial of equal
protection to some children simply because of their parents' religious
beliefs.
Numerous instances of discrimination among children based upon
the religious beliefs of their parents appear in the laws relating to
child-rearing. This Article focuses on the areas of medical care and
school regulation.2 In these areas, the harms to children arising from
the law's discriminatory treatment are readily discernable, and the
children are unlikely to have any advocate for their independent
interests. In these areas, myriad state and federal laws impose on
parents and educators responsibilities to undertake or to refrain from
certain actions, reflecting a legislative judgment that imposing these
responsibilities is necessary to protect and promote the well-being of
children. As a general rule, for example, parents by law must ensure
that their children receive vaccinations, physical examinations, ade-
quate nutrition, and medical treatment for disease or injury.3 States
also legally mandate that parents send their children to schools that
comply with regulations regarding teachers' qualifications, content and
methodology of instruction, and several other aspects of school opera-
tion.4
1. See Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due
Process and the Effect of Faith Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing
Parents, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 43, 48 n.28 (1994) (noting that 42 such prosecutions have been
documented).
2. Other areas in which such discrimination exists include adoption and foster care.
See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 126, 140-42, 156-58 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 22-52 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, however, these laws typically restrict their
application to avoid conflict with the beliefs and practices of minority
religious groups.' Significantly, legislatures have included religious
exemptions in child welfare and education laws even in many areas
in which the courts have found that religious accommodation is not
constitutionally required. As a result of these exemptions, the
children of members of some religious groups do not receive the
benefits and protections that the laws afford children generally.
Substantial litigation and legal commentary has surrounded reli-
gious objections to a few sorts of state child welfare and education
laws. Most relates to objections to vaccinations or to blood
transfusions or other medical care for children at risk of dying, and
objections by church school officials or home schooling parents to
teacher certification requirements.6 These are cases in which a state
has refused to accommodate the religiously grounded desires of
parents regarding the care and education of their children, and the
parents have sued the state claiming a violation of their constitutional
rights. No one has ever advanced in court, however, a claim that
when the state does accommodate "religious objector" parents it
thereby violates a fundamental right of their children-namely, the
children's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the
laws.7 That no one has ever asserted such a claim is unsurprising,
since neither state officials nor parents would have an interest in
advancing such a claim, and whether anyone else could advance such
a claim is unclear.
Legal commentators, too, have failed to perceive the problem of
equal protection for children that such exemptions create.8 Instead,
both courts and commentators have analyzed religious exemptions
principally in terms of the religious free exercise rights of the parents
who receive the exemptions, and in terms of the equal protection
rights of other parents-those who object to a particular child welfare
5. See infra notes 60-75, 110-19, 127-39, 146-49, 159-60 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 86-87, 113-14, 133-39 and accompanying text.
7. One state court has commented that a spiritual treatment exemption to neglect
laws violates the equal protection rights of children who fail to receive medical care as a
result. State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 935 (Ohio 1984).
8. The only recognition of this problem the author has encountered in the scholarly
literature are very brief discussions of spiritual treatment exemptions to neglect laws in
equal protection terms in Ann M. Massie, The Religion Clauses and Parental Health Care
Decisionmaking for Children: Suggestions for a New Approach, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
725, 771-73 (1994), and in Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the Costs of Parental Free
Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief and a Child's Right to
Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 319, 348-50 (1991).
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law but do not fall within the law's exemption because they do not
have the right sort of beliefs or religious affiliation.9 Occasionally
legal commentators, troubled by the consequences of religious exemp-
tions for the welfare of children, assert on the children's behalf moral
claims to state protection of their welfare. They typically balance
such claims against parents' constitutional rights in order to argue that
courts should limit or eliminate the religious exemptions.' ° They fail
to perceive, however, that a fundamental problem of inequality
9. See, eg., Dalli v. Board of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219,223 (Mass. 1971) (holding that
religious exemption to immunization law violates Establishment Clause and equal
protection rights of parents not covered); Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218,223 (Miss. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980) (holding that religious exemption to compulsory
immunization law violates equal protection rights of parents not covered by the
exemption); Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d at 933-35 (holding that spiritual treatment exemption
to child neglect law violates the Establishment Clause and the equal protection rights of
parents not covered by the exemption); Massie, supra note 8, at 736-46 (arguing that Free
Exercise Clause does not require spiritual treatment exemption); Shelli Dawn Robinson,
Commentary, Commonwealth v. Twitchell: Who Owns the Child?, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & PoL'Y 413, 425-31 (1991); Judith Inglis Scheiderer, Note, When Children Die as a
Result of Religious Practices, 51 OHio ST. L.J. 1429, 1439-41 (1990); Edward E. Smith,
Note, The Criminalization of Belief- When Free Exercise Isn't, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1491,
1494-1509 (1991) (discussing free exercise rights of religious objectors).
Commentators and courts have also viewed religious objection exemptions to child
welfare laws as violations of the Establishment Clause. E.g., Dalli, 267 N.E.2d at 223;
Massie, supra note 8, at 747-71. In addition, many scholars have discussed the due process
problems that arise when states include spiritual treatment exemptions in their child
neglect laws while at the same time imposing criminal liability on any parent who causes
a child to die by failing to secure appropriate medical care, regardless of the reason. See,
e.g., Christine A. Clark, Religious Accommodation and Criminal Liability, 17 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 559, 584-88 (1990); Rosato, supra note 1; Scheiderer, supra, at 1441-43.
Notably, all of the works cited, which are typical of the scholarly work that has been
done on religious parenting, discuss only instances in which children die because their
parents rely exclusively on spiritual treatment. The more common and widespread practice
of denying children immunization and periodic physical examinations apparently has not
captured the attention of legal writers. Similarly, in the area of education, much has been
written about battles between religious conservatives and states over state certification of
church schools and home schools, while day-to-day practices of these schools that might
be harmful to the secular interests of their pupils, such as sexist teaching, receive almost
no attention. See, eg., Neal Devins, Fundamentalist Christian Educators v. State: An
Inevitable Compromise, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 818 (1992); Mark Murphy, Note, A
Constitutional Analysis of Compulsory School Attendance Laws in the Southeast: Do They
Unlawfully Interfere with Alternatives to Public Education?, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 457
(1992); Daniel J. Rose, Note, Compulsory Education and Parent Rights: A Judicial
Framework of Analysis, 30 B.C. L. REv. 861 (1989).
10. See, e.g., John T. Gathings, Jr., Comment, When Rights Clash: The Conflict
Between a Parent's Right to Free Exercise of Religion Versus His Child's Right to Life, 19
CUMB. L. REv. 585, 604-08, 615-16 (1989); Wayne F. Malecha, Note, Faith Healing
Exemptions to Child Protection Laws: Keeping the Faith Versus Medical Care for Children,
12 J. LEGIS. 243, 259-63 (1985).
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among groups of children inheres in these situations, a problem that
rises to constitutional dimensions and throws into question in its
entirety this very common practice of according some parents a right
to deny their children important secular benefits. Indeed, even the
fact that some children must have their interests balanced against the
religious preferences of other persons, before a court can determine
whether they are to receive the legal protections guaranteed other
children, is a form of unequal treatment that requires justification.
Courts would never consider the religious views of other persons as
a justification for the state denying benefits to a particular group of
adults.
This Article demonstrates that a compelling legal argument
against religious exemptions to child welfare and education laws is
that they discriminate among groups of children, in the conferral of
important state benefits, on an arbitrary and improper basis-namely,
the religious beliefs of other persons. Such a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection challenge on behalf of the adversely affected children
would be stronger than other approaches to protecting their well-
being because it would elevate the children's status in these situations
from that of parental appendages or petitioners for state largesse to
that of constitutional right-bearers." Asserting that an exemption
violates some children's constitutional right would force the courts to
focus more closely on the underlying purpose of child welfare
laws-to provide children with forms of protection that a majority of
citizens (not just liberal child advocates) deems important enough to
mandate. 2 It would induce judges to recognize the distinct person-
hood of children and the ways in which children's welfare interests
may conflict with the preferences of parents, facts that courts
11. Massie argues that spiritual treatment exemptions violate children's free exercise
rights. Massie, supra note 8, at 769-71. This argument does attempt to raise children's
status to that of right-bearers, but it is not a very strong argument. If a child himself does
not have religious beliefs inconsistent with those of his parents, a supposed free exercise
right of the child would have to depend on one of three claims: (1) that children have a
right not to have any religious (or other?) views impressed upon them, which is
implausible, (2) that present treatment of a child might be contrary to his future views
concerning religion, which is highly speculative, or (3) that present treatment of a child
might be contrary to the child's future interest in religious freedom (e.g., if it caused the
child to die or stifled the growth of intellectual capacities), which is better characterized
as the child's present interests in health and cognitive development.
12. This has been the result in equal protection suits that parents have brought on
behalf of particular groups of children. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-25
(1982) (holding that denial of free public education to undocumented alien school-age
children violates Equal Protection Clause).
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routinely overlook. 3 It would also reveal the impropriety of
balancing children's fundamental interests against parents' wishes, for
whatever reason, to depart from societal standards of parental
responsibility. Finally, an equal protection challenge on behalf of
children would force states to do something they have never been
called on to do-to articulate in court a legitimate reason for their
practice of de jure discrimination among different groups of children
in providing protection from parents' harmful practices and decisions.
Thus, rather than requiring a showing that the state (that is, the rest
of us) has a compelling interest in protecting the child of a religious
objector, as is required when parents' free exercise rights are the only
constitutional rights asserted, an equal protection claim on behalf of
the child would impose on the state the burden of showing that it
(and not just the parents) has a sufficiently strong interest in denying
protection to the child.
In searching for such a rationale, state officials and judges would
have to confront some very difficult questions about the moral, politi-
cal, and legal standing of children born into minority religious
communities, about the state's responsibility for the welfare of these
children, about the permissible bases for state decisionmaking in this
realm, and about the coherence and legitimacy of a notion of parental
authority and entitlement that precludes treating all children as equal
human beings. The answers they arrive at may force state officials
and judges not only to eliminate religious exemptions that are not,
according to past judicial decisions, constitutionally compelled, but
also to reconsider the prevailing judicial interpretation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments as conferring on parents a right to control
the lives of their children. 4
This Article analyzes the theoretical, doctrinal, and practical
issues that an equal protection claim on behalf of religious objectors'
children would raise. Part I describes several of the ways in which
federal and state laws discriminate among groups of children based
upon the religious preferences of their parents. It highlights two
particular legal provisions-one in the area of education and one in
the area of medical care-that child advocates might wish to challenge
on equal protection grounds. The first is a religious exemption from
prohibitions against sex discrimination and sex bias in elementary and
13. See James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1394-96, 1399-1402 (1994).
14. For an argument on different grounds for eliminating parents' rights, see Dwyer,
supra note 13.
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secondary education.'" The second is a religious exemption from
compulsory child immunization laws.'6 Focusing on the sexist
practices of certain types of religious schools brings out particularly
sharply the conflict that all of these situations pose between, on the
one side, accommodation of minority religious practices and the
political values supporting such accommodation and, on the other
side, the commitment of a liberal democracy to the value of equality
among persons.
Part II of the Article sets forth the elements of an equal
protection claim and analyzes with respect to each the arguments that
advocates for children might advance against parental religious
exemptions, as well as arguments that parents and the state might
advance in response. Of particular importance are discussions
concerning the level of scrutiny that courts should apply to these
statutory provisions and discussions concerning the legitimacy of the
legislative purposes that states might assert in defense of parental
religious exemptions. Part II argues that child welfare and education
laws containing parental religious exemptions should be subjected to
heightened judicial scrutiny.7 Further, it explains why the actual
legislative purpose underlying these exemptions (deference to or
accommodation of the religiously-grounded wishes of parents) is not
only insufficient to satisfy this standard, but is in fact an illegitimate
state purpose that courts should not even consider."8 Part II also
constructs a number of other potential rationales for parental religious
exemptions, and shows that these too are inadequate. 9 It thus
concludes that most, if not all, religious exemptions to child welfare
and education laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause. Accordingly, courts should invalidate them.
However, a serious practical obstacle lies in the way of securing
equal protection of the laws for religious objectors' children. An
equal protection claim of the type that Part II articulates would not
have the support of parents, state officials, or the general public, and
would be unlikely to have the support of the children themselves.
Part III addresses this dilemma and finds that, while the rules of
federal procedure do not formally preclude a suit going forward
despite the absence of support from any of the parties directly
15. See infra notes 43-59, 72-85 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 230-343 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 352-69 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 371-446 and accompanying text.
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affected by the challenged state action, past judicial applications of
the relevant rules suggest that it would in practice be quite difficult to
bring a claim on behalf of religious objectors' children.2 Any judge
would likely be reluctant to confer child-representation status on an
outside advocate when none of the parties involved supports such
representation. So applied, the federal rules may themselves present
an equal protection problem, by precluding claims to enforce the
constitutional rights of a certain class of persons. Thus, Jenny Doe,
a young girl about to begin school for the first time, whose parents
wish to send her to a fundamentalist Christian school that will teach
her to assume a role subordinate to men for the rest of her life,
suffers discrimination at three levels. (1) Her parents, her school, and
her parents' religious community treat her as inferior by virtue of her
gender. (2) Federal and state law-makers treat her as less deserving
than children in secular schools of protection against sexist teaching.
(3) Finally, the courts treat her as less deserving of enforceable
constitutional rights than the rest of society.
Part HI suggests a strategy for initiating an equal protection suit
on behalf of such a child despite existing obstacles.2 It also con-
siders possible compromise positions regarding various religious
exemptions that would allow states to protect somewhat the develop-
mental interests of the children involved while minimizing parents'
inevitable resistance. As a matter of legal principle, avoiding such
resistance is not a legitimate reason for legally discriminating against
these children, but as a matter of political reality it is, of course,
something courts and state officials will-and perhaps should
-consider.
I. CHILD WELFARE AND EDUCATION LAWS THAT DISCRIMINATE
AMONG CLASSES OF CHILDREN
A. School Regulations
States regulate public schools extensively. All states require, for
example, that public schools hire only teachers possessing state-award-
ed credentials,' and all prescribe specific training and tests as
20. See infra notes 447-64 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 465-74 and accompanying text.
22. See EDMUND REUTI'ER, JR., THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 437 (3d ed. 1985).
This requirement is explicit in state education statutes. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 16-23-1
(1995); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44065, 44261, 44830(a), 44866 (West 1993); id. § 44265.5
(West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-145 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); ILL.
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prerequisites to obtaining credentials.' Many states also require that
public school teachers periodically receive additional training24 and
evaluation,' and that teachers whose work is unsatisfactory undergo
special remedial training and reassessment or be dismissed.26
Statutory provisions governing public school teacher qualifications
reflect a legislative judgment that the educational needs of children
are likely to be fulfilled only by teachers with proper preparation
under appropriate supervision, and that the quality of teacher training
bears a close relation to the successful performance and development
of students.2 7
In addition to controlling who teaches in public schools, states
typically also exercise substantial control over the content of
education in public schools. They mandate that public schools teach
certain subjects, follow prescribed curricular guidelines,29 use only
CONP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, para. 5/21-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
120.101.7 (West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1233(1) (1994); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001
(McKinney 1995).
23. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-23-14, 15 (1995); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44259, 44261
(West 1994); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, paras. 5/21-1a, -2a, -2b, -3, -5 (West 1993);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.41531 (Callaghan 1987 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 804(6)
(McKinney 1988) id. § 3004 (West 1995); Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d
485, 492-95 (8th Cir. 1987) (describing elements of teacher training program in Iowa).
Many state statutes direct a state agency, typically the state board of education, to define
the prerequisites and standards for obtaining teaching credentials. ROBERT C. O'REILLY
& EDWARD T. GREEN, SCHOOL LAW FOR THE 1990s: A HANDBOOK 62 (1992).
24. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 16-23-8, 16-23-13.1 (1995); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44277 (West
1993 & Supp. 1996).
25. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44662(b) (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); id. § 44830(b)
(West 1993) (requiring that all teachers pass basic skills proficiency exam); id. § 44664
(requiring annual evaluation of probationary teachers and annual evaluation of tenured
teachers); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, para. 5/24A-5 (West 1993) (requiring school
districts to establish teacher evaluation plans and evaluate all teachers at least once every
two years).
26. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44664(b) (West 1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105,
paras. 5/24A-5(f), (g), (h) (West 1993).
27. See, e.g., 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 1245, § 15(d), (e) (1994); Fellowship Baptist, 815 F.2d
at 492-95 (describing teacher training program in Iowa as " 'essential if one is to become
a good teacher' ") (quoting Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 620 F. Supp. 308, 316
(S.D. Iowa 1985)); cf Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571,579 (Neb.) ("[I]t
goes without saying that the State has a compelling interest in the quality and ability of
those who are to teach its young people."), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981).
28. See MARTHA M. MCCARTHY & NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, PUBLIC SCHOOL
LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 80 (3d ed. 1992) (noting that all states require
instruction regarding the United States Constitution, that most require instruction in
American history, and that other subjects commonly required are English, mathematics,
drug education, health and safety, and physical education); O'REILLY & GREEN, supra
note 23, at 121 ("[I]n all states, the local public school district must offer a curriculum that
the state prescribes."). Roughly half of the states empower local school boards to adopt
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textbooks and other instructional materials approved by state
officials, 0 and regularly administer standardized tests and other
evaluative devices.31 Some states also dictate minimum requirements
for progress to higher grades and for a high school diploma 2 State
and local school officials regularly inspect public schools to ensure
their compliance with these directives.33
California's education code is one of the most extensive.34 Like
many other states, California requires that all public schools teach
core subjects such as English, mathematics, social studies, sciences,
fine arts, health, and physical education. California also goes
beyond core requirements. 36 It mandates, for example, that public
schools implement "programs in ethics and civic values" that (1) teach
children to value "[h]uman individuality, dignity, and worth,"
"[f]reedom and autonomy," "the common good," and "[e]quality of
opportunity," and (2) foster in children self-respect, cooperativeness,
and "critical thinking skills necessary for sound judgment in matters
courses of study, but often the local board must obtain approval of its decisions from the
state board of education. MCCARTHY & CAMBRON-MCCABE, supra, at 80.
29. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 16-40-1.1, 16-40A-2, 16-40A-3 (1995); CAL. EDUC. CODE §
51215 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996) (requiring local school boards to adopt student
proficiency standards); id. § 51980 (West 1989) (health education); id § 60200.6 (social
science courses); id. § 51220.5 (West Supp. 1996) (parenting skills course); id- § 51553 (sex
education); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-10.1-4-8, -9.1, -11 (Burns 1994) (health education); id
§ 24-10.1-4-7, -10 (Burns 1991 & Supp. 1995); Ud § 24-10.1-4-13, -14 (Burns Supp. 1995);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.41507 (Callaghan 1987 & Supp. 1995) (sex education).
30. E.g., ALA. CODE § 16-36-5 (1995); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 60001,60200 (West 1989
& Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-10.1-9-1 (Bums 1991); see also O'RELLY & GREEN,
supra note 23, at 122 (listing other states that require local school boards to select
textbooks from an approved list). A number of states delegate the textbook designation
function to local school boards. Id. at 123.
31. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 60603, 60605, 60608 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
32. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51225.3 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); ILL. COMp.
STAT. ANN. ch. 105, paras. 5/27-22 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
33. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1240 (West 1994 and Supp. 1996).
34. New York's public school regulations are comparably extensive. See Blackwelder
v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 122-23 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (detailing legislative and
administrative provisions governing public schools).
35. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51210 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); see also id. § 51220
(requiring additionally that in middle and high schools instruction be given in foreign
languages, applied arts, vocational-technical skills, and driving); id §§ 51222-23
(establishing minimum time for physical education).
36. Many other states' curricular mandates also go beyond the core academic subjects.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 16-35-4, 16-40-1 (1995) (physical education), 16-40-1.1 (personal
and parental responsibility instruction), 16-40A-2 (sex education), 16-40A-3 (drug
education) (1995); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, para. 5/27-5 (West 1993) (physical
education); MINN. STAT. § 120.101.6(4) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (health and physical
education).
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of ethical conduct and civic responsibility."37 The critical thinking
skills that public schools are to foster include the abilities "to
recognize when a claim is reasonable ... in view of the relevant
evidence and supporting arguments" and "to understand and entertain
the reasons for points of view other than one's own."38 The Califor-
nia Code further requires that in adopting textb6oks for use in public
schools, the State Board of Education select "materials that illustrate
diverse points of view, represent cultural pluralism, and provide a
broad spectrum of knowledge, information, and technology-based
materials."39  These provisions reflect a legislative judgment that
children must develop habits of cooperativeness and critical thinking
in order to thrive as adults in the pluralistic social and business
environment of contemporary mainstream America.
Other California statutes require that middle schools and high
schools provide instruction in AIDS prevention, including information
about "the failure and success rates of condoms and other contracep-
tives in preventing sexually transmitted HIV infection," and that they
endeavor to inculcate in students compassion for persons with
AIDS.'m Public school students must also take, in either seventh or
eighth grade, a course in parenting skills designed to teach them
about child development, nutrition, effective parenting strategies, child
abuse prevention, personal relationships, how to promote self-esteem
in children, and family health.4' That children benefit by learning
how to avoid sexually transmitted diseases is obvious. Learning to be
successful future parents arguably also benefits the students, in addi-
tion to benefiting the children they will have and society as a whole,
since failing as a parent can also be a source of great suffering for the
parent.
One particular type of school regulation on which the analysis
below focuses is a prohibition against sex discrimination and sexist
teaching in elementary and secondary schools. In this area, the
United States Congress-which historically has left regulation of the
37. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44790 (West 1993).
38. Id.
39. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60200(h) (West Supp. 1996).
40. Id. § 51201.5; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51202 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996)
(mandating instruction in personal and public health and safety, "including venereal
disease and the effects of alcohol, narcotics, drugs, and tobacco upon the human body").
41. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51220.5 (West Supp. 1996); see also id. § 51553 (West 1994)
(prescribing content of sex education curriculum); 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 763 (endorsing State
Board of Education's "Model Curriculum for Human Rights and Genocide").
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internal practices of schools to state and local government 42 -has
been sufficiently concerned to enact federal legislation prohibiting a
practice it perceives to be harmful. Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 forbids sex discrimination of any kind against
any persons in schools that receive direct or indirect financial
assistance from the federal government.43 Although the majority of
claims under Title IX have challenged exclusion of female students
from certain school activities or programs or unequal distribution of
school resources among male and female programs,' the language
of the statute is broad enough to encompass also sexist teaching and
other forms of unequal treatment of boys and girls in the classroom
and in academic and career counseling. It states: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... 45
Many states also have passed legislation prohibiting sex
discrimination and sex bias in education. These are partly redundant
of the federal legislation, but in many cases they serve to clarify
and/or extend the mandate. The state prohibitions take two forms.
First, they proscribe inequities in the availability of classes and
extracurricular activities (most often athletic programs) between male
and female students.' New York's Education Law, for example,
42. See David L. Kirp, Introduction: The Fourth R: Reading, Writing, 'Rithmetic-and
Rules, in SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS: THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF
EDUCATION 1-17, at 1 (David L. Kirp & Donald L. Jensen, eds., 1986); ROSEMARY C.
SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW: LEGAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL POLICY
IN THE POST-BROWN ERA 2 (1986).
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
44. MCCARTHY & CAMBRON-MCCABE, supra note 28, at 154-60.
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1994) (prohibiting states
from denying equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her sex).
The implementing regulations echo this broad language, 34 C.F.R. § 106.31 (1995), but also
contain the qualification that textbooks and curricular materials are not covered. 34
C.F.R. § 106.42 (1995) ("Nothing in this regulation shall be interpreted as requiring or
prohibiting or abridging in any way the use of particular textbooks or curricular
materials."). The Supreme Court substantially curtailed the effectiveness of Title IX by
its decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 570-74 (1984), which held that only
the particular program or activity within a school that receives federal financial assistance
need comply with the law's requirements. See SALOMONE, supra note 42, at 130-33.
However, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, P.L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28, amended
Title IX to extend explicitly the prohibition to the entirety of any educational institution
that receives federal aid for any of its programs.
46. E.g., WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 10; ALASKA STAT. § 14.18.010 (1992) ("A person
in the state may not on the basis of sex be excluded from participation in, be denied the
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states that "no person shall be refused admission into or be excluded
from any course of instruction offered in the state public and high
school systems by reason of that person's sex. No person shall be
disqualified from state public and high school athletic teams, by
reason of that person's sex ... ."' Second, they proscribe giving
instruction or career counseling in a sexist manner and prohibit the
use of sexist instructional materials.4" The State of Washington, for
example, has mandated that the "superintendent of public instruction
shall develop regulations and guidelines to eliminate sex
discrimination ... in textbooks and instructional materials used by
students."49  Washington law also stipulates that counseling and
guidance personnel "shall be required to stress access to all career and
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving federal or state financial assistance."); id. § 14.18.040 (respecting athletics and
recreation); id § 14.18.050 (respecting course offerings); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 40-41
(prohibiting school districts from discriminating by sex in class enrollment or opportunities
for athletic participation); id §§ 220, 230(a) (West 1994) (prohibiting exclusion from or
denial of benefits of "any academic, extracurricular, research, occupational training, or
other program or activity" on the basis of sex); id § 49020 (high school athletics); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 296-61 (1985); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, para. 5/27-1 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1995) (courses of instruction and athletic programs); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.41289
(Callaghan 1987 & Supp. 1995) (athletic programs); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 126.21 (West
1994) (athletic programs); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-3003 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-38-1.1
(1988) (curricular programs and athletics); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28A.640.010 (West
Supp. 1996) (inequality in educational opportunities); id. § 28A.640.020(1)(c), (d)
(recreational and athletic activities, access to course offerings); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.22
(West Supp. 1996) (physical education courses).
47. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3201-a (McKinney 1995).
48. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.18.030 (1992) ("Guidance and counseling services in
public education.., shall stress access to career and vocational opportunities to students
without regard to sex."); id § 14.18.060 (sex bias in textbooks); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 40
(West 1989) (prohibiting differences by sex in conducting classes or counseling for careers,
and requiring that school personnel "affirmatively explore with the pupil the possibility of
careers, or courses leading to careers, that are nontraditional for that pupil's sex"); id. §§
220, 230 (West 1994); id. § 45 (West Supp. 1996); id. § 51500 (West 1989) ("No teacher
shall give instruction nor shall a school district sponsor any activity which reflects adversely
upon persons because of their... sex"); id. § 51501 ("No textbook, or other instructional
materials shall be adopted by... any governing board for use in the public schools which
contains any matter reflecting adversely upon persons because of their ... sex."); id. §
60040 (requiring school boards to adopt only instructional materials that portray
"contributions of both men and women in all types of roles, including professional,
vocational, and executive roles"); id. § 60044; NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-3003 (1994); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 16-38-1.1 (1988); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.640.020 (West Supp. 1996).
49. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.640.020(1) (West Supp. 1996). California
affirmatively requires that courses in social studies in the public schools include "study of
the role and contributions of both men and women." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51204.5 (West
1989).
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vocational opportunities to students without regard to sex."5 Some
states go beyond these prohibitions to require that teachers act
affirmatively to counteract sexism, particularly by promoting the self-
esteem of female students. Illinois, for example, requires that all
public elementary and secondary schools include in their curriculum
a unit of instruction on the history of women in America, including
"a study of women's struggles to... be treated equally as they strive
to earn and occupy positions of merit in our society."'" California
statutes encourage public school teachers to "impress upon the minds
of pupils the meaning of equality and human dignity" and to foster an
environment among students "that is free from discriminatory
attitudes."52
These statutory provisions regarding sexism in schools clearly rest
on a legislative judgment that sexist education and denial of equal
opportunity are harmful to female students 3 Voluminous research
supports this judgment. Even subtle forms of discrimination and bias
in curriculum, teaching methods and language, and teacher interac-
tions with students result in diminished self-esteem, inhibited cognitive
development, passivity, reduced aspirations, and lower achievement
on the part of female students. 4 In addition to the psychological
50. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.640.020(1)(b) (West Supp. 1996).
51. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, para. 5/27-20.5 (West 1993).
52. California Schools Hate Violence Reduction Act of 1995, 1994 Cal. Stat. ch.
1198(2); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 33032.5(3) (West Supp. 1996) (directing State Board
of Education to develop guidelines for training teachers to "promote an appreciation of
diversity and to discourage the development of discriminatory attitudes and practices that
prevent pupils from achieving their full potential").
53. See, e.g., Women's Educational Equity Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 7231(b)(3)(7)
(1994) (finding that "teaching and learning practices in the United States are frequently
inequitable as such practices relate to women and girls" and that "the full participation of
women and girls in American society.., cannot be achieved without educational equity
for women and girls"); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51004 (West 1989) ("The Legislature further
recognizes that all students need to be provided with opportunities to explore and make
career choices and to seek appropriate instruction and training to support those choices.");
HAW. REV. STAT. § 296-60 (1985 & Supp. 1992) ("[E]qual access to education.., cannot
be achieved when our students are required to assume stereotyped sexual roles."); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.640.010 (West Supp. 1996) ("This violation of [equal educational
opportunity] rights has had a deleterious effect on the individuals affected .... ."); 60 Op.
Att'y Gen. 326 (Cal. 1977) ("The important governmental objective served by [California
Interscholastic Federation Bylaw 200, which sets forth the conditions under which high
school students may compete on opposite sex or mixed teams,] is that of providing equal
opportunities for girls in high school athletics.")
54. See JANICE STRE1TMATTER, TOWARD GENDER EQUITY IN THE CLASSROOM:
EVERYDAY TEACHERS' BELIEFS AND PRACrICEs 57, 61, 66 (1994) (stating that girls "are
increasingly more hesitant to compete with boys in the academic arena," and less persistent
in efforts to succeed in school work as they pass on to higher grades); id. at 68 (stating that
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harm arising directly from a sense of lesser competence and inferior
status, 5 and the material harm that ultimately results from their
male students outscore female students on tests measuring higher cognitive skills); id. at
70 (observing that by middle school, girls become less confident of their ability to do well
in math); id. at 71 (observing that female students tend to develop "learned helplessness");
id. at 72 (observing that male students outperform females in science); id. at 73 (observing
that by the end of high school, female students tend to see themselves as less competent
in science than boys); id. at 79 (observing that girls need to see successful women depicted
in curricular materials in order to develop high expectations for themselves); id. at 153-54
(stating that because teachers exert greater pressure on males to find answers and solve
problems, while expecting less achievement from females, "females may accomplish less
than males due to the lower expectations of them" and "are more likely to go through the
system with fewer challenges"); LYN YATES, THE EDUCATION OF GIRLS: POLICY,
RESEARCH AND THE QUESTION OF GENDER 35-41 (1993); Sharyl Bender Peterson &
Mary Alyce Lach, Gender Stereotypes in Children's Books: Their Prevalence and Influence
on Cognitive and Affective Development, 2 GENDER & EDUC. 185, 194 (1990) ("[G]ender
stereotypes affect not only self-concept, potential for achievement and perceptions of
others, but a variety of dimensions of cognitive performance as well."); Mid-Atlantic
Center for Sex Equity, Cost of Sex Bias in Schools: The Report Card, in SEX EQUITY IN
EDUCATION: READINGS AND STRATEGIES 25, 26 (Anne O'Brien Carelli ed., 1988)
[hereinafter SEX EQUITY IN EDUCATION] (stating that female students are "less likely to
believe they can do college work," that they develop "learned helplessness," and they show
less career commitment); Craig Flood, Stereotyping and Classroom Interactions, in SEX
EQUITY IN EDUCATION, supra, at 109, 115 (citing studies analyzing correlation between
gender-bias in classroom interactions and lowered self-esteem, lesser achievement, and
lesser commitment to careers on the part of girls); Dolores A. Grayson & Mary D. Martin,
Gender Expectations and Student Achievement (GESA): A' Teacher Training Program
Addressing Gender Disparity in the Classroom, in SEX EQUITY IN EDUCATION, supra, at
127, 129 ("Repeatedly the studies have indicated a correlation between these perceived
expectations and classroom interactions and their impact on academic achievement."); id.
at 131 (low-ability boys are more likely to give themselves a high self-concept than girls,
and high-ability girls are more likely to give themselves a low self-concept than high-ability
boys); Irene Payne, A Working-Class Girl in a Grammar School, in LEARNING TO LOSE:
SEXISM AND EDUCATION 19 (Dale Spender & Elizabeth Sarah eds., 1988) [hereinafter
LEARNING TO LOSE] ("The curriculum, career advice and construction of the 'feminine'
within the school all served to reproduce the sexual division of labour."). One author
writes:
[G]irIs learn to reduce their expectations, to lower their self-esteem. They have
been persuaded to distort their own being in order to be consistent with the
distortions which surround them.... Having been subjected to this constant
barrage [of sexist images], they are lucky if they can visualise any alternatives to
the advantaged male and the disadvantaged female.
Dale Spender, Education or Indoctrination?, in LEARNING TO LOSE, supra, at 22, 27.
55. Pippa Brewster writes:
This shift, which occurred with all of us, has been variously described as female
under-achievement, as lack of motivation, or as the emergence of the home-
making instinct, but regardless of what it is called, it is quite clear that for all of
us during secondary school, we came to be in a losing position in terms of our
culture's criteria for achievement. We were conscious that it was occurring but
were resigned to it.
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failure to achieve what they are capable of in school, 6 many female
students suffer great frustration because they are discouraged from
pursuing any interests that are "non-traditional," have lesser opportu-
nities than boys, and receive fewer rewards for achieving in tradition-
ally male-dominated domains, such as athletics and science. 7 These
harms afflict females not only while they are in school but throughout
their lives.58 Moreover, research has revealed that boys, too, are
Pippa Brewster, School Days, School Days, in LEARNING TO LOSE, supra note 54, at 5,
8. Another author writes:
Biased behavior on the part of educators has a powerful impact on the
development of students' self-images and expectations, as well as their attitudes
toward their own sex and the other sex. Restrictions by sex can cause students
to become insecure about their abilities and interests, even at an early age.
SEX EQUITY IN EDUCATION, supra note 54, at xiv (citations omitted).
56. See STREITMATTER, supra note 54, at 61 (noting that males "still tend to dominate
certain areas, most notably higher-level math and science classes, which lead the way to
occupations that hold higher societal prestige and pay higher salaries"), 71, 91; YATES,
supra note 54, at 37 ("[M]athematics continues to dominate as a 'critical filter' for entry
to a wide range of occupations and tertiary courses, well beyond its specific relevance to
the fields in question."); SEX EQUITY IN EDUCATION, supra note 54, at xviii (" 'The effect
of this sex role division on women is heavily economic. Girls and women are conditioned
to be dependent, compliant, and of secondary status in the home and workplace.' "
(citation omitted)); Spender, supra note 54, in LEARNING TO LOSE, supra note 54, at 31
(stating that as long as schools convey to students the belief that women are inferior,
"women will continue to find themselves devalued, in the lowest paid, least skilled jobs,
with least power to change those conditions.").
57. One author notes:
The attributes of individual people, as opposed to "boys" and "girls," are often
disregarded, especially if the characteristics tend to break a stereotype. The
negative consequences of ignoring stereotypical sex roles and biasing influences
can include criticism, labeling, and even ostracism. Sex bias can box students into
roles that are uncomfortable and inhibitive.
SEX EQUITY IN EDUCATION, supra note 54, at xiv. Streitmatter agrees:
Many girls who assume the traditional gender characteristics find their inability
to participate in school on an equal footing with the boys extremely frustrat-
ing .... For the girls who are increasingly choosing to buck tradition within the
school structure, there may be few rewards. Although they may achieve in non-
traditional academic areas or excel at a sport, the rewards for those activities tend
to go to boys rather than girls.
STREITMATrER, supra note 54, at 57-58; see also Dorothy B. McKnight, Issues in Physical
Education and Athletics, in SEX EQUITY IN EDUCATION, supra note 54, at 209, 215-16
(arguing that as a result of gender-stereotyped views regarding participation in physical
activities and sports, female students have fewer opportunities to perform physically and
to lead a group, "are rarely encouraged to achieve high levels of physical skill," and
receive fewer rewards for achievement; instead, "women who are active and excel in sports
also find rejection and subsequent loss of self-esteem," and so females generally "are likely
to avoid participation in sport activities and as a result become physically unfit").
58. See, e.g., JOANNE H. MEEHL, THE RECOVERING CATHOLIC: PERSONAL
JOURNEYS OF WOMEN WHO LEFr THE CHURCH 69-98 (1995).
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harmed by gender stereotyping in education, as it effectively restricts
the opportunities and behaviors available to them. 9
In contrast to this extensive state regulation of public schools,
state regulation and oversight of private schools-particularly religious
schools-is minimal or non-existent.' In Tennessee, for example,
state law prohibits state officials from "regulating the selection of
faculty or textbooks or the establishment of a curriculum in church-
related schools.' ,61 Indiana exempts from all its school regulations
any non-public school that does not wish to receive state ac-
creditation. 2 Many other states also make state approval optional
59. See SEx EQurrY IN EDUCATION, supra note 54, at xiii (stating that both girls and
boys, "by being pressured to adhere to their sex roles ... have limited opportunities to
reject interests, behaviors, and values that do not suit them"); i. at xviii (arguing that boys
"'are discouraged from developing the affective, nurturing side of their personalities. As
adults they find themselves successful in varying degrees in the workplace but often lacking
the skills and experience appropriate to forming satisfying, close relationships' ");
STREITMATrER, supra note 54, at 99 ("When accorded equal social status, students of both
genders are freed to interact and learn together in a less inhibited fashion.").
60. See, eg., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.41578 (Callaghan 1987) (requiring private school
administrators to provide local school superintendent with names and ages of enrolled
pupils, name and addresses of parents, and names of children enrolled but not in regular
attendance); id. § 15.1925 (Callaghan 1992) (authorizing state school superintendent to
examine private schools' sanitary condition, records of enrollment, courses of study, and
teacher qualifications); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 20-5-109(1)-(4) (1995) (requiring merely that
nonpublic schools teach the basic courses taught in public schools, give at least 180 days
of instruction, maintain records of pupil attendance and immunization, and operate in a
building that complies with local health and safety laws); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3024, 3211
(requiring attendance records), 3204, 3210 (prescribing minimum number of days of
instruction) (McKinney 1994).
Most often, general school regulations do not exclude religious schools explicitly but
rather do so implicitly by addressing directives only to public schools or only to public
schools and private schools receiving state funding (which would include some religious
schools but exclude others). E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 16-23-1, 16-23-8, 16-35-4, 16-40A-2
(1995); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001 (McKinney 1994) (teacher certification requirement).
Many provisions, however, do explicitly exclude church schools. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 16-46-
3(a)(3) (exemption from licensure requirements), 16-40-1 (church schools excluded from
requirement of program of physical education) (1994); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3210(2)(e)
(McKinney 1994) (established religious groups exempt from school registration
requirement). Thus, regulation of secular private schools is typically greater than
regulation of church schools, though not as extensive as regulation of public schools. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 16-28-1, 16-46-5 (1995).
61. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-50-801(b) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
62. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-3-17.3(a) (Burns Supp. 1995).
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for religious schools,' and exercise little or no control or supervision
over instruction in non-approved schools.'
States that do require state approval or accreditation for some or
all private schools typically do not attempt to control the content or
methods of instruction in licensed schools, beyond mandating merely
that they offer certain core subjects.65 In Kentucky, for example,
63. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 16-46-3, 16-46-5 (1995) (exempting church schools from
general licensing requirement); IOWA CODE ANN. § 299.1,299.2 (West Supp. 1995); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW §§ 3210(2)(e) (McKinney 1994) (established religious groups exempt from
school registration requirement), 5001 (private kindergarten, nursery, elementary, and
secondary schools exempt from licensing requirement); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-50-801(d)
(1994 & Supp. 1995). Iowa law provides an exemption from its compulsory education laws
and instructional standards for religious groups that "profess principles or tenets that differ
substantially from the objectives, goals, and philosophy of education embodied in the
standards." IOWA CODE ANN. § 299.24 (West Supp. 1995). Iowa state courts have,
however, confined application of this exemption to the Amish. See Johnson v. Charles
City Community Sch. Bd., 368 N.W.2d 74, 82-83 (Iowa), cert. denied sub nom. Pruessner
v. Benton, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985).
64. See, eg., ALA. CODE §§ 16-28-3, 16-28-7 (requiring church schools merely to file
an enrollment and attendance report with the local public school superintendent), 16-35-4
(requiring state board of education to prescribe minimum contents of courses of study only
for public schools) (1995); ALAsKA STAT. § 14.07.020(a)(10) (1992) (State Department of
Education not authorized "to require religious or other private schools to be licensed");
id. § 14.07.020(a)(7) (Department may prescribe health and safety standards for all public
and private schools); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-201, 79-1701 (1994) (requiring parents who
send their children to a non-approved school and who have religious objections to state
regulations merely to submit a statement declaring that their children attend a school for
175 days a year and receive instruction in core curricular subjects). Minnesota's
requirements for non-accredited nonpublic schools are somewhat more demanding. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 120.101 to 120.102 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996) (requiring instruction
in certain core subjects, employment of teachers satisfying one of several criteria, periodic
assessment of student performance, submission of annual reports as to children enrolled
and teachers employed, and maintenance of documentation of compliance with subject re-
quirements). Minnesota also gives school superintendents statutory authorization to make
on-site inspections of nonpublic schools to monitor compliance with these requirements.
ld. § 120.103.1 (West 1993). Iowa requires that school-age children in non-approved
schools receive "competent private instruction." IOWA CODE ANN. § 299.1 (West Supp.
1995).
65. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 16-28-1(1), 16-46-5 (1995); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105,
para. 5/26-1.1 (West 1993); cf Nebraska ex reL Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301
N.W.2d 571, 579 (Neb.) (describing state-imposed curricular requirements for private
schools in Nebraska as "very minimal"), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981). California,
which exercises such extensive legislative control over public education, requires private
schools merely to provide "verification" that they: employ persons "capable of teaching,"
offer instruction in the subjects required to be taught in public schools, maintain a record
of pupil attendance, and annually submit to the school superintendent an affidavit stating
the number of students enrolled and teachers employed and providing assurance that they
maintain records of teachers' qualifications and the courses given. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§
33190, 48222 (West 1993). Section 48222 also states that state verification that a private
school has satisfied these requirements "shall not be construed as an evaluation,
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state regulation of private schools is limited to the requirement that
they give instruction in "the several branches of study required to be
taught in the public schools," using the English language, and that
they operate for at least as many days each year as do the public
schools. 6 6  State statutory requirements for instruction in subjects
beyond the core, such as sex education or parenting, and for use of
prescribed textbooks, usually by their terms apply only to public
schools. 7
Perhaps most importantly, very few states require that teachers
in religious schools possess a state-issued credential, receive any
particular training, or undergo any evaluations.6 8 A number of states
mandate that private schools periodically administer one or more
standardized tests to their students and report the grades to state
officials, as a limited means of monitoring the quality of education in
private schools, but they do not condition continued operation of the
schools on students reaching certain levels of achievement. 69 In any
event, such tests are notoriously superficial and indicative of only a
very narrow type of skill-rote memorization-that an authoritarian
recognition, approval, or endorsement of any private school or course."
New York is unusual in requiring instruction in a number of non-core subjects in all
schools in the state. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 801 (requiring instruction in "patriotism,
citizenship and human rights issues, with particular attention to the study of the
inhumanity of genocide, slavery, and the Holocaust" and in "the history, meaning,
significance and effect of the provisions of the constitution of the United States, the
amendments thereto, the declaration of independence, the constitution of the State of New
York and the amendments thereto"); id. § 803 (physical education, abuse of alcohol,
tobacco, and other drugs); id, § 806 (highway safety, traffic regulation, and bicycle safety);
id. § 808 (fire and arson prevention) (McKinney 1994).
66. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 158.080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
67. For citations to these statutes, see supra notes 29-30,36-41, and accompanying text.
68. Alabama, for example, limits all of its statutory provisions regarding teacher
qualifications to public schools. ALA. CODE §§ 16-23-1, -8 (1995); see also N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 3001 (McKinney 1994) (limiting scope of teacher certification requirement to public
schools); Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d
877, 884 (Ky. 1979) (interpreting Kentucky state constitution to prohibit requirement that
teachers in non-public schools be state-certified), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980). Min-
nesota requires that teachers in a non-accredited nonpublic school have a state teaching
license, be directly supervised by a person holding such a license, complete a teacher
competency examination, or hold a bachelor's degree, and does not require any
qualifications of teachers in accredited nonpublic schools. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 120.101.7,
.8 (West 1993). Michigan and Nebraska are among the few states that require teachers in
religious schools to have state certification. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.1923 (Callaghan
1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1233(1) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
69. See Denise M. Bainton, Note, State Regulation of Private Religious Schools and the
State's Interest in Education, 25 ARIz. L. REv. 123,144-45 (1983) (discussing Kentucky and
North Carolina testing statutes).
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education may promote at the expense of other important
capacities-such as critical and creative thinking-and so provide little
or no protection against inadequate schooling." Ample evidence
shows that many religious schools in this country, particularly those
of fundamentalist Christians, provide what state education officials
would regard as an inadequate education (in a non-legal sense) to
their pupils, not only because they fail to hire qualified teachers but
also because, as part of their distinctively religious mission, they
endeavor to stifle rather than nurture students' critical thinking capacities7 1
70. In New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of E. Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940
(1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990), then Judge, now Supreme Court Justice,
Breyer wrote:
Can [the School Committee] be certain that good [test] results reflect good
teaching, i.e., the teaching of intellectual skills, discipline and complete subject
matter, rather than simply teaching the answers to questions the teachers believe
will appear on rests? And how can testing measure those important aspects of
an adequate education that do not readily reduce themselves to standardized test
questions, aspects such as practical vocational skills, the "basic tools by which
individuals might lead economically productive lives," . . . or the values of civic
participation that are "necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system" ... ?
Id. at 948-49 (citations omitted). In Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485,
494 (8th Cir. 1987), the court wrote:
While testing is a valuable tool, it is not sufficient in and of itself to determine
whether a student is receiving an adequate education. Tests primarily determine
knowledge of content of the subject matter. They do not test other aspects of
education necessary to prepare a student for life in today's society.
(quoting Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 620 F. Supp. 308, 316 (S.D. Iowa 1985));
Edward B. Fiske, America's Test Mania, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1988, § 12 (Education
Supp.), at 16, 19, col.2 (stating that multiple choice tests "measure how good students are
at recognizing information, not generating it. 'It's testing for the TV generation
-superficial and passive .... We don't ask if students can synthesize information, solve
problems or think independently.' " (quoting Linda Darling-Hammond, director of
education for the Rand Corporation)); Robert J. Sternberg, Misunderstanding Meaning,
Users Overrely on Scores, EDUC. WEEK, Sept. 23, 1987, at 28, 22 (standardized tests "do
not measure synthetic or insightful-thinking skills ... nor do they measure practical
intellectual skills"); cf Fleischfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 690 n.10
(7th Cir. 1994) (noting that "senses of imagination and creativity ... are fundamental to
children" and that tolerance is among the values schools should instill in students).
71. See, e.g., PETER P. DEBOER, THE WISDOM OF PRACTICE: STUDIES OF TEACHING
IN CHRISTIAN ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOLS 138 (1989); ALBERT J. MENENDEZ,
VISIONS OF REALITY: WHAT FUNDAMENTALIST SCHOOLS TEACH 3, 144 (1993); PAUL
F. PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS 135,169-70 (1987); ALAN PESHKIN,
GOD'S CHOICE: THE TOTAL WORLD OF A FUNDAMENTALIST CHRISTIAN SCHOOL 44,55,
141, 190 (1986); SUSAN D. ROSE, KEEPING THEM OUT OF THE HANDS OF SATAN:
EVANGELICAL SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 139-40, 179, 205 (1988); see also Mozert v.
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1069 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that plaintiff
fundamentalist parent testified "that she did not want her children to make critical
judgments and exercise choices in areas where the Bible provides the answer"), cert.
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Neither Title IX nor any of the state laws prohibiting sexist
schooling applies universally. Title IX, after setting forth the
prohibition in very broad terms, specifically exempts from its coverage
any "educational institution which is controlled by a religious
organization to the extent the application of this part would not be
consistent with the religious tenets of such organization."72 Most
states that have enacted school sex discrimination provisions have
drafted them so as to apply in the first instance only to public
schools.7' In at least two states, however, statutory provisions mirror
the federal legislation. They set forth an anti-discrimination mandate
denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); ef New Life Baptist, 885 F.2d at 951 (noting that trial court
record revealed that plaintiff fundamentalist Christian school would likely provide
inadequate education if left unregulated).
Regarding the authoritarian nature of Catholic schooling, see PETER MCLAREN,
SCHOOLING AS A RITUAL PERFORMANCE: TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
EDUCATIONAL SYMBOLS AND GESTURES 178, 182-83, 210 (1986); PATRICK H.
MCNAMARA, CONSCIENCE FIRST, TRADITION SECOND: A STUDY OF YOUNG AMERICAN
CATHOLICS 99-106 (1992); MEEHL, supra note 58, at 27, 38-40; GARY SCHWARTZ,
BEYOND CONFORMITY OR REBELLION: YOUTH AND AUTHORITY IN AMERICA 165-76
(1987).
This situation, it is worth noting, has implications not only for future state regulation
of religious schools, but also for affirmative action policies today. Arguably, persons who
received their education from a fundamentalist Christian or other conservative religious
school suffered greater educational deprivation than did the vast majority of white women,
and a large percentage of minority men and women, who attended other kinds of schools
in this country and who are today the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs. One
observer of fundamentalist Christian schooling in this country, in fact, has observed that
it is very effective in reproducing a class of servile laborers in intellectually unchallenging,
low-pay occupations. See ROSE, supra, at 200-05. Persons raised in conservative minority
religious sects may also suffer negative stigmatization in mainstream American society,
because of the very traits that their authoritarian upbringing instills in them-i.e.,
intolerance, dogmatism, close-mindedness. Yet the debate over affirmative action that
rages in this country today does not even address the situation of these persons, let alone
suggest that they deserve the same types of redress that women and minorities rightfully
receive.
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (1994); see also 34 C.F.R. § 106.12 (1995) (implementing
regulations).
73. E.g., WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 10; ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.18.010-.060 (1992); CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 40 (West 1994) (discrimination in school district enrollment policies and
public school career counseling); id. § 45 (West Supp. 1996) (combatting sexist attitudes
among pupils); id. § 49020 (West 1993) (equal opportunity in high school athletics); id. §
51501 (West 1989) (instructional materials adopted for use in public schools); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 296-61 (1985); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, paras. 5/1-3, 5/27-1 (West
1993 & Supp. 1995) (sex-based exclusion from courses of instruction or athletic programs
in public schools); id. para. 5/27-20.5 (West 1993) (history of women curriculum); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 79-3002(1), 3003 (1994); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3201-a (McKinney 1994); OR.
REV. STAT. § 659.150 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-38-1.1 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 28A.640.010, .020 (West Supp. 1996); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 119.22 (1991); see also 20
U.S.C. § 1703 (1994) (prohibiting state denial of equal educational opportunity).
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applicable to public schools and any private schools that receive state
financial aid, or that enroll any students who receive state or federal
aid,74 but then specifically exempt from the mandate schools
operated on the basis of religious beliefs that are sexist.75 Thus,
certain religious schools are explicitly singled out at the federal and,
in some jurisdictions, state level to enjoy special license to engage in
sexist practices and instruction.
Substantial evidence indicates that a great number of religious
schools in this country exploit this legal privilege by deliberately and
systematically inculcating in their students the belief that females are
inferior to males, that a woman's purpose in life is to serve a husband
and raise children, and that only men should pursue careers outside
the home, become active in public affairs, or assert opinions about
matters beyond home life. The strongest evidence of sexist teaching
pertains to fundamentalist Christian schools.76 An ethnographic
study of one such school discovered teachers instructing their students
that "sexual equality denies God's word,"'77 and that if a wife does
not accept a subordinate, obedient role in the home "the doors are
wide open to Satan."' This same school prohibited girls from serv-
ing as class president.79 Typically, fundamentalist Christian schools
also discourage girls from engaging in any form of athletic competi-
tion." Hundreds of thousands of girls in this country today are
being taught in fundamentalist Christian schools that they cannot be
leaders, that they should not have or pursue dreams of success outside
the home, and that they should not be assertive or seek to make
important decisions!'
Sexist teaching is not limited to fundamentalist Christian schools.
The sexist nature of Orthodox Jewish teaching appears to be well
74. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 210, 220 (West 1994) (applying prohibition to any
public or private school that "receives or benefits from state financial assistance or enrolls
students who receive state student financial aid"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.550(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994) (applying prohibition to any education program or activity
receiving state financial assistance).
75. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 221 (West 1994) (stating that prohibition "shall not apply to
an educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the application
would not be consistent with the religious tenets of that organization"); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 344.555(1)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993) (same).
76. See, e.g., PARSONS, supra note 71, at 98-99, 101; PESHKIN, supra note 71, at 101,
127, 175; RosE, supra note 71, at 109-10, 163-64.
77. PESHKIN, supra note 71, at 137.
78. Id. at 127.
79. Id. at 101.
80. PARSONS, supra note 71, at 109.
81. See id. at 98-99; PESHKIN supra note 71, at 101; ROSE, supra note 71, at 163-64.
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known, if not well documented. Published accounts attest to discrimi-
nation by gender in access to religious instruction," but beyond this
provide little or no description of the internal practices of these
schools. Catholic parochial schools, which constitute the largest group
of religious schools in this country, have historically been pervasively
sexist,8" though they may have improved significantly in this regard
in recent years. The Catholic Church itself remains notoriously
patriarchal.' To the extent that instruction within conservative
religious schools is sexist, their female pupils may suffer a "double
deprivation." Not only may they fail, along with their male class-
mates, to receive an education from qualified teachers that fosters
intellectual growth,' but they also sustain treatment that consigns
them to lives of subordination even within the confining community
of their upbringing.
The failure of states to regulate religious schools to any
significant degree raises the question of whether they could do so
constitutionally if they wished. The permissible scope of state
regulation of religious schools has been the subject of considerable
82. See Alison Wheeler, Separatist Religious Groups and the Establishment Clause, 30
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223,224 (1995) (describing Satmar sect of ultraorthodox Jewish
denomination, author states that the Satmar "remain segregated by sex outside the home
.... Their children are educated in sex-segregated parochial schools, with boys focusing
upon study of the Torah and girls preparing to become Satmar wives and mothers");
Harold S. Himmelfarb, Jewish Day Schools: Growth in an Era of Religious and
Educational Decline, in RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES K-12, at 383-418
(Thomas C. Hunt & James C. Carper eds., 1993) (noting varying degrees of gender
segregation in Jewish schooling, depending on degree of orthodoxy of sponsoring
denomination).
83. See, e.g., MEEHL, supra note 58, at 73, 78-79.
84. The most obvious evidence of this is the Pope's continuing opposition to
ordination of women as priests. One might also interpret the church's continued stand
against priests marrying as reflecting a negative view of women, and the church's continued
opposition to divorce, contraception, and abortion as supportive of male dominance within
marriage and control over women more generally.
85. Catholic school students do perform better on average than public school students
on standardized test scores. MARY A. GRANT, CATHOLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: DEVELOPMENTS AND CURRENT CONCERNS 235 (1992). As noted above,
such scores reveal little about the quality of education. See supra note 70. In addition,
there are well-known problems associated with concluding from the fact of higher scores
that instruction in Catholic schools is in any way superior to that in public schools. For
example, private schools are able to exclude "difficult" children, and within a given
community tend to draw children whose parents are on average more concerned about and
involved in their children's education, as evidenced by the parents' willingness to pay
tuition rather than take advantage of the 'free' education in the local public school. See
Jomills Henry Braddock II, The Issue Is Still Equality of Educational Opportunity, 51
HARV. EDUc. REV. 490, 491-92 (1981); Richard J. Murname, Evidence, Analysis, and
Unanswered Questions, 51 HARV. EDUC. REV. 483, 485-87 (1981).
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litigation, as fundamentalist Christian groups in many states have
raised First Amendment Free Exercise Clause challenges to state
efforts to exercise a minimal level of control and oversight over their
church schools.8 6 However, states have never attempted to go very
far to control the nature and content of instruction in private schools,
so courts have not had much occasion to define the outer limits of
permissible state regulation. Moreover, the outcomes of disputes that
have reached the courts do not provide unambiguous indication of
how receptive courts are to parental challenges,' and the Supreme
Court has yet to articulate any specific guidelines for how far states
may go. Determining precisely which types of state regulation of
religious schools are constitutionally permissible according to the
prevailing judicial interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is
therefore difficult.
There are a few exceptions. State and federal courts have consis-
tently upheld state laws requiring state approval of all private
schools,"8 certification of private school teachers, 9 instruction in
86. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 1390-96.
87. Compare, eg., Nebraska ex rel Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571,
573, 575, 580 (Neb.) (upholding state board of education regulations that specified "in
detail the subjects required to be taught in both elementary and secondary schools,
together with an explanation of the aims sought to be accomplished by each individual
program" and prescribed "the use of necessary materials and equipment ... and
requirements relating to health and safety" in private schools), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S.
803 (1981) with State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 765-70 (Ohio 1976) (invalidating state
law mandating amount of instructional time for each subject, requiring that all activities
of religious schools conform to policies adopted by local board of education, and requiring
religious schools to cooperate with other members of their community).
88. E.g., New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of E. Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940,
944-45 (1st Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); North Valley Baptist Church v.
McMahon, 696 F. Supp. 518,530 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (concerning preschool licensing), affd,
893 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937 (1990); State v. Andrews, 651 P.2d
473, 475 (Haw. 1982) (licensing for religious schools does not infringe upon religious
freedom); Faith Baptist, 301 N.W.2d at 579-80; State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220,222,231
(N.D. 1982) (upholding prosecution of parents who sent children to unapproved Christian
day school), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983); State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist, 683
S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex. 1984) (licensing of child-care facilities involving compelling state
interest), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 801 (1985). But cf. State v. LaBarge, 357 A.2d 121,
124-25 (Vt. 1976) (finding that a state cannot constitutionally require all children to attend
public or approved private school when criteria for approval of private schools went
beyond those necessary for ensuring minimally adequate education).
89. E.g., Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 492-95 (8th Cir. 1987);
Johnson v. Charles City Community Sch. Bd., 368 N.W.2d 74, 81 (Iowa), cert. denied sub
nom. Pruessner v. Benton, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985); Faith Baptist, 301 N.W.2d at 579-80;
Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d at 229-31 (N.D. 1982); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 892-99 (N.D.
1980); see also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,245-47 & n.7 (1968) ("[A] substantial
body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at private
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core subjects," and reporting of attendance information9 against
challenges under the federal Constitution. Responsibility for any
state's failure to impose these requirements on religious schools thus
rests entirely with the state's own legislature and administrative
bodies. Moreover, states may condition government financial
assistance to private schools on their compliance with requirements
that the states might not otherwise be constitutionally permitted to
impose. In particular, the Supreme Court has upheld against First
Amendment challenge Title IX's conditioning of federal financial
assistance on compliance with that statute's anti-sex-discrimination
provisions, finding that "Congress is free to attach reasonable and
unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that
educational institutions are not obligated to accept." g
Opponents of state regulation often cite State v. Whisner,93 a
1976 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court regarding state control over
the content of instruction in religious schools." In Whisner, the
court struck down state law provisions mandating instructional time
"almost to the minute" for various core subjects, requiring that all
activities of religious schools conform to policies adopted by the local
board of education, and directing religious schools to "cooperate with
elements of the community in which it exists." 95 The court found
these provisions "so pervasive and all-encompassing that total
schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which ...
employ teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction."). But
cf. Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877,884
(Ky. 1979) (striking down state law requiring that private school teachers be certified, as
violative of Kentucky's state constitution), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980).
90. E.g., Faith Baptist, 301 N.W.2d at 579-80; Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 892-99 (N.D. 1980);
see also Allen, 392 U.S. at 245-46 (endorsing power of states to require that instruction not
in public schools "be at institutions which provide minimum hours of instruction, employ
teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction").
91. E.g., Fellowship Baptist, 815 F.2d at 490-92; State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254,
266 (Vt. 1990).
92. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984); cf. Kline Capps & Carl H.
Esbeck, The Use of Government Funding and Taxing Power to Regulate Religious Schools,
14 J.L. & EDUC. 553, 573 (1985) (arguing that scope of Congress's ability to include in
federal education law, as conditions for receipt of federal aid, requirements that would
otherwise be unconstitutional is uncertain, but noting that those Justices of the Supreme
Court most likely to uphold such conditions would be the more conservative members of
the Court, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist and then Justice White).
93. 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976).
94. Opponents of state regulation have cited Whisner in People v. Bennett, 501
N.W.2d 106, 125 (Mich. 1993) (Boyle, J., dissenting); Faith Baptist, 301 N.W.2d at 578-79;
and City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362 (Wash. 1982).
95. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 765-67.
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compliance with each and every standard by a non-public school
would effectively eradicate the distinction between public and non-
public education" 96 by causing "the absolute suffocation of indepen-
dent thought and educational policy" in non-public schools.97 Such
extreme public control over religious schools, the court indicated,
would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters98 that parents have a right to educate their children
outside the public school system.99
However, much stronger authority supports state regulation of
religious schools, even when not simply a condition for receipt of aid,
at least where the regulation is tied to an important interest of the
children in these schools and would not entirely eradicate the distinc-
tively religious nature of the schools. In addition to the lower court
decisions cited above upholding particular state regulations,"° the
Supreme Court has since 1923 repeatedly affirmed the general
authority of states to impose "reasonable regulations" on private
schools, including religious schools.'0 ' In Pierce, for example, the
Court specially noted that "[n]o question is raised concerning the
96. Ik at 768.
97. Id. at 770.
98. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
99. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 770-71; see also Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106,
130 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (indicating that if state law required "the teaching of secular matters
that are inconsistent" with the religious beliefs of home schooling parents, "a serious
burden on rights protected by the free exercise clause might be found"), appeal dismissed,
866 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1989).
100. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
101. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) ("The Court has repeatedly
stressed that ... [parents] have no constitutional right to provide their children with
private school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation."); Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,461 (1973) (emphasizing "the limited scope of Pierce"); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972); id. at 239 (White, J., concurring) (stating that the
Court's precedents provide "no support to the contention that parents may replace state
educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child
needs to be a productive and happy member of society"); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 246-47 (1968) (dictum) (stating that refusing to permit home schooling is
consistent with Pierce, given state's interest in ensuring quality of nonpublic education);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400
(1923); see also Fleischfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir.
1994) (rejecting parental free exercise challenge to materials included in state-prescribed
reading program of public school alleged to be inconsistent with parents' religious beliefs);
Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[I]t is 'settled beyond dispute,
as a legal matter, that the state has a compelling interest in ensuring that all its citizens are
being adequately educated.' ") (quoting trial court); Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d
1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979) ("There is a compelling state interest in the choice and
adherence to a suitable curriculum for the benefit of our young citizens and society.").
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power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect,
supervise, and examine them, their teachers and pupils."'" Similar-
ly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"°3 the Court emphasized that "[t]here is
no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for
education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the
control and duration of basic education."'1 4
The Supreme Court might, therefore, uphold quite extensive state
regulations of religious and other private schools, if a state can
demonstrate the importance of its regulations for children's develop-
ment and well-being0 5 and the unavailability of less restrictive
means for achieving its goals. 06 Even were the Court to agree with
Whisner that religious schools must be able to retain a distinctive
character, it could quite reasonably conclude that this would be
possible even if religious schools were subject to all of the statutory
102. 268 U.S. at 534.
103. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
104. ld. at 213.
105. Significantly, in Whisner "[t]he state did not ... attempt to justify its interest in
enforcing the 'minimum standards' as applied to a non-public religious school." 351
N.E.2d at 771. In post-divorce custody disputes, lower courts have been willing to curtail
the religious practice of parents, even within the parents' own homes, when "particular
religious practices or beliefs pose a threat of or result in actual physical or mental injury
to the child." Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1239 (Alaska 1979). For example, in
LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1990), Nebraska's highest court upheld a lower
court order directing a non-custodial Jehovah's Witness parent to refrain from exposing
his child to his religious practices during visitation, because doing so caused the child to
suffer extreme stress. Id. at 4-6. The court stated:
Courts have a duty to consider whether religious beliefs threaten the health and
well-being of a child.... Thus, when a court finds that particular religious
practices pose an immediate and substantial threat to a child's temporal well-
being, a court may fashion an order aimed at protecting the child from that
threat.
Id. at 5; see also Bonjour, 592 P.2d at 1239 ("[W]e think it constitutionally permissible for
a court to take account of the actual religious needs of a child in awarding custody to one
parent or another."); cf. Hanson v. Hanson, 404 N.W.2d 460, 463 (N.D. 1987) ("[M]ost
courts ... have refused to restrain a noncustodial parent during visitation periods from
exposing the minor child to his or her religious beliefs and practices, absent a clear,
affirmative showing that these religious activities will be harmful to the child."). Curtailing
the harmful practices of schools is much less intrusive in family life than imposing
restrictions on parents in their interactions with their children, so courts should be even
more willing to do the former.
106. The strict scrutiny test under which courts analyze restrictions on parents' freedom
to control the education of their children in accordance with their religious beliefs requires
that state regulations be the least restrictive means for serving a compelling state interest
in children's education. See North Valley Baptist Church v. McMahon, 696 F. Supp 518,
524 (E.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, 893 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937 (1990);
Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 128-30 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
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regulations that states currently impose on public schools."W
Arguably, then, the federal government and the states are not
constitutionally foreclosed from extending many more of their school
regulations, including those regarding sex discrimination, to cover
sectarian private schools. At a minimum, they should be able to
condition receipt of any financial aid on compliance with all important
regulations presently applicable to public schools. If this is the case,
then the legislatures bear full responsibility for failing to do so.
It is also worth noting that if courts did strike down on free exer-
cise grounds legislative efforts to extend regulations now applicable
only to public and non-sectarian private schools to cover religious
schools as well, this judicial action would itself constitute an invidious
discrimination between groups of children based on the religious
beliefs of their parents. The prevailing jurisprudence regarding
parents' constitutional rights does in fact discriminate in this way;
doctrinally the state bears a greater burden of justification when its
regulations conflict with parents' religious beliefs than when its regula-
tions conflict solely with parents' non-religious preferences regarding
their children's upbringing."° To the extent that this doctrine
107. Restrictions on religious instruction and ceremonies in public schools generally
arise out of federal court decisions interpreting the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, and out of state constitutional provisions in some jurisdictions, rather than
out of state statutes. One lower state court in Iowa has held that a statutory requirement
that schools use a "multi-cultural non-sexist approach" to instruction could not
constitutionally be applied to a religious school whose religious tenets conflicted with such
an approach. The state did not appeal this ruling. See Johnson v. Charles City Com-
munity Sch. Bd., 368 N.W.2d 74, 82 n.2 (Iowa 1985).
108. Specifically, laws infringing upon parental free exercise rights under the First
Amendment are subject to strict scrutiny, requiring the state to demonstrate that its law
is the least restrictive means to serving a compelling state interest, while laws infringing
only upon parents' more generalized substantive due process right under the Fourteenth
Amendment have generally been subject only to rational basis review, requiring a parent
challenging a law to show that it is not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,214-15,233 (1972); People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106,
111-15 (Mich. 1993) (discussing recent cases). But cf. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d at 123-24 n.10
(Boyle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (parents' right to the custody and
control of their children under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause appears
increasingly to be treated as a fundamental right triggering what is in effect, if not in name,
strict scrutiny); Francis B. McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of
Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REv. 975, 985-92 (1988) (advancing the same argument).
One recent and stark example of the judiciary's disparate treatment of children based
on their parents' religious beliefs is a pair of decisions by the Supreme Court of Michigan
concerning the constitutionality of the State's teacher certification requirement for home
schools. The Court held in companion cases that the requirement violated the free
exercise right of parents who object to the requirement on religious grounds, but did not
violate the due process right of parents who object to the certification requirement for
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causes some children not to receive legislative protections that other
children receive, just because of their parents' religious beliefs, it too
constitutes discriminatory state action susceptible to equal protection
challenge."°
In addition to leaving religious schools virtually unregulated,
nearly all states allow parents to "home school" their children instead
of sending them to a public or private school,"' even though courts
have consistently held that parents, other than the Amish and similar
groups, have no constitutional right to home school."' Ap-
proximately one million children in this country are in home schools,
and the most common reason parents have for choosing this option
is religious opposition to the content and manner of instruction in
public schools."' Home schools are also almost entirely unregula-
ted-again, even though most court decisions indicate that states are
constitutionally free to regulate them to a substantial degree."'
non-religious reasons. See Bennett, 501 N.W.2d at 117; People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W,2d
127, 129 (Mich. 1993).
109. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948) (holding that judicial decisions
constitute state action susceptible to equal protection challenge).
110. Donald D. Dorman, Note, Michigan's Teacher Certification Requirement as Applied
to Religiously Motivated Home Schools, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 733, 746 (1990); see,
e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (4) (West 1993); N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3204.1 (McKinney
1995).
111. E.g., Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 496-98 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that so-called "Amish exception" to Iowa's compulsory school attendance law did
not apply to fundamentalist Christians); Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96, 97-99 (4th
Cir. 1983) (rejecting Pentecostal parents' claim that compulsory school attendance laws
violated their right to free exercise of religion), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984); Hanson
v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109 (1980); see also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,246-
47 (1968) (stating in dictum that refusing to permit home schooling is consistent with
Pierce, given state's interest in ensuring quality of nonpublic education).
112. Researchers have estimated the number of American children in home schools to
be as high as one million. See JOHN W. WHITEHEAD, HOME EDUCATION: RIGHTS AND
REASONS 127 (1993). The primary motivation of parents who resort to home schooling for
their children, moreover, appears to be a religious one. Id. at 131.
113. See, e.g., Clonlara, Inc. v. Runkel, 722 F. Supp. 1442, 1454, 1458-60 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (upholding teacher certification requirement for home schools); Blackwelder v.
Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 112, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding statute requiring
instruction in home schools to be "substantially equivalent" to that in public schools and
to be given by "competent" instructors); Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109, 114-15
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (upholding requirement for teacher certification for home instruction);
Jernigan v. State, 412 So. 2d 1242, 1246-47 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (teacher certification);
In re Sawyer, 672 P.2d 1093, 1097-98 (Kan. 1983) (upholding state regulations dictating
minimum hours of instruction and teacher qualifications for home schools); Bennett, 501
N.W.2d at 115-17 (same); In re Kilroy, 467 N.Y.S.2d 318, 321 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983)
(upholding requirement that home schools submit to periodic home visits by state
education officials).
[Vol. 741350
CHILDREN OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS
For example, not a single state today requires that children whose
parents choose to home-school them receive instruction from a state-
certified teacher if the parents assert a religious objection to such a
requirement."' Montana's regulation of home schools is typical. It
requires merely that parents operating a home school notify the
county school superintendent that they are home-schooling their child,
maintain records of their child's attendance and immunization, give
at least 180 days of instruction each year, teach the same basic
subjects taught in the public schools, and operate the school in a
building that complies with local health and safety regulations."5 A
number of other states require essentially nothing more than that
home-schooled students annually take a standardized achievement
test,"6 and do not even require that students achieve any particular
score on these tests in order to continue being home-schooled."
114. Over 20 states repealed their teacher certification requirements for home schools
between 1982 and 1992. Devins, supra note 9, at 819. The Supreme Court of Michigan
struck down that state's teacher certification requirement as applied to religious home
schools in 1993. See People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Mich. 1993) (holding
teacher certification requirement for home schools invalid as applied to parents with
religious objection to using certified teachers). Several states now require that home-
schooled children receive instruction from a person possessing a certain level of education,
but this is most often simply a high school diploma or General Equivalency Degree. E.g.,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1701 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2.1.C (Michie 1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-06 (1993 & Supp. 1995). At least three states require that children
whose parents choose to home school them for non-religious reasons must receive
instruction from a state-certified teacher. See ALA. CODE § 16-28-1 (1995); NEB. REV.
STAT. 79-1701(2) (1994); Bennett, 501 N.W.2d at 117 (upholding teacher certification
requirement against challenge by parents with non-religious objections). These three states
thus clearly discriminate between groups of children based upon the religious beliefs of
their parents.
115. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 20-5-109 (1995); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West
1993 & Supp. 1995) (requiring teaching of certain subjects and periodic assessment of
home-schooled children by a standard, national norm-referenced achievement test); id. §
120.102 (requiring submission of an annual report to the school district superintendent).
New York State law requires that instruction in a home school be "substantially
equivalent" to instruction in public schools and be provided by "competent" instructors,
and that home school instructors maintain attendance records. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§
3204(2), 3211 (McKinney 1995). It leaves largely to local school boards the judgment
whether particular home school programs satisfy this equivalency requirement. See
Blackwelder, 689 F. Supp. at 124, 127.
116. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:236.1(10) (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 120.101.8 (West 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. 115C-564 (1994).
117. See Devins, supra note 9, at 827 (discussing North Carolina regulation of home
schools) ("The law does not require a showing of any particular level of proficiency on the
standardized achievement test; it requires no showing of competency on the part of the
teacher to teach; it requires no health or safety inspections; and there are no curriculum
or minimum attendance requirements, except to operate on a 'regular schedule' during at
least nine calendar months.").
1996] 1351
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In Tennessee, an elementary level home school that is "associated
with" and "supervised by" any organization that conducts church-
related schools need not comply with any regulations whatsoever,11
while "Mississippi has appeared to have abdicated any regulation over
home and private schools."" 9
Most states also exempt from certain types of instruction in
public schools, such as sex education, students whose parents have
religious objections to that instruction."2  California's Education
Code provides a general exemption: "Whenever any part of the
instruction in health, family life education, and sex education conflicts
with the religious training and beliefs of the parent or guardian of any
pupil, the pupil, on written request of the parent or guardian, shall be
excused from the part of the training which conflicts with such reli-
gious training and beliefs."'' Even some children attending public
school, therefore, may fail to receive formal instruction regarding
contraception, prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, parenting
responsibilities and skills, and gender equality solely because of their
parents' religious beliefs.' "
118. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3050(a)(2)(A) (1990 & Supp. 1995). Such a home school
at the secondary level must provide instruction by someone with a high school diploma or
G.E.D., register the student or students with the local education agency, and administer
a standardized achievement test. Id. § 49-6-3050(a)(2)(B), (C). Home schools not so
associated must comply with the sort of minimal regulations imposed in most other states.
Id. § 49-6-3050(b) (mandating notice to local superintendent, records of attendance and
instruction, minimum length of school day and school year, administration of standardized
tests, required subject areas, and minimum level of education for instructor).
119. People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 141 n.50 (Mich. 1993) (citing Miss. CODE §
37-13-91(10)) (emphasis added).
120. E.g., ALA. CODE § 16-41-6 (1995) (exemption from instruction regarding "disease,
its symptoms, development and treatment"); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 51201.5(c), 51550, and
51820 (West 1987-88 & Supp. 1996) (granting parents right to request for any reason that
child not attend class discussing prevention of AIDS or venereal disease, or "any class in
which human reproductive organs and their functions and processes are described,
illustrated or discussed"); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, paras. 5/27-9.1 (West 1993) (sex
education), 9.2 (instruction in AIDS prevention); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-10.1-4-8 (Burns
1991 & Supp. 1995) (hygiene); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.41506-07 (Callaghan Supp. 1995-96)
(sex education); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204(5) (McKinney 1995) (health and hygiene).
121. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51240 (West 1987-88). This provision includes "personal
moral convictions" within the meaning of "religious training and beliefs." Id.
122. The limits of parents' constitutional rights are unclear in this area as well.
Compare Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270, 277 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (preventing state from
compelling student in public school to attend coed physical education class) with Roman
v. Appleby, 558 F. Supp. 449,456 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("[P]arental requests that their children
be exempted from a part of the general public school programs have been frequently
denied.") and Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 401, 405 (D. N.H. 1974) (stating that
parents may not withdraw their children from health education or music classes, nor from
any instructional period simply because audio-visual equipment is used).
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Finally, in addition to regulations explicitly addressing education,
many states include in their abuse and neglect laws provisions
prohibiting serious mental and emotional harm to children,"z' and
courts have occasionally terminated a parent's custody rights based in
whole or part on a showing of emotional harm. 24 As discussed
above, sexist socialization of girls at home and in school can result in
mental and emotional harm to them that lasts throughout their
lives.' Yet, as one might guess, no one has ever brought a claim
under the abuse laws against the sexist practices of any religious
school.
In fact, public discussion about the sexist treatment of children
in some minority religious communities is nearly nonexistent in this
country, even among feminist scholars and political leaders, while
gender inequality and gender bias in adult workplaces and in public
schools and mainstream universities is one of the most discussed
topics of our time. This probably reflects in part the discomfort that
many people feel with challenging the child-rearing practices of other
adults, particularly when the other adults are motivated by sincere
religious beliefs and belong to a minority religious community that
just wants to be left alone. But it is also no doubt partly a reflection
of widespread self-centeredness and indifference to the plight of
"other people's children." The children who do not receive the
protection of school regulations are particularly easy to ignore,
because their parents intentionally isolate them from the "corrupting"
influence of the rest of society. We in the mainstream at best forget,
and at worst simply abandon, these children.
B. Medical Care Requirements
All states in this country impose on parents both a general
responsibility to secure appropriate medical care for their children and
more specific obligations to secure particular types of care. The
general responsibility arises from child neglect laws that set forth
conditions for removal of children from their home and/or for
termination or restriction of parental rights. These laws include in
123. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-81(b)(4)(A)(IV), (B)(iv-v) (1994). The federal Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 also includes mental injury in its definition
of child abuse. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
124. E.g., In re M.C.A.B., 427 S.E.2d 824 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); In re E.P.N., 388 S.E.2d
903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
125. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
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their definition of neglect a failure to provide adequate medical
care." In forty-six states, however, the neglect laws carve out an
exemption for parents who choose not to seek medical care for their
children because such care conflicts with the parents' religious beliefs,
and who instead provide "spiritual treatment" or "faith healing" to
their children. 27 States also carve out spiritual treatment exemp-
tions from some criminal laws that prohibit harm to children, such as
child-endangerment or manslaughter statutes.'18 These religious
exemptions eliminate an important incentive for parents to secure
treatment for their children despite religious misgivings.
126. The United States Department of Health and Human Services requires states to
implement a program for reporting and prevention of child neglect as a condition for
receiving federal funding for child protection programs, and includes failure to provide
medical care in its definition of neglect. See Rosato, supra note 1, at 59-61 (discussing 45
C.F.R. § 1340.2).
127. For an overview of and citation to spiritual treatment exemptions in state child
welfare laws, see Rosato, supra note 1, at 51-59. A large number of states first created
such exemptions in response to a federal directive that they do so. Eric W. Treene, Note,
Prayer-Treatment Exemptions to Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes, Manslaughter
Prosecutions, and Due Process of Law, 30 HARv. 3. ON LEGIS. 135, 141 (1993). That
directive no longer exists, id.; present federal regulations expressly state that the federal
requirement that states develop reporting and prevention programs should not be read as
requiring or prohibiting a spiritual treatment exemption. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(2)(ii)
(1994). The statutes on their face are actually meaningless, typically stating that a child
who is under treatment solely by spiritual means shall not for that reason alone be
considered neglected. If courts interpreted this provision as allowing a finding of neglect
whenever there were any other reason for doing so, such as the possibility of any harm
from the failure to secure medical care, they would have to order treatment in all and only
those cases where they would do so even if there were no parental religious opposition to
medical care. As discussed below, however, courts have instead interpreted this provision
as allowing them to find neglect and order treatment only where a child is at substantial
risk of death or grievous harm. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. See also
Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 580 (Colo. 1991) (en -banc) (noting that interpreting
spiritual treatment exemption to apply only when there is no other reason to deem a
child's health at risk-that is, when the child is not at all sick or injured-would eviscerate
the exemption).
The religious sects most well-known for opposing conventional medical care are
Christian Scientists, who oppose all medical care, and Jehovah's Witnesses, who object
primarily to blood transfusions, but numerous other sects also oppose all or certain types
of medical treatment. See Lybarger, 807 P.2d at 572 (en banc) (involving the Word of
Faith Evangelistic Association); In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425,427 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)
(involving The Church of God of the Union Assembly, Incorporated, which forbids its
members "to use medicine, vaccinations or shots of any kind, and teaches them instead to
live by faith"); Henry J. Abraham, Abraham, Isaac, and the State: Faith Healing and Legal
Intervention, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 951, 964-67 (1993); Rosato, supra note 1, at 44 n.2, 45
n.3.
128. See Rosato, supra note 1, at 53-54.
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Perhaps more important than neglect and criminal laws for the
physical health of children, though, is the courts' ability to intervene
and order medical care for a child when parents do not seek or
consent to such care themselves. States generally require medical and
educational professionals to report instances of suspected neglect to
state authorities.29 However, most reporting statutes also contain
exceptions for spiritual treatment, 30 thereby reducing the likelihood
that a child in urgent need of medical care will come to the attention
of state officials before dying if her parents have certain religious
beliefs about illness. In recent decades, many children have died
when their parents, out of religious conviction, deprived them of
medical care or other necessities. 3'
When children whose parents fail, for religious reasons, to secure
or consent to necessary medical care for them do come to the
attention of state officials, courts have some authority to order
medical treatment over the parents' objections. 32 A substantial
amount of litigation and commentary has surrounded the question of
when a court order is appropriate.'33 Courts have uniformly found
it appropriate to order medical treatment for a child, over parents'
objection that doing so violates their First Amendment right to the
free exercise of religion, when treatment is necessary to prevent the
child from dying." 4 Most courts have held that intervention is also
129. See id. at 52 (noting that reporting statutes impose criminal penalties for failure
to report incidents of suspected neglect and abuse). Federal regulations require recipients
of grants under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act to "provide by statute that
specified persons must report and.., that all other persons are permitted to report known
and suspected instances of child abuse and neglect to a child protective agency." 45 C.F.R.
§ 1340.14(c) (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring
states to provide for "the reporting of known and suspected incidents of child abuse and
neglect" in order for them to qualify for grants).
130. See Rosato, supra note 1, at 52 n.43, 53 n.46. Federal regulations appear to
authorize such an exception to reporting mandates for recipients of grants under the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1340.2(d)(2)(ii), 1340.14(c) (1995).
131. See Rosato, supra note 1, at 62-63.
132. Statutes in 11 states specifically authorize courts to intervene in circumstances that
involve spiritual treatment. See id. at 63 n.101. In other states, courts act on the basis of
their general authority to enter appropriate orders to protect children from harm. Federal
regulations require that recipients of grants under the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act that have a spiritual treatment exemption to their neglect laws permit "the
administrative or judicial authority of the State to ensure that medical services are
provided to the child when his health requires it," 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(2)(ii) (1994), and
provide emergency services to protect any child in need of immediate medical attention.
45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(f) (1994).
133. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 1396-1403.
134. Id. at 1399.
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appropriate when necessary to prevent "grievous harm" to a child,'35
which one state court defined as "a significant impairment of vital
physical or mental functions, protracted disability, permanent
disfigurement, or similar defects or infirmities.' 3 6
A few courts, however, have held that no injury short of death
suffices to override the religious objection of parents.'37 Moreover,
no court has ordered treatment to prevent harm to a child that is less
than "grievous" when parents objected on religious grounds, and
some have indicated that they would not do so. 38  Thus, state
legislatures and state and federal courts allow certain parents, those
with particular religious beliefs, to do something that parents
generally are prohibited from doing-to deny their children medical
care necessary to prevent significant harm. In a few cases, parents
have been deemed entitled to do this even when the harm to their
children would be grievous.'39
The most common specific statutory requirement for parents
regarding their children's health is the requirement that parents have
their children vaccinated against certain diseases-typically, diph-
theria, tetanus, hepatitis, pertussis (whooping cough), rubella, mumps,
measles, polio, and haemophilus influenza type b.' All states
require vaccination against all or most of these diseases as a pre-
135. Id. at 1399-1401. At least one state statute specifies that a court order is
appropriate only in "a life threatening situation or when the condition will result in serious
handicap or disability." COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-103 (Supp. 1995).
136. Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 578 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
137. E.g., People in the Interest of D.L.E., 614 P.2d 873, 873-75 (Colo. 1980) (holding
that 12 year-old child with epilepsy cannot be adjudicated neglected, despite refusal of
mother and child to comply with program of medical treatment, because child's life not
in imminent danger); In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972) (refusing to order spinal
operation to overcome paralysis of boy whose mother objected on religious grounds to the
necessary blood transfusion); see also In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1120 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989) (reaffirming Green while ordering blood transfusion where six year-old at risk of
dying from sickle-cell anemia). The federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
of 1974 treats as neglect only the withholding of medical treatment when a child would die
without it. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
138. E.g., Lybarger, 807 P.2d at 578 (en banc) (indicating that parents have no respon-
sibility to seek medical care for a child who is "ill or injured" unless the child's condition
meets this standard of seriousness).
139. See cases cited supra note 137.
140. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-702 (Michie 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 3380 (1995), superseded by § 126505 (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-204a (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.032(1) (West 1988 & Supp.
1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-7-9.5(a) (Bums 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 139.9(1) (West
1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-C:20-a(I) (1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164.2
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-152(a) (1995); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 49-6-5001(b) (1990).
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condition for a child attending any school, public or private.' 4'
These laws reflect a legislative judgment that vaccinations are
necessary to prevent serious harm to children. 42 Many of these
141. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.125 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-872.B (1990);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-902 (1989 & Supp. 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-502 (1993); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 232.032(3) (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-771(b) (1993); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 298-42 (1991); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-1118(1) (1993) (day care); id. § 39-4801
(preschool - grade 12); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, para. 5t27-8.1(5) (West Supp.
1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-7-10.1(c) (Burns 1992 & Supp. 1995); IoWA CODE ANN.
§ 139.9(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5209(a) (1992); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 158.035 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:170.A
(West 1992 & Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6355 (West 1992); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § 15 (Law. Co-op. 1991); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(9208) (Callaghan
1995); id. § 15.41177(1) (Callaghan 1995 & Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 123.70 (West
1993 & Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-37 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 167.181(2),
210.003(1) (Vernon 1991 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 20-5-403(1) (1995); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 79-444.01 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.435(1) (Michie 1991
& Supp. 1995); id. § 394.192.1, 439.550 (Michie 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-C:20-
a(II) (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-2 (Michie 1994); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 914.1
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(7) (McKinney 1995 &
Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-155(a) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07-17.1(1)
(1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.671(A) (Baldwin 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 1210.191(a) (West 1989); OR. REv. STAT. § 433.267(1) (1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 13-1303a(a) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-38-2 (1988 & Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. §
44-29-180(A) (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5001(a) (1990);
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 2.09(a) (West 1995), superseded by § 38.001 (West Special
Pamphlet 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-301(1), 302(1) (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 1121 (1982 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-271.2(A), 271.4 (Michie 1993); W.
VA. CODE § 16-3-4 (1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 252.04(2) (West Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT.
§ 21-4-309(a) (1992).
Many states' vaccination laws also make failure to have one's child immunized a
criminal offense, typically a misdemeanor punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. E.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-702(e) (Michie 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-771(h) (1992); MD.
CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-301(e)(1) (1992 & Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 16-3-4 (1995).
Georgia and Mississippi also punish some children-those receiving AFDC benefits-when
their parents fail to get them vaccinated without a legitimate excuse, by denying benefits
to such parents. GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-102.1(a)(2) (1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-49-8(4)
(Supp. 1995).
142. For explicit statutory recitations of legislative intent, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 3381.5(a), superseded by § 120430 (West Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-527
(Supp. 1994); see also 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 1094, § 1 (stating that immunization is "one of
the truly great medical advances of this generation" and that it has proved safe); 1966 N.Y.
Laws, ch. 994, § 1 (same); Mandatory Immunization of Students and Religious Exemption,
44 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 7, at 6 (Mont. Feb. 27, 1991); Kleid v. Bd. of Educ., 406 F. Supp.
902, 904-05 (W.D. Ky. 1976) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to religious
exemption and noting that the legislative purpose behind a vaccination requirement was
"to protect the health of school age children" from "certain dreadful diseases"); In re
Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) ("The Legislature has already
made a determination that inoculation of school age children against, inter alia, measles
constitutes sound and necessary medical care.").
1358 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
diseases can cause serious permanent damage and even death,
particularly in very young children," and vaccines against them
have proven largely safe and effective."4  Outbreaks of many of
This legislative judgment has its detractors. See, e.g., NEIL Z. MILLER, VACCINES:
ARE THEY REALLY SAFE AND EFFECTIVE? 69-70 (1994) (arguing against giving children
any of the commonly mandated vaccines). Arguments against vaccines are strongest with
respect to those that are not very effective or safe and those aimed at diseases for which
herd immunity has been achieved (i.e., more or less complete eradication of the virus
within a population as a result of widespread immunity). The polio virus, for example, has
been entirely eliminated from this country (outside of laboratories) and almost all other
countries of the world, and the oral polio vaccine has itself caused a small number of
children to contract polio and a larger number of children to feel quite ill for a period of
time. 1995 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 91-92 [hereinafter ALMANAC]; RONALD W.
ELLIS, VACCINES: NEW APPROACHES TO IMMUNOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 208, 211 (1992).
However, outbreaks of the other diseases for which vaccines are commonly mandated
continue to occur, see infra note 145, and non-immunized children are therefore at risk of
contracting the disease.
143. Thirty percent of persons who contract tetanus die from respiratory failure as a
result. ALMANAC, supra note 142, at 91. Pertussis, also known as whooping cough, "is life-
threatening, especially in children under 1 year. It's caused by a bacterium that clogs the
airways with mucus, causing a severe cough that sounds like a 'whoop.' The coughing can
last two months, inviting other infections such as pneumonia or bronchitis." Id.; see also
ELLIS, supra note 142, at 24 (noting that complications from pertussis include pneumonia,
apnea, seizures, encephalopathy, and death, and that a recent study showed that 0.5% of
reported cases of pertussis in children under six months of age were fatal). Before a
vaccine for Hib became available in 1987, 0.5% of all children contracted the disease
before the age of five, 12,000 children developed meningitis from the disease each year,
3,000 a year suffered brain damage, and 600 died each year. ALMANAC, supra note 142,
at 91. With regard to measles, a New York court addressing vaccination laws found:
Most children who contract measles merely suffer high fever, cough, red eyes,
runny nose and skin rash. However, some develop pneumonia, a complication
of measles which can cause permanent lung damage, chronic and recurring
infection or death. Another serious complication of measles infection is
encephalitis, an inflammation of the brain. Approximately fifteen percent of
patients with measles related encephalitis die and another twenty-five to thirty-
five have permanent neurological damage. Measles infected children may also
develop subacute sclerosing panencephalitis (SSPE) which causes irreversible
neurological damage, mental retardation and seizures, and from which there is
little chance of recovery.
In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
144. For example, the court in Christine M. found that "the measles vaccines currently
in use are safe and effective. The measles vaccine causes mild side effects, such as low
grade fever and malaise, and is not life-threatening." 595 N.Y.S.2d at 608-09. Ninety-five
percent of those who receive the vaccine are fully immune for the rest of their lives, and
the other five percent receive some immunity, rendering infection less severe if they do
contract measles. Id. at 609. The Hepatitis B vaccine has been very effective in this
country. ELLIS, supra note 142, at 187-88. The Hib vaccine causes very minor side effects,
"consisting mostly of low-grade fever and soreness at the site of the shot." ALMANAC,
supra note 142, at 91. The pertussis vaccine, however, "causes more adverse reactions than
any other vaccine. Most common are fever, soreness at the site of the shot, and irritability.
In rare cases, the vaccine causes very high fever and convulsions." Id. But cf. ELLIS,
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these diseases continue to occur,'45 and non-immunized children are
naturally more likely to contract them.
Nevertheless, nearly all states exempt from their compulsoryimmunization laws parents who have religious objections to vaccina-
tion. 46' These states thereby deny to a certain group of
supra note 142, at 26 (noting that although the whole cell pertussis vaccine is less effective
and has more negative side effects than other commonly used vaccines, "risk-benefit
evaluations indicate a net benefit" from its use).
145. See, e.g., Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d at 608 (noting outbreak of measles in New
York City from late 1989 to mid-1991, in which 5,600 reported cases and 19 reported
deaths occurred); Maricopa County Health Dep't v. Harmon, 750 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1987) (affirming order excluding unvaccinated children from school during
outbreak in 1986 in which at least 63 children contracted measles); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-
527(6) (Supp. 1994) (noting that cases of pertussis and cases of mumps exceed 1,000 each
year in this country). Outbreaks of pertussis occurred in Alameda County, California in
the fall of 1994 and in 1989. Memorandum from Kathleen Jacobsen, Alameda County
Public Health Advisor, to John Dunajski, Alameda County Senior Public Health Advisor
(Jan. 13, 1995) (available from State of California Dep't of Health Services Immunization
Branch). In Texas, there were 121 reported cases of pertussis, 51 reported cases of H-flu
infection, and 231 reported cases of mumps among public school children in 1993. TEXAS
DEP'T OF PUBLIC HEALTH, TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL IMMUNIZATION REPORT FOR 1993-94,
at 1 (May 1994) [hereinafter TEXAS REPORT]. In 1993, seven reported cases of tetanus
also occurred among children attending public schools in Texas. Id.
146. E.g., ALA. CODE § 16-30-3(1) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-702(f) (Michie
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-903(2)(b) (1989 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 131(a)(6) (1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-506(1) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.032(4)(a)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-771(e) (1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 298-
44(2) (1991); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-1118(2) (day care), 39-4802(2) (preschool - grade 12)
(1994); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, para. 5/27-8.1(8) (West 1993 & $upp. 1995); id. ch
410, para. 235/6 (West 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-7-2(a) (Bums Supp. 1995); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 139.9(4)(b) (West 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.036 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 46.1409(H) (West Supp. 1996) (child care facilities);
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-402(b)(1) (1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § 15 (Law. Co-op.
1991); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.41177(1)(b) (Callaghan 1995 & Supp. 1995-96); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 123.70 subd. 3(d) (West 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 167.181(3), 210.003(2)(b)
(Vernon 1991 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 20-5-405(1) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 392.435(1), 394.192(1) (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-
C:20-c (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:5B-5(c) (West Supp. 1995) (children in day care); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164.9 (McKinney 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-157 (1995); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-07-17.1(3) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.671(A)(3) (Baldwin
1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1303a(d) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-38-2 (1988 &
Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5001(b) (1990); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §
2.09(c)(1)(B) (West 1995), superseded by § 38.001 (West Special Pamphlet 1996); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1121 (1982 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-271.4 (Michie
1993); WYO. STAT. § 21-4-309(a) (1992). One typical exemption reads "This section shall
not apply to children Whose parent, parents, or guardian hold genuine and sincere religious
beliefs which are contrary to the practices herein required, and no certificate shall be
required as a prerequisite to such children being admitted or received into school or
attending school." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(9) (McKinney 1993).
Several states allow for exceptions to the vaccination requirement when parents
declare that vaccination conflicts with the religion or religious beliefs of their child. See
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children-those born to parents having particular religious
beliefs-the important protection the vaccination laws were intended
to afford children. Tens of thousands of children in this country go
unimmunized today because their parents have claimed this religious
exemption. 47 Moreover, most states that provide an exemption also
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-204a(a)(3) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); KAN STAT. ANN. §
72-5209(b)(2) (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-444.06 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:1A-9.1
(West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 433.267(1) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-271.2.C(i)
(Michie 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 252.04(3) (West Supp. 1995). Since the children
involved would typically be at most six years of age when parents first claimed the
exemption, and might be as young as two or three (the immunization requirement in
Kansas, for example, applies to some preschools and day care programs), and since the
statutes accept the parents' declaration as conclusive testament to the beliefs of the
children, this reference to the children's religious beliefs is clearly an oblique reference to
the parents' beliefs. Part I.D below addresses the relevance of children's religious beliefs
at some length.
A few states extend the exemption also to parents who object to vaccination for their
children based on personal beliefs other than religious beliefs. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-873.A.1 (1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-903(2)(b) (1989 & Supp 1995); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6355.3 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-302(3)(b)
(1994). In California, roughly half of the parents who claim the exemption do so on the
basis of non-religious beliefs about the efficacy and/or safety of particular vaccines.
Conversation with Tina Kimmel, Research Analyst, State of California Dep't of Health
Services Immunization Branch, Feb. 16, 1995 [hereinafter Conversation with Kimmel].
Louisiana's exemption is the broadest, allowing children to attend school without
vaccination if either a student or a student's parent presents a "written dissent." LA. REV,
STAT. ANN. § 17:170(E) (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
Compulsory vaccination statutes also typically excuse parents whose child has a
physical condition that, in the judgment of a physician, makes vaccination inadvisable for
medical reasons. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-702(f) (Michie 1995); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 25-4-903(2)(a) (Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 131(a)(5) (1993); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 298.44(1) (1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 139.9(4)(a) (West 1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 76, § 15 (Law. Co-op. 1991); MINN STAT. § 123.70. subd. 3(c) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:2N-4 (West 1987); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(8) (McKinney 1995); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-07-17.1(3) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 433.267(1)(b) (1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 13-1303a(c) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-38-2 (1994); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §
2.09(c)(1)(A) (1991), superseded by § 38001 (West Special Pamphlet 1996); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 22.1-271.2.C(ii), -271.4 (Michie 1993).
147. In 1994, the parents of 2,654 kindergarten students in California claimed the
"personal belief" exemption to the state's immunization law. IMMUNIZATION ASSESSMENT
OF CALIFORNIA KINDERGARTEN STUDENTS - 1994: FINAL RESULTS (available from State
of California Department of Health Services Immunization Branch). If this figure for
kindergarten students is representative of every grade level, the total number of children
in grades K through 12 in California schools who have not received vaccinations because
their parents have personal beliefs that oppose vaccination is roughly 34,500. During the
1993-94 school year in Pennsylvania, at least 6,610 students were unimmunized because
their parents claimed the religious exemption. PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL IMMUNIZATION
LAW REPORT. 1993-1994 SCHOOL YEAR (available from Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Dep't of Health - Immunization Program). Among public school students in Texas during
the 1993-94 school year, over 2,000 were unimmunized because their parents claimed the
religious belief exemption. TEXAS REPORT, supra note 145, at 29. If patterns in Texas are
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direct school administrators to exclude unvaccinated' children from
school during outbreaks of any of the diseases for which vaccination
is normally required.'" As a result, religious objectors' children
may not only fail to receive the same immunological protection other
children receive, but may also be denied schooling for periods of time
when other children are receiving it. These states thus permit
parents' religious beliefs to effect a double denial of benefits to
children in certain, not uncommon, circumstances.149
These exemptions exist even though states are not constitutional-
ly required to include a religious exemption in their compulsory
immunization laws. Courts that have addressed the issue have all
held that a law compelling vaccination of all children does not violate
the constitutional rights of any parents or children."' In doing so,
similar to those in other states, the number of children in private schools in Texas whose
parents claimed the religious exemption is at least double this figure, or well over 4,000
children. In Massachusetts, 159 of the children enrolled in kindergarten classes responding
to a state survey for the 1993-94 school year were unimmunized because of their parents
religious objection, suggesting a total of over 2,000 children in grades K through 12.
MASSACHUSEITS DEP'T OF PUBLIC HEALTH IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM-KINDERGARTEN:
RESULTS OF THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF IMMUNIZATION LEVELS, 1993-94 (available from
State Laboratory Institute, Boston, MA).
Of course, a much larger number of children fail to receive immunizations because
their parents are simply negligent or cannot afford the vaccinations, a situation that elicits
expressions of moral outrage in some quarters. See, e.g., Juel Crawford, Federal Action
Improves Immunization for Children, N.Y. ST. CHILD ADVOC. 1, 4 (Fall 1994).
148. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-873.C (1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 3385 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996), superseded by § 120365 (West Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 14, § 131(a)(7) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.032(8) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996);
GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-771(f) (1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:170(F) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 6356(1) (West 1992); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 20-5-
405(3) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.446 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07-17.1(6) (1991);
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-47 (Michie 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 252.04(7) (West Supp. 1995);
WYo. STAT. § 21-4-309(a) (1992). Such exclusion provides some protection from disease
to unvaccinated children, and so has an ameliorative effect with respect to risk of
contracting the disease, though this strategy is certainly not as effective as vaccination.
Exclusion of unvaccinated children may also help to protect those children who have
received an ineffective vaccine, which routinely occurs in a small minority of cases with
respect to most vaccines. Conversation with Kimmel, supra note 146.
149. In California, there is on average one outbreak of disease per year that requires
exclusion of unvaccinated children from school. Conversation with Kimmel, supra note
146. During the measles outbreak that gave rise to the Harmon litigation in Arizona, 158
children had to be excluded from school. Maricopa County Health Dep't v. Harmon, 750
P.2d at 1364, 1366 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
150. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174,176-77 (1922) (holding that city ordinance making
certificate of vaccination a pre-condition for school attendance did not violate due process
or equal protection rights of excluded child); Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union
Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 88-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding religious exemption
limited to members of recognized religious organization violates Establishment Clause);
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these courts have found that protecting children from disease is a
compelling state interest.'' In contrast, when parents have raised
Establishment Clause or Equal Protection challenges to religious
exemptions that do not include them, courts have stated that the
purpose of the exemptions is simply to accord "respect," 152
"deference,"' 153 or "heed" to,"5 or to "minimize imposition" up-
on,155 the parents' religious beliefs, a purpose that the courts have
not treated as a compelling one. Unsurprisingly, no court has found
that a legislative intent to further the interests of children underlies
these exemptions.
Other common specific parental obligations related to children's
health are requirements to ensure that children receive a general
15615physical examination, a vision or hearing test,5 7 and screening
for diseases such as tuberculosis.5 8  Statutes imposing these obliga-
tions, like those requiring vaccinations, typically exempt parents who
Harmon, 750 P.2d at 1370; Wright v. DeWitt Sch. Dist., 385 S.W.2d 644, 646, 648 (Ark.
1965); Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816,818 (Ark. 1964); Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107,111-12
(Md. 1982); Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1980); Mountain Lakes v. Maas,
152 A.2d 394,400-03 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959). These courts have relied on Zucht
and two other Supreme Court decisions: Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170-71
(1944) (upholding a guardian's conviction for allowing her ward to distribute religious
literature in the streets at night), and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-30 (1905)
(rejecting a free exercise challenge to a state law mandating vaccination of all adults during
an outbreak of smallpox). In Prince, the Court stated explicitly that a parent "cannot
claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on
religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose
the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death."
321 U.S. at 166-67.
151. See, e.g., Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 83 ("We affirm that the health regulation in
question is a reasonable exercise of police power on a subject of paramount and
compelling state interest and, therefore, is valid."); Harmon, 750 P.2d at 1369-70; Brown,
378 So. 2d at 222-23.
152. Davis, 451 A.2d at 112.
153. Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F. Supp. 1259, 1265 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
154. Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 83.
155. l at 88.
156. E.g., ALA. CODE § 16-29-1 (1994); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60608 (West 1995)
(providing for rules governing physical fitness test in schools); IND. CODE § 20-8.1-4-18(a)
(1995) (requiring a physical examination for employed children aged 14 to 17).
157. E.g., MICH. CoMw. LAWS ANN. § 333.9307 (West 1995); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 905(1)
(McKinney 1994) (regarding eye and ear tests).
158. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.032(2), (9) (West 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 298-42(b)
(1994); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, para. 5/27-8.1(1) (West Supp. 1995); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 214.034 (Baldwin 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.442 (West 1994); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 200:38 (1993); N.J. REV. STAT. § 18A:40-16 (1995). Children might
also be screened for sickle cell anemia, IND. CODE § 20-8.1-7-11(a) (1994), lead poisoning,
it, or scoliosis, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 905(1) (McKinney 1994).
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have religious objections." 9 As a result, children with a vision or
hearing impairment or other physical disability, or who have contrac-
ted tuberculosis, may not be diagnosed in a timely manner, thereby
suffering avoidable harm because the state has not guaranteed these
children the protection it guarantees to children whose parents do not
have religious objections. Another very provocative example of a
religious exemption related to children's health is that contained in
laws requiring that only certified medical doctors perform circum-
cisions. Many of these laws provide that persons, such as Jewish
mohels, who perform circumcisions in the context of a religious
ceremony need have no medical training."6
De jure discrimination among groups of children based on
parents' religious beliefs occurs in other contexts as well. For
example, foster care and adoption statutes frequently include religious
matching provisions, requiring adoption agencies to place children
with foster care or adoptive parents of the same religion as the
biological parents if the latter so request. These provisions, for the
sake of satisfying the religious preferences of biological parents, create
an obstacle to placement for some children and prevent others from
continuing in a relationship already formed with foster parents who
159. E.g., IND. CODE § 20-8.1-3-19 (1994) ("No child shall be compelled to undergo any
examination or treatment under this chapter when his parents object on religious
grounds."); id. § 20-8.1-4-18(c) (regarding physical exam for employed minors); id. § 20-8.1-
7-2(a); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 214.036 (Baldwin 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
333.9307 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. § 144.442.1(8) (1994); N.J. REv. STAT. § 30:5B-5.c
(1994) (concerning children in day care); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 905(1) (McKinney 1994)
(discussing scoliosis test for children). Alabama's requirement of a physical exam applies
only to children attending a public school. ALA. CODE § 16-29-1 (1994).
160. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1703(e)(4) (1995); MINN. STAT. § 147.09(10)
(1995); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 37-3-103(h) (1993); Wis. STAT. § 448.03(g) (1995). Recently
two states enacted another type of law relating to circumcision that raises a different sort
of equal protection problem. This legislation outlaws circumcision of females, but not
circumcision of males. MINN. STAT. §§ 144.3872, 609.2245 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-36-01 (1995). Yet the reasons some cultural groups practice female circum-
cision-tradition, making offspring look like their parents, hygiene, control of
sexuality-are the same reasons historically why the United States (alone now among
Western nations) practices routine circumcision of males, and are equally invalid in the two
cases. See William E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and
Constitutional Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337, 339-41 (1984-85); Marilyn Fayre Milos & Donna
Macris, Circumcision: A Medical or a Human Rights Issue?, 37 J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY 87S,
88S, 90S-94S (1992). Moreover, the reasons Americans have for condemning female
circumcision-it inflicts excruciating pain, violates bodily integrity, and destroys healthy
protective and functional tissue-apply also to male circumcision. See Brigman, supra, at
340-41; Milos & Macris, supra, at 88S-94S; J.R. Taylor et al., The Prepuce: Specialized
Mucosa of the Penis and Its Loss to Circumcision, 77 BRIT. J. UROLOGY 291,291, 294-95
(1996).
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want to adopt them, because the latter are not of the right faith. 61
Moreover, in addition to these examples of dejure discrimination, one
could identify numerous instances of de facto discrimination against
certain groups of children, instances in which states self-consciously
fail to enforce child welfare laws with respect to children of certain
religious groups. One notable but rarely discussed example is states'
failure to investigate and enforce legal restrictions on the child-rearing
practices of reclusive religious cults. 62
The discussion below focuses on religious exemptions to
education and medical care laws. The invidious discrimination among
groups of children that these exemptions represent is clear on the face
of the statutes, yet is less likely than other forms of disparate
treatment to be recognized as such and to face challenge. These
exemptions cause harm to children who have neither the state nor any
set of caretakers advocating for their temporal interests, in contrast
to, for example, religious preference provisions in adoption and foster
care laws.'64 In essence, in these contexts the children's caretakers
161. See David S. Rosettenstein, Trans-racial Adoption and the Statutory Preference
Schemes: Before the "Best Interests" and After the "Melting Pot", 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
137,147 n.45 (1994) (discussing the impact of biological parents' religious preference in the
race-based hierarchy for child placement).
162. See Susan Landa, Children and Cults: A Practical Guide, 29 J. FAM. L. 591, 591-
92, 607-16, 624-34 (1990-91) (discussing cult practices harmful to children and difficulties
associated with intervening in cults to protect children).
Laws also discriminate in numerous ways among groups of children defined by other
characteristics. For example, adopted children receive less legal protection of their
relationship with their custodial parents than do children who are in the custody of their
biological parents. Several recent highly publicized cases involving 'botched adoptions'
illustrate this problem. In these cases, a biological father whose parental rights were not
properly terminated at the time of adoption sued to obtain custody after adoptive parents
had already formed a bond with a child. Neither the adoptive parents nor the child in
these cases enjoyed constitutional protection of their relationship. See, e.g., DeBoer v.
Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 11, 11 (1993) (Baby Jessica); Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Il1.
1994) (Baby Richard), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). In contrast, the United States
Supreme Court has held in other contexts that biological parents enjoy strong due process
rights in state proceedings brought to terminate their relationship with a child. Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982) (holding that state must provide clear and convincing
evidence to support termination of a biological parent's custody rights based on abuse);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1973) (holding that a father of an illegitimate child
is entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before the state may remove a child from
his custody); see also supra note 160 (discussing gender discrimination in the law relating
to circumcision of children).
163. See Rosettenstein, supra note 161, at 179-81 (describing litigation brought on
behalf of children in foster care). The term "temporal interests" here connotes human
interests that are secular rather than religious or spiritual in nature. Articulation and
defense of a perfectly clear analytical distinction between these two types of interests
would be difficult in a short space; a rough-and-ready statement, however, of the particular
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collude with the state to deny them equal protection of the laws.
Other situations in which young children do not receive equal
protection of the laws also involve the problem that the persons
harmed are not themselves able to advance a legal claim against the
state, and in fact may not even understand that they are being
harmed. In the case of religious exemptions to education and medical
care regulations, though, the additional problems arise that the
parents of the children harmed do not want to challenge the denial of
equal protection, and that the children harmed might themselves
express opposition to the school regulations or medical care, echoing
the objections of their parents.
These unique features of the parental religious exemption provi-
sions create real practical obstacles to challenging them in court. Part
III below addresses these practical obstacles. In addition, these
features raise important substantive doctrinal and theoretical
questions concerning the state's treatment of the family-in particular,
questions about the rationality of treating families as unitary entities,
the propriety of deferring to parents' preferences regarding the
upbringing of children, the proper scope of an individual's religious
liberty, and the bases upon which state actors make decisions on
behalf of children. Part II addresses these substantive questions in
the course of constructing and evaluating an equal protection claim on
behalf of religious objectors' children.
II. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS AS VIOLATIONS OF CHILDREN'S
EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS
To simplify the equal protection analysis somewhat, this Part
highlights one specific type of religious exemption in each of the two
main substantive areas, medical care and education. In the medical
area, it considers the constitutionality of religious exemptions to
interests that fall into these categories, and that are relevant to the discussion below, is
possible. Avoidance of physical harms such as disease, damaged and malformed body
parts, and death is a temporal interest. So too is avoidance of psychological harms such
as a diminished sense of self-worth, extreme anxiety, neurosis, and psychosis, or emotional
harms such as feelings of abandonment, rejection, and shame. In contrast, being "saved"
or "right with the Lord," receiving God's blessing, developing or perfecting one's soul, and
securing a place in heaven-benefits whose description necessarily entails reference to an
existence beyond this world or the material universe-are spiritual or religious interests.
No doubt some would challenge the particular distinction drawn here, and some would
dispute the possibility of drawing any meaningful distinction whatsoever, but the above
categorization seems consistent with a widespread acceptance in our culture of separate
worldly and spiritual realms, the former being the province of science and human authority
and the latter being the province of religion.
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compulsory vaccination laws. In the area of education, it considers
the constitutionality of the failure of *the federal government and
certain states to apply to religious schools prohibitions against sex
discrimination and sex bias that they apply to other schools. For
reasons revealed below, the case against vaccination exemptions is the
easier one to construct, and so each of the sections of this Part begins
with a discussion of vaccination laws.
Narrowing the subject matter of this Part to two specific types of
legal provisions by no means renders the equal protection analysis
uncomplicated. An equal protection claim involves several
elements-showing intentionally discriminatory state action, deter-
mining the appropriate level of judicial review, identifying legitimate
state purposes, and assessing the importance of these purposes-and
each element raises difficult questions in the context of religious
exemptions to child welfare mandates. The discussion below gives
careful consideration to each element, in the order that an equal
protection claim dictates. In doing so, it is able to draw heavily upon
the few Supreme Court decisions that have dealt with inequalities in
states' distribution of benefits among groups of children in addition
to the far more numerous decisions concerning inequalities among
groups of adults. While these decisions do not provide the clearest
guidance possible, they do consistently enunciate certain principles
that underlie the Equal Protection Clause and that clearly show the
laws with which this Article is concerned to be violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The analysis below, reflecting the topic's complexity, is lengthy
and rather formal in character. Careful consideration of the legal
principles at stake reveals that simplistic assertions about parents'
rights, religious freedom's importance, or the virtue of tolerance are
no answer to legitimate concerns about the welfare of children born
to members of minority religious communities. A more searching
analysis is necessary. This analysis might be used as a starting point
for legislative policymaking that must also consider messy political
realities, or for litigation or lobbying efforts that must at times pursue
compromise positions. Part III does, in closing, suggest compromise
positions that might be minimally adequate to protect the interests of
children, but working out such positions in detail is not one of the
aims of this Article.
A. State Action
The first showing that a plaintiff advancing a Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection Clause claim must make is that the challenged
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discriminatory conduct constitutes state action.' 14 The Equal Protec-
tion Clause by its terms constrains only the state, not private par-
ties. 6  Both of the situations under discussion in this Part involve
ostensibly private action-the choices of parents, the actions of reli-
gious schools-as a but-for cause of the supposed harm, so one might
think that the problem for children of religious objectors is essentially
a private one upon which the Constitution has no bearing. Unless
there is also some action attributable to the state that itself constitutes
a denial of equal protection, no Fourteenth Amendment violation,
and thus no basis for federal court intervention, exists. Whether any
state action is present is a distinct and preliminary issue to that of the
constitutionality of such state action.
1. Discriminatory Laws
In the case of vaccination laws, state action is readily apparent.
States legislatively guarantee to children generally a specific benefit
(protection from disease) but then explicitly deny that guarantee to
a particular subgroup of children identifiable by their parents' be-
liefs." The fact that parents must act (by formally objecting to
164. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful"). Similarly, a claim against the federal government under the Fifth Amendment
would have to begin by identifying some action of the federal government that
discriminates among similarly situated persons. For the sake of writing economy, the
discussion below for the most part refers only to actions against states under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Analysis of a Fifth Amendment claim against the federal
government would be essentially the same. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
638 n.2 (1975) (observing that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause contains an equal
protection component that imposes on the federal government the same restrictions that
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause imposes on the states).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
166. Denying some group of persons benefits given to others, even those that the
federal Constitution does not require states to provide, can be as much a violation of equal
protection as the imposition of punishments or other burdens. Califano v. Westcott, 443
U.S. 76, 85 (1979) (stating that welfare benefits are subject to the guarantee of equal
protection); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 468-70 (1977) ("[W]hen a State decides to
alleviate some of the hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner in which
it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limitations."); United States Dep't of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537 (1973) (striking down as irrational Food Stamp Act's
exclusion of households containing individuals unrelated to any other household member);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 168 (1972) (holding denial of
workmen's compensation benefits to illegitimate children invalid); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
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vaccination) in order for their children not to receive the statutory
benefit does not alter the fact that the state itself acts in a
discriminatory fashion. This situation is closely analogous to one the
Supreme Court addressed in Gomez v. Perez,167 which held that a
state violated the Equal Protection Clause when it conferred on
children generally a judicially enforceable right to support from their
natural fathers, but denied that right to illegitimate children. That an
illegitimate child would only fail to receive support if his or her father
chose not to send support, and that the state simply declined to act in
those instances rather than affirmatively acting to prevent illegitimate
children from receiving support, did not eviscerate the cause of action
on state action grounds."6 Similarly, at issue in the case of compul-
sory immunization is whether a specific statutory provision that singles
out a particular group of children for lesser protection of the laws
than other children receive-in the form of an obligation imposed on
their parents-violates the constitutional requirement that states treat
similarly situated persons similarly.'69
State action is also obviously present in the case of federal and,
in at least two jurisdictions, state legislation prohibiting sex
discrimination in education. As do the immunization statutes, these
laws set forth a requirement that is to apply very broadly-to all
schools that receive government financial assistance of any kind,
directly or indirectly-but then explicitly single out, on the basis of
religious beliefs, certain entities that are responsible for the welfare
U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding denial of right of action for wrongful death of parent to
illegitimate children invalid); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Such
an opportunity [for an education], where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.").
167. 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
168. Similarly, a criminal statute that prohibited assault but made an exception for
assaults against some particular group of persons, such as African-Americans or atheists,
and that ordered police not to act to prevent assaults against such persons, would clearly
be reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause. An assault on such persons by private
individuals is itself private action, but the statute's discrimination among classes of persons
in regard to who will receive the state's protection against such private action is clearly
state action.
169. Religious exemptions to state vaccination laws have in fact been the subject of
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause challenge on numerous occasions, when
parents not covered by the exemption complained to the State that they too wanted to
deny their children immunization. On none of those occasions was there any suggestion
that the exemption did not constitute state action. See, e.g., Sherr v. Northport-East
Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Kleid v. Board of
Educ. of Fulton, 406 F. Supp. 902, 906 (W.D. Ky. 1976); Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107, 115
(Md. 1982); Dalli v. Board of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Mass. 1971); Brown v. Stone,
378 So. 2d 218, 221 (Miss. 1980).
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of children but that are nevertheless to be free from the child-
protective mandate. 70  These legislative classifications clearly
constitute state action susceptible to constitutional challenge. The
same is true of any other school regulations that specifically exempt
from otherwise generally applicable requirements all religious schools
or those religious schools whose religious tenets conflict with the
requirements.
It is important to consider further, though, precisely when state
and federal non-regulation of religious schools amounts to state
action. Many existing education laws and regulations, including most
of those relating to sex discrimination and sex bias, apply in the first
instance only to public schools. In addition, if someone successfully
challenged a law or regulation of the type discussed in the previous
paragraph-one that explicitly excludes only certain religious schools
from an otherwise very broad mandate-the state in question might
respond by simply scaling back its regulation so that it applies in the
first instance only to public schools, rather than taking the more
difficult path of attempting to impose the regulation on religious
schools that vehemently oppose it.
We must therefore ask whether a failure to regulate religious
schools constitutes state action if the state also does not regulate other
private schools. We might also ask whether there is discriminatory
state action in the not uncommon case in which federal and state
regulations extend to all public and private schools that receive gov-
ernment assistance, but do not also include schools that accept no
government assistance-which are, for the most part, religious schools.
Answering these questions, which go to the very heart of the prevail-
ing scheme of government regulation of education in this country,
requires more extensive analysis.
In defense of its choice to limit the scope of its school regulations
to public schools or to schools receiving government assistance, a state
would probably argue that it is simply acting to control its own func-
tions and their effects, while leaving the 'private' domain unregulated.
The notion of a division between public and private domains is a
familiar one in our society, which prizes above all else the individual
liberty that our system of limited government preserves. In fact, one
is more likely to hear expressed the view that a state is over-reaching
its proper bounds of authority-when it attempts to regulate private
170. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. Part II.B below considers whether
these education laws can fairly be said to discriminate between classes of children, rather
than only between groups of schools. See infra text accompanying note 222.
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schools, than one is to hear a claim that the state is in some way
harming children who attend private schools when it fails to ensure
that they receive an adequate education or to protect them from
injurious practices.
Thus, a state might contend that its school regulations are analo-
gous to restrictions on employment practices that governmental bodies
impose on themselves but do not also impose on private employers.
Private sector employees do not complain that this disparate
treatment of state and private employment, in terms of the
protections afforded employees, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Such a claim would probably fail, since courts generally do not treat
a failure to prohibit or prevent private conduct as state action. Courts
instead deem such inaction immune from constitutional challenge,
unless it reasonably can be viewed as encouraging the private
conduct.'7' Courts only rarely regard a state's decision not to apply
all of the rules governing its own internal operations to the private
sector as encouraging any behavior in the private sector. Rather, they
view it simply as a manifestation of the state's special vigilance over
its own affairs. Regulations that apply only to public schools or only
to schools receiving state financial assistance might be viewed in the
same light.'72
It is thus essential to understand why this notion of separate
public and private domains, whatever its viability in other contexts, is
untenable in the context of children's schooling. Regulation of
schooling differs from regulation of government employment or other
171. See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197
(1989) (holding that a state's failure to protect child from abusive father is not state action
under the Due Process Clause); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467 (1973) (holding
that states may not lend textbooks to racially segregated private schools, and stating that
"[a] State's constitutional obligation requires it to steer clear, not only of operating the old
dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving significant aid to institutions
that practice racial or other invidious discrimination"); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19
(1948). But see Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation
of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1053, 1082
(1990) (arguing that Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961),
"effectively imposed a duty on the state to include an anti-discrimination provision in
leases of public property" despite absence of any encouragement). An exception to this
rule applies to instances in which a state holds a person in custody against his will; the
state is then under a special duty to ensure the safety and well-being of that person. See
Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
172. Actions of public school officials are actions of the state for purposes of
constitutional rights adjudication. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985)
(holding that public school officials are subject to strictures of the Fourth Amendment
when they conduct searches of a student's person or property).
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internal practices of government in a number of relevant ways. First,
state provision of and support for education is not an internal practice
of government, but rather the provision of a government benefit to
private persons in the community, like any welfare program. Second,
education is an essential good that states undertake to guarantee for
all children. State education laws as a whole manifest a governmental
intent to assume ultimate authority over this fundamental aspect of
children's lives. In fact, compulsory education laws typically take the
form of mandating that all children attend public school and then
carving out an exception to this mandate for children whose parents
prefer some alternative form of schooling that the state deems accept-
able.73 This element renders state education law more analogous
to a law guaranteeing welfare assistance to all persons, while also
allowing individuals to opt out if they prefer to obtain subsistence
from a private source. In contrast, regulation of government
employment practices inherently relates to a very limited group of
persons-government employees-who stand in a special relationship
to the government.
Third, with respect to schooling, the state does not simply refrain
from involving itself in private actors' choices and behaviors, as it
might be said to do with respect to private employment.' The
state affirmatively invests in parents the legal authority to determine
173. Illinois' compulsory attendance law, for example, states:
Whoever has custody or control of any child between the ages of 7 and 16 years
shall cause such child to attend some public school in the district wherein the
child resides the entire time it is in session during the regular school term ...
Provided, that the following children shall not be required to attend the public
schools:
1. Any child attending a private or a parochial school where children are
taught the branches of education taught to children of corresponding age and
grade in the public schools ....
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 105, para. 5/26-1 (West Supp. 1995). See also CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 48200,48222 (West 1995) (setting forth compulsory education requirements and
exemptions for children in private schools). As noted above, under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, states must allow parents to choose private
schooling for their children. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533-34 (1925).
174. Whether one may ever plausibly say that the state is not involved in private
market behavior is, of course, a highly debatable issue. Many writers have pointed out
that the government is fundamentally involved in "private" markets, by establishing and
enforcing base-line entitlements. Some commentators have regarded this fact as a reason
for abandoning the state action requirement in Fourteenth Amendment adjudication. E.g.,
Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REv. 347, 367 (1963) (observing
that state action "as a limitation, has substantially disappeared"). In any event, a relevant
difference surely exists between the freedom adults have to choose their job and the
freedom young children have to choose their school.
1996] 1371
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
what schooling their children will receive. 5 Children themselves
have no legal or practical control over the decision whether they will
receive the state-proffered benefit of a public school education or will
instead receive some other, possibly inferior, form of schooling.
Moreover, no other private party can decide the matter; the state
grants parents exclusive control. 6 Private employers, in contrast,
enjoy no comparable state-conferred authority over their employees.
With the addition of this crucial third feature, a proper analogy
to state education law would be a hypothetical law establishing a
universal welfare assistance guarantee, with an individual opt-out
provision, that gives some persons (say, for example, religious leaders)
an exclusive legal right to decide for certain other persons (such as
their followers) whether those other persons will receive the
government assistance or will instead receive some private alternative
that may be substantially inferior."v A basic ethical principle in our
society, which undergirds numerous legal rules, holds that while
competent individuals may justly suffer as a result of their own
choices, no one should suffer avoidable harm because of circumstan-
ces beyond their control, and particularly not as a result of other
people's choices. 8 Both this hypothetical welfare law and state
175. The term "state" as used here and in the discussion immediately following
connotes federal and/or state legislatures and courts. It is a combination of the products
of these institutions that makes up the present regime of plenary parental rights to control
children's lives. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 1379-1405.
176. See David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction and Private Wrongs, 1989
Sup. Cr. REv. 53, 64-66:
[Tjhe family unit is to a significant extent the product of state action.... The
government actively supports the family unit in countless ways. State law
imposes support obligations on parents and gives them vast rights to control and
direct their lives. State law bars strangers from intervening in the family except
in extraordinary circumstances. Many state laws [are] designed to promote the
establishment and maintenance of families. Through schools and many other
media, the government promotes the family unit and reinforces the authority of
the parents.
This conferral of authority is analogous to a state grant of a monopoly to a private
sector supplier of some service. See Lawrence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional
Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1, 12 (1990)
(arguing that the state should have been found responsible for the harm that the parent
in DeShaney inflicted on his child because "it was the monopoly created by the legal
structure in DeShaney that made the plaintiff peculiarly vulnerable").
177. Completing the analogy in the case of religious group leaders would require adding
a legal provision denying followers a right to exit from the group.
178. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (noting " 'the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing.' ") (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)
(footnote omitted)).
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education codes that leave some schools unregulated violate this
principle. If children in religious schools receive a secular education
inferior to that in the local public school, or incur harms from which
public school students are protected, it is a result not of their own
choice, but rather of the state empowering their parents to deny them
the benefits that public school students receive.
These features that distinguish regulation of education from
regulation of the internal practices of government also render the
failure to regulate religious schools, under any scheme of state
regulation, closely analogous to religious exemptions from compulsory
immunization laws. In both cases, the state guarantees an important
benefit-in one case protection from disease, in the other case a
quality education in an environment free of certain harmful prac-
tices-to children generally, and stands prepared to deliver that
benefit itself Then, however, the state denies that guarantee to a
certain class of children-those whose parents decide that they should
not have the benefit. That state action is critically involved in both
instances becomes even clearer when one recognizes that the state
stands ready to prevent its own officials or private parties other than
the parents from acting to secure the statutory benefit for the children
who fall into this legally created class. 179
The overall effect of state law governing education is thus to
create an absolute bar to a certain class of children receiving a quality
education free from harmful practices that the state proscribes in most
schools."m As such, this situation is different from those in which
states, prior to 1976, left private elementary and secondary schools
free to engage in racially discriminatory admissions practices, which
179. With respect to state regulations restricted in scope to public schools, this class
includes more than just children of religious objectors, encompassing also children whose
parents choose for other reasons to enroll them in a school not covered by the regulations.
180. Cf Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 210
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Wisconsin's child-protection program thus effectively
confined Joshua DeShaney within the walls of [his father's] violent home until such time
as [the state's child protection agency] took action to remove him."); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (holding that a state's refusal to give Medicaid for nontherapeutic
abortions does not impinge upon a fundamental right because it "places no obsta-
cles-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion"). Strauss
observes:
The fact that the state has placed someone in the custody of a private party
instead of in the custody of a state employee has no bearing on whether the state
has placed the person in danger or has cut off that person's sources of private
aid. And it is pointless, and probably meaningless, to ask whether an infant is
in a family against his or her will.
Strauss, supra note 176, at 66.
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courts found not to constitute state action.' Parents of a child
denied admission to such a school readily could, and were motivated
to, secure an alternative avenue for obtaining the state-guaranteed
benefit at stake, which was simply an education in some school."
In contrast, from the standpoint of a child who is in a school that, for
example, teaches her that she is by virtue of her gender an inferior
human being, the state is ultimately responsible for the fact that she
is in that school rather some other, and for the fact that she is
subjected to subordination-producing socialization rather than
receiving an education that treats her as an equal human being-a
benefit that the state guarantees other children."
State non-regulation of religious schools is also similar in relevant
ways to the situation the Supreme Court addressed in Plyler v.
Doe."8 That case involved Texas state laws that failed to extend
the benefit of a free public education to undocumented alien chil-
dren' -arguably state inaction-rather than affirmatively and
directly harming these children in some way. The Court held that
181. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,457-58, 469 (1973). Courts did find,
however, that state aid to such schools was state action subject to challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court held in 1976 that racially discriminatory private school admissions policies violate
federal civil rights legislation. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 186 (1976).
182. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 321 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Like
parks, there are normally alternatives for those shut out" from racially discriminatory
schools). Contrast this situation with one in which the parents of a black child wished, for
whatever reason, to send the child to an overtly racist private school (say, for example, if
white adoptive parents of a black child converted to a religion that preaches white
supremacy). By authorizing the parents to choose that form of schooling for the child, the
state would effectively create an absolute obstacle to that child receiving the protection
from discrimination that the state guarantees to children whose parents choose a public
school education for them. The freedom of private schools to discriminate in admissions
is grounded, perhaps nonsensically, in the constitutional right of free association;
individuals (parents? children?) have the right to choose not to associate with any other
individuals or class of individuals. See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 469. To suggest that a young
girl in a fundamentalist or Jewish Orthodox school exercises a right of free association by
attending that school, or that she freely chooses to associate on the terms of association
(such as subordination of females) that characterize such a school, would be ludicrous.
183. Finding state action in this context would therefore not require finding it also
whenever the state fails to apply to private provision of services or goods regulations it
applies to its own provision of those benefits, since a person who is legally and practically
capable of choosing between the two sources of benefits properly bears responsibility if
he chooses the private source knowing that its benefits are inferior.
184. 457 U.S. 202, 206 (1982). A fuller discussion of this case appears infra at notes
297-302 and accompanying text.
185. Specifically, the laws prevented school districts from receiving state funds for the
education of children not legally admitted into this country, and authorized school districts
to deny these children enrollment in their public schools. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
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these laws violated the equal protection rights of these children. 6
The Plyler opinion does not suggest that excluding undocumented
alien children from the scope of the state legislation guaranteeing
children an education might be just inaction on the part of the State,
and so immune from constitutional challenge. The ultimate effect of
the laws was to prevent many children living in Texas from receiving
any education. Likewise, a court should find that a state's limiting of
protections against harmful practices such as sex discrimination and
sex bias to students in public schools, or to students in schools receiv-
ing government assistance, is state action subject to judicial scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.
2. State Encouragement of Discriminatory Private Conduct
Anti-sexism laws written to apply only to public schools satisfy
the state action requirement in an additional way. In some situations,
private discrimination gives rise to a Fourteenth Amendment claim,
when a state effectively encourages private parties to engage in
discrimination. Encouragement of private discrimination constitutes
reviewable state action because" 'a state may not induce, encourage
or promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally
forbidden to accomplish.' " While it might seem on the surface
that states are simply indifferent to the sexist practices of some reli-
gious schools, in fact they do effectively encourage gender discrimina-
tion and gender bias in private schools by excluding these schools
186. Id. at 230.
187. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 465,465 (1973) (citation omitted). In Gilmore v.
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575-76 (1974) (holding that city may not give exclusive-use
park permit to racially discriminatory private schools), the Court stated: "The
Constitutional obligation of the State 'requires it to steer clear, not only of operating the
old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving significant aid to
institutions that practice racial or other invidious discrimination.' " Id. at 569 (citation
omitted). For a lucid analysis of Supreme Court decisions articulating the encouragement
rationale, see Snyder, supra note 171, at 1069-76. Also underlying the encouragement
rationale may be the same understanding manifested in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence-that state endorsement of private conduct or expression substantially
increases the coercive effect of such conduct or expression on other individuals. When
states give support to conservative religious groups, the concern arises that private citizens,
including children within these groups, might perceive the state to be endorsing the views
of those groups, including beliefs as to the proper worth and role of women relative to
men. Cf. Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2494 (1994) (holding
that state statute creating special school district following village lines for a religious
enclave incorporated as a village to exclude all but its practitioners violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
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from the coverage of anti-sexism laws while at the same time provid-
ing them with various forms of state aid.
A state's failure to voice explicit support for discriminatory
practices of private schools is not determinative for state action
purposes.'88 Nor need the state intend to promote such prac-
tices,189 and its assistance need not be a controlling factor in private
parties' decisions to engage in such practices. 9 ' It is sufficient that
the state gives assistance to these schools of a kind that is "provided
only in connection with schools,"' 9' and that it "significantly
aid"' or have "a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and
support private discrimination."'93
What counts as assistance for purposes of the encouragement
rationale is not entirely clear from Supreme Court decisions. 94
Norwood v. Harrison95 held that providing textbooks to children
attending schools with racially exclusive admissions policies amounts
to state encouragement of such discrimination. In reaching this
decision, the Court at times emphasized the tangible nature of
188. See Gilmore, 417 U.S. at 575-76 (White, J., concurring):
Under Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), it is perfectly
clear that to violate the Equal Protection Clause the State itself need not make,
advise, or authorize the private decision to discriminate that involves the State
in the practice of segregation or would appear to do so in the minds of ordinary
citizens.
189. See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 460 (invalidating a statutory scheme to supply textbooks
to private schools whether or not they engage in discriminatory practices, even though "the
statutory scheme was not motivated by a desire to further racial segregation").
190. Id. at 465.
191. Id. The Norwood Court indicated that forms of assistance provided only in
connection with schooling, and available from sources other than the state, such as
textbooks and tuition grants, constitute state encouragement of private school practices,
while "generalized services government might provide to schools in common with others,"
and that are available only from the government, such as police and fire protection, do
not. Id.
192. Id. at 467.
193. Id. at 466.
194. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,722 (1961) ("Only by sifting
facts and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement of the state in private
conduct be attributed its true significance."). Clearly, though, indirect aid-that is, aid
going directly to students or parents of students who attend private schools, rather than
to the schools themselves-can count as state assistance for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 464 n.7. The Norwood Court rejected the
direct/indirect distinction operative in Establishment Clause cases, holding that state aid
that is permissible under the Establishment Clause may nevertheless be impermissible
under the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
195. 413 U.S. at 471.
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monetary and material benefits.'96 At other times, though, the
Norwood Court spoke more generally of "significant aid"'1 7 and
" 'state support... through any arrangement' "for schools engaging
in invidiously discriminatory practices.198 Significantly, the Court
also held that state aid may constitute encouragement for equal
protection purposes even though it does not constitute promotion of
religion for Establishment Clause purposes, as was the case with
textbook loans to students.199
All states in this country provide substantial material assistance
to private schools, including religious schools, in direct and indirect
ways.' They do so indirectly by providing aid in the form of text-
196. E.g., id. at 463-64 ("Free textbooks, like tuition grants directed to private school
students, are a form of financial assistance inuring to the benefit of the private schools
themselves."); id. at 464 ("[T]he State by tangible aid in the form of textbooks thereby
gives support."); id. at 466 (mentioning "the type of tangible financial aid here involved");
id. at 469 (mentioning "material aid from the State").
197. Id. at 467.
198. Id. at 464 n.7 (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958)).
199. Id.; see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (holding that a loan
of textbooks to parochial school students does not violate Establishment Clause).
200. Developments in the Law-Religion and the State: IV. Government Aid to Private
Religious Activity, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1675, 1675 (1987). The Supreme Court has held
that the Establishment Clause prohibits states from providing religious schools with on-site
instructional services; some forms of instructional materials and equipment--such as maps,
charts, films, and projecting, recording, and laboratory equipment; or bus transportation
for field trips. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 380 (1985); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975). States also
may not provide tuition reimbursement to parents who send their children to religious
schools. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780-85
(1973). States may not make direct payments to religious schools except in very limited
circumstances, such as to reimburse costs incurred in providing state-mandated services.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
States are constitutionally permitted to exempt religious schools from income and
property taxes, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 679 (1970), to allow parents of
religious school students tax deductions for tuition, textbook, and school transportation
expenses, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1983), and to provide textbooks,
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 238, off-premises remedial instruction, id. at 248, on-premises
diagnostic speech and hearing services, id. at 244, on-premises sign-language interpreter
services, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 6 (1993), and bus transporta-
tion between home and school to pupils in religious schools, Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
Thus far, no court has ever held that states are constitutionally required to provide any
aid whatsoever to private schools or their students, see, e.g., Cook v. Griffin, 364 N.Y.S.2d
632, 638 (1975), though the Supreme Court's most recent decision concerning the
Establishment Clause implications of aid to religious schools arguably lays the groundwork
for such a holding in the future. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 6, held that state provision of a sign
language interpreter for a deaf student in a Catholic school does not violate the
Establishment Clause. The Court found that providing benefits to all children regardless
of the nature of the school they attend constitutes state neutrality toward religion, and
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books, auxiliary services, school lunches, and transportation to private
school pupils, and tax deductions for educational expenses to their
parents."' Some localities have begun distributing vouchers that
thereby implied-no doubt, without realizing it-that failing to provide to children in
parochial schools some benefits provided to children in other schools would constitute
impermissible government hostility to religion.
Whether a state that provides assistance to some private schools should be required
to provide it to all, and whether states should be required to aid all private schools so as
to ensure children in them an education equivalent to that in public schools, are legitimate
and interesting questions. In the cases cited above in which the Supreme Court held that
a state may not give to religious schools certain forms of aid that it might permissibly give
to non-religious schools, because to do so would promote religion and/or entangle the state
in a religious practice, apparently no one thought to argue that this interpretation of the
Establishment Clause is inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause, insofar as it denies
a state benefit to children consigned to religious schools. Of course, avoiding state
entanglement in religion is a legitimate and important state interest (a naked preference
for parents who choose a secular school for their children, on the other hand, is not), but
whether denial of aid to religious schools is substantially related to this interest is
debatable. If a state offers aid to all private schools, that in and of itself would not
amount to state endorsement of religion, at least when there are a significant number of
non-religious private schools in the state. Cf Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1 (concluding that
providing service to all deaf children, regardless of nature of school attended, does not
constitute unconstitutional aid to religion). Such aid may simply endorse high-quality
education for children, and most forms of state aid to private schools do not entangle the
state in the value decisions of school administrators.
The real problem with state aid to religious schools arises when a state exempts
religious schools from regulations it applies to all other schools that it aids, or exempts all
private schools from regulations it applies to public schools. Then the state appears to
endorse the internal practices of the schools. The only ways for the state truly to treat all
children equally are (1) to make public school attendance compulsory for all children (in
contravention of Pierce) or (2) to ensure that all children in private schools receive an
education of comparable quality to that given in public schools. The latter method might
in fact require that states give aid to private schools, including religious schools, and would
definitely require applying to all schools, including religious schools, all regulations
applicable to public schools that are necessary to ensure quality and to prevent harm to
children.
201. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-9-9.5 (Burns 1992) (reimbursements for
textbooks and workbooks); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.41321 (Callaghan Supp. 1995)
(transportation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 123.935 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996) (requiring school
districts to provide on request free health services and guidance and counseling services
to nonpublic school students); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 701.3, 712 (McKinney 1988 & Supp.
1996) (imposing duty on local school district officials to loan textbooks and library
materials to pupils in nonpublic schools); Huff v. Notre Dame High Sch., 456 F. Supp.
1145, 1147 (D. Conn. 1978) (describing federal, state, and local aid given, in the form of
money and in-kind services, to Catholic high school in Connecticut); 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 422
(Ky. 1972) (concluding that state provision of school lunches for parochial schools did not
violate state constitution). In addition to forms of aid statutorily mandated, some local
school boards offer to religious schools all the assistance they are constitutionally
permitted to give. See O'REILLY & GREEN, supra note 23, at 212.
For purposes of the encouragement rationale, whether state aid is directed to parents
or to the schools should not matter, since parents and private school officials act
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parents can use to pay tuition at private schools,' and these too
provide indirect, but quite substantial, aid to private schools. States
and the federal government also subsidize religious and other private
schools in several direct ways. They give money outright to schools
in some instances, to reimburse them for costs of compliance with
state requirements such as standardized testing of students.2 3
Perhaps most importantly, private schools enjoy tax-exempt status, at
least so long as they do not have racially discriminatory admission
policies.' 4 This status spares these schools from income, social
security, and unemployment taxes, and allows private donors to take
a charitable deduction on their individual income, estate, and gift tax
returns for contributions to the schools.' ° Tax-exempt status thus
constitutes a substantial government subsidy for private schools.'
cooperatively to establish and subject children to sexist instruction. State school-related
aid to parents who send their children to private schools supports and encourages
discrimination in these schools as much as does aid given directly to the schools.
202. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) (authorizing
vouchers for students attending non-sectarian private schools in Milwaukee); Fox
Butterfield, Tax Rebate in New Hampshire Town Poses Test for School-Choice Issue, N.Y.
TlvIES, Jan. 30, 1991, at B6 (describing local ordinance in Epsom, New Hampshire granting
property tax abatement to parents who send their child to a private high school, sectarian
or non-sectarian).
203. O'REILLY & GREEN, supra note 23, at 268-69.
204. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 1990);
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding IRS revocation of tax-
exempt status of two private schools that had racially discriminatory admissions policies).
Religious organizations sponsoring schools also enjoy tax-exempt status. See I.R.C. §
501(c)(3); cf David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty,
76 CORNELL L. REv. 769, 919-20 (1991) (arguing that extension of tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory private institutions may constitute sufficient state support for the
discriminatory private conduct to render it violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
205. See I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(1), (c)(2) (1994) (defining donations to religious institutions
as charitable deductions for income tax purposes); I.R.C. § 2055(a)(2) (1994) (defining
donations to religious institutions as charitable deductions for estate tax purposes); I.R.C.
§ 2522(a) (defining donations to religious institutions as charitable deductions for gift tax
purposes); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739-40, 746 n.14 (1984) (holding that African-
American children in public schools and their parents lacked standing to challenge tax-
exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools and describing the various benefits
of tax-exempt status).
206. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983):
Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is
administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect
as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on
its income. Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of
a portion of the individual's contributions.
1&; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 773-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that tax-exempt
status for racially discriminatory private schools constitutes a subsidizing of the schools
and their discriminatory practices); id. at 784-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); Green v.
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Under the Norwood rationale, such aid amounts to en-
couragement of any discriminatory practices of private schools that
the states do not prohibit. Indeed the very purpose of conferring tax
exempt status on an entity is to support activities that the government
deems beneficial to society, that the government endorses.2°7 If
state and federal governments wished not to encourage sexist
practices in religious schools, therefore, they should withhold tax-
exempt status, and all other state-conferred benefits, from schools that
engage in such practices, .just as they do with respect to racially
discriminatory practices. A suit on behalf of students in religious
schools that receive state aid, on the basis of the discriminatory
practices at those schools, should therefore be able to rely successfully
on the encouragement rationale of state action.
Many religious schools, though, refuse more overt forms of state
financial assistance, such as textbook loans, even in forms permissible
under the Establishment Clause, precisely because they do not wish
to comply with state regulations that do apply to all schools receiving
such state aid.' One might argue, however, that even if a school
accepted no financial assistance whatsoever, not even tax-exempt
status, the encouragement rationale would still be applicable to any
sexist practices it might have, because the mere offer of aid to private
schools, without a demand that any school receiving that aid comply
with anti-sexism mandates, encourages these schools to engage in
sexist practices. In other words, by restricting the scope of its anti-
sexism laws to public schools, while at the same time offering to
Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1134-36 (D.D.C.), (finding that tax-exempt status was
critically important to the ability of racially discriminatory private schools to succeed),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
207. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 773 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he existence of a federal
tax exemption amounts to a federal stamp of approval which facilitates fund raising on
behalf of racially segregated private schools."); id. at 783-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory private schools as "an official
policy of encouraging white children to attend nonpublic schools"); Bob Jones Univ., 461
U.S. at 587 n.10 (stating that a tax exemption has the "basic goal of encouraging the
development of certain organizations").
208. This is not true of all such schools, of course. There is a division among
fundamentalist Christian educators now about whether to support school voucher
proposals. See MENENDEZ, supra note 71, at 5 (noting that many fundamentalist Christian
school administrators, advocates, and patrons are mounting political campaigns to get
school voucher plans passed). While vouchers would certainly help the schools financially,
recent experience in California suggests that voters are not likely to approve voucher plans
that do not also increase state regulation of the private schools that would receive the
vouchers. See Cynthia Bright, The Establishment Clause and School Vouchers: Private
Choice and Proposition 174, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 193, 204-05 (1995).
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religious and other private schools aid in the form of tax-exempt
status, textbooks, bus transportation, and other services, a state en-
courages these schools to engage in discriminatory conduct just as
much if the schools decline the aid as if they accept it. In either case,
the state implicitly sends a message that it deems it acceptable for
private schools to engage in such conduct. Norwood's rationale of
encouragement should therefore mean that a state's failure to require
private schools, religious or otherwise, to comply with anti-
discrimination laws in order to receive tangible state aid, constitutes
state action.
In addition, the encouragement rationale might be extended to
apply when the state provides less obvious, but nevertheless tangible,
forms of aid. For example, mere exemption from some regulations
applicable to public schools, such as teacher certification or curricular
requirements, creates a tangible benefit, since private schools would
otherwise have to expend funds to comply with those regulations. Of
course, a failure to impose costs rather than a provision of overt
benefits looks more like state abstention from, rather than involve-
ment in, private behavior. The distinction is only apparent, however,
not real, particularly since the state imposes these costs on similar
enterprises.
Religious schools also receive important non-financial, education-
related benefits from the state. In particular, many receive the benefit
of state approval or certification, which in some states is a sine qua
non for operation 9 and in other states enhances a school's public
image.210 Insofar as accreditation implies state endorsement, it not
only constitutes a benefit to private schools but also, in an even more
direct sense, constitutes encouragement to those schools to continue
doing whatever they are doing. By approving and certifying private
209. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text; cf Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,
301-02 (1966) (holding that racial discrimination by court-appointed private trustees of a
public park is state action).
210. School certification is a state monopoly, and in that respect it is unlike the
provision of textbooks or tuition grants. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465
(1973). How this distinction could be relevant to the supportive or encouraging quality
of state action, however, is difficult to see. The Norwood Court's distinction between
assistance "provided only in connection with schools" and "generalized services
government might provide to schools in common with others," id., a distinction the Court
has relied upon in the Establishment Clause context as well, must be the controlling
distinction. School certification is quite obviously a benefit provided only to schools. In
contrast, the state's guarantee of police and fire protection to private schools does not
constitute state encouragement, since it is a type of benefit the state provides to all
businesses and individuals.
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schools that engage in sexist practices and granting parents a right to
choose to put their children in those schools, while deliberately
leaving these schools outside the scope of prohibitions against sexist
education, the state effectively confers its imprimatur upon these
schools and their sexist practices, and thereby encourages these
schools to continue those practices.21' The message to parents and
religious leaders is that while state institutions must conform to
majoritarian norms regarding gender equity, the state condones and
supports private institutions' departure from these norms in educating
children. If states did not wish to send this message, they should
impose the majoritarian norms on private child-rearing institutions or
refuse to license or give aid of any kind to private institutions that
violate these norms.
States thus provide assistance to religious schools in many forms,
direct and indirect, and thereby also implicitly encourage any
pedagogical practices at those schools that state laws do not prohibit.
On this basis, too, then, a court should conclude that a state's failure
to prohibit sex discrimination in religious schools is actionable under
the Equal Protection Clause.212 As a remedy, a court might order
211. Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (attributing private racial
discrimination to a state where state constitutional provision explicitly granted property
owners a right to discriminate in the sale, lease, or rental of their property because that
provision would "significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations");
Snyder, supra note 171, at 1074-76 (arguing that state encouragement of private action by
creating a legally enforceable right to undertake that action should result in state respon-
sibility for the consequences of that action).
212. One final conceptual approach to showing state action in the case of sexist
practices in religious schools would be to argue that because private schools perform a
public function under authority delegated by the states, their internal practices, including
any gender discrimination, are actually state actions. While this approach might be
theoretically sound, it would be most unlikely to succeed in actual litigation. The Supreme
Court has treated conduct by private parties as state action when it was closely related to
a practice that was traditionally an exclusively state function, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-28 (1991) (holding that private litigants' use of peremptory
challenge in civil trial to exclude jurors on basis of race violated equal protection rights of
excluded jurors); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944) ("[S]tate delegation to a
party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state
function that may make the party's action the action of the State."), or where the private
conduct took place on state property and was closely related to a state operation, e.g.,
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961) (holding that private
lessee of part of a publicly owned and operated parking garage was required to comply
with the Fourteenth Amendment in operation of a restaurant located on the premises).
Courts have rejected, however, arguments that employment, admissions, and disciplinary
practices of private schools constitute state action, primarily because the state does not
endeavor to regulate these aspects of private schools and because no private school has
a monopoly over education. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (holding
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a state to extend its regulations universally, or it might require a state
to revoke its approval of, or withdraw all direct and indirect forms of
financial assistance from, a school that engages in sexist practices, on
the basis that granting any of these benefits to such a school in and
of itself encourages the school to engage in sexist practices."
that private school's firing of teachers for expressing certain views was not state action, in
part because "in contrast to the extensive regulation of the school generally, the various
regulators showed relatively little interest in the school's personnel matters"); Huff v.
Notre Dame High Sch., 456 F. Supp. 1145, 1146-50 (D. Conn. 1978) (holding that Catholic
high school's disciplinary expulsion of student was not state action); Family Forum v.
Archdiocese of Detroit, 347 F. Supp. 1167, 1170-73 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (holding that
Catholic high school's racially discriminatory decision regarding hiring of a principal was
not state action); Penny v. Kalamazoo Christian High Sch. Ass'n, 210 N.W,2d 893, 896
(Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that private school's refusal to enroll plaintiff's child was
not state action and noting that "[d]efendant does not operate the only high school in the
... area").
While these decisions do not analytically foreclose an argument that pedagogical
practices of private schools are state action, since states do undertake to regulate these
practices to some degree and since a school does have a monopoly over a child's
education, from her perspective, once her parents enroll her, the notion that private
schooling is outside the public domain is deeply ingrained. See, e.g., Evans, 382 U.S. at 302
(stating that while parks are "plainly in the public domain," schools are "in the private
sector"). Justices Marshall and Brennan endorsed the view that private school internal
practices could sometimes be regarded as state action, see Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 851
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[A]ctions directly affecting the students could be treated as
under color of state law, since the school is fulfilling the State's obligations to those
children."), but none of the present members of the Court take as expansive a view of the
judicial role in protecting individuals from harmful private exercises of legal power. In any
event, if the state is sufficiently implicated in the practices of private schools to support a
case for characterizing school officials as state actors, then the state's involvement would
likely also amount to encouragement of the private discrimination, which is sufficient to
satisfy the state action requirement. See supra notes 187-211 and accompanying text.
213. Cf Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,602-04 (1983) (finding no free
exercise violation when federal government denied tax-exempt status to religious academic
institution that practiced racial discrimination); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S.
556, 566-69 (1974) (enjoining city from granting exclusive access to public recreational
facilities to racially segregated private schools); Norwood, 413 U.S. at 463-67 (ordering
state to cease providing textbooks to private schools with racially discriminatory admissions
policies and noting that the Supreme Court "has consistently affirmed decisions enjoining
state tuition grants to students attending racially discriminatory private schools"); Pitts v.
Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (enjoining state from granting
tax exempt status to organizations with racially discriminatory membership policies on
basis of encouragement rationale).
One might also challenge the tax-exempt status of religious schools that engage in
gender discrimination on statutory grounds, arguing that the Internal Revenue Code
requires denial of tax-exempt status to such schools. Cf Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 595-
96 (holding that proper interpretation of § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code would
exclude racially discriminatory private schools, because such discrimination is contrary to
public policy and such schools do not provide " 'beneficial and stabilizing influences in
community life' " nor a "public benefit within the 'charitable' concept"); Green v.
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (holding that private schools with racially
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Reaching the conclusion that non-regulation of religious schools
constitutes state action, one might object, leaves the states' entire
scheme of school regulation open to constitutional challenge, and so
raises the concern that it might require that states impose all the same
regulations on all private schools that they impose on public schools,
thereby eviscerating the distinction between public and private educa-
tion in this country.14  This concern, however, is both overstated
and irrelevant. It is overstated because for an equal protection claim
to succeed, plaintiffs would also have to show that children in
religious schools suffer harm as a result of a state not extending some
regulation universally and that the state lacks an adequate rationale
for failing to do so. Therefore, states might permissibly give religious
schools greater operational and instructional freedom than they give
public schools, so long as doing so causes no harm to religious school
pupils or so long as it serves a sufficient state purpose. As noted in
Part I, there is no reason to believe that a religious school would be
unable to maintain a distinctively religious character even if it were
subject to all of the statutory regulations to which public schools are
now subject. Moreover, this concern is also irrelevant, because if the
constitutional right of children to equal protection of the laws requires
that states eviscerate all significant distinctions between public and
non-public schools, then ex hypothesis they have no sufficient reason
for not doing so.
B. Intentional Discrimination
To constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
challenged state action must involve intentional215 discrimination
between similarly situated216  classes of persons. Laws that
discriminatory admissions policies are not entitled to tax exempt status, and that donations
to such schools thus cannot qualify as charitable deductions), affd sub nom. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971); Dean Pappas, Note, The Independent Sector and the Tax Laws:
Defining Charity in an Ideal Democracy, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 461, 474 (1991) (noting that
"charitable organization" tax exemption presumes that exempt organizations are in fact
charitable and do not engage in practices contrary to important public policies).
214. In State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976), the Ohio Supreme Court
emphasized this concern that extensive regulation of private schools would render them
indistinguishable from public schools. Id. at 768.
215. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976).
216. See City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 447-50 (1985)
(holding that a zoning ordinance requiring a special permit only for group homes for the
mentally retarded is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,79 (1981) (upholding military draft registration applicable to males
and not females, the Court stated: "The Constitution requires that Congress treat similarly
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discriminate on their face between similarly situated classes of persons
clearly suffice to establish the intent element of an equal protection
claim." 7 Importantly, discrimination need not be motivated by a
desire to harm the disadvantaged group in order to run afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Certainly legislators do not affirmatively
desire that certain children not receive appropriate medical care or
schooling. But a government that is simply blind or indifferent to the
suffering of the members of a disadvantaged group also denies equal
protection," and this appears to be the case with religious exemp-
tions to child welfare and education laws.
With respect to this element, immunization laws again provide
the easier case. These laws explicitly deny a particular subgroup of
children-those whose parents have a particular set of religious
beliefs-the benefit of compulsory immunization. By this de jure
classification, states unquestionably discriminate purposefully (even
though not maliciously) among groups of children based upon their
parents' religious beliefs. Those whose parents do not have religious
beliefs opposed to immunization must receive the specified vaccina-
situated persons similarly, not that it engage in gestures of superficial equality"); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (invalidating law preferring males to females when two
persons of opposite sex are otherwise equally entitled to be administrator of an estate but
stating that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat
different classes of persons in different ways").
217. Disparate impact from a facially neutral law, in contrast, though not sufficient in
and of itself to demonstrate a discriminatory purpose, may constitute evidence that such
a purpose underlies the law. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993) ("[A] plaintiff
challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim
by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be
understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on
the basis of race."); Washington, 426 U.S. at 241. The discriminatory purpose, moreover,
need not be the only purpose on which the law rests. Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
218. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 1516-20 (2d ed. 1988).
The Supreme Court's willingness to strike down affirmative action programs on equal
protection grounds makes clear that even "benign" classifications lacking malicious
discriminatory intent can violate the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986); see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982)
(invalidating state nursing school policy of excluding males). In Hogan the Court
explained that a
"benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against
any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme." The same
searching analysis must be made, regardless of whether the State's objective is to
eliminate family controversy, to achieve administrative efficiency, or to balance
the burdens borne by males and females.
Id (citations omitted).
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tions 19 Those whose parents do have religious beliefs opposed to
immunizations, on the other hand, need not receive those vaccina-
tions.
The two classes of children, furthermore, clearly are similarly
situated with respect to the underlying purpose of immunization laws.
All children in this country, regardless of their parents' religious
beliefs, are at greater risk of contracting certain serious diseases if not
vaccinated against them, and will suffer and possibly die if they do
contract one of these diseases.' In fact, children of parents whose
religious objection to vaccination extends also to all other forms of
medical care have an even greater need than other children of receiv-
ing vaccinations. They are likely to suffer to a greater extent than
other children if they do contract a disease, given the likelihood that
their parents would not seek palliative or curative medical treatment
for them, but would instead rely exclusively on prayer.221
219. Significantly, no compulsory immunization laws exempt parents who have scien-
tific/medical beliefs opposed to vaccination, even though parents might reasonably be
concerned about adverse side effects and doubt the need for certain vaccines and may
believe that alternative medical approaches to preventing disease are superior. See supra
notes 140-42, 146. States give no weight in this context to parents' views about what is
best for the physical health of their children, but decisive weight to parents' beliefs about
divine commands and childrens' spiritual well-being.
220. Cf. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973)
(invalidating exclusion of families containing illegitimate children from state welfare
program and arguing that "the benefits extended under the challenged program are as
indispensable to the health and well-being of illegitimate children as to those who are
legitimate"); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("Government must exercise [its] powers so as not to discriminate between
[its] inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of
regulation.") (emphasis added). Courts typically find two classes of persons are not
similarly situated when they believe the "disfavored" group may actually need special
favorable treatment because of some diminished ability. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
444-45. If children of religious objectors have a need for special treatment, it is for greater
state supervision and control over their health care rather than less.
Some children might be somewhat less in need of vaccination than the average child
if their parents, as part of their religious way of life, provide other forms of protection
against disease that most children do not receive-perhaps, for example, a special,
immunity-boosting diet. However, what makes these children dissimilarly situated is not
the beliefs of their parents that are opposed to vaccination, but rather their parents'
alternative health-promoting actions, which other parents might also perform even without
a religious motivation. An exemption for parents who undertake these alternative
measures might therefore be warranted, but this fact cannot support an exemption tied to
religious opposition to vaccination.
221. See Rosato, supra note 1, at 62 n.96 (citing news report of six children in
Philadelphia who died of measles-related complications because their parents refused to
vaccinate them and then refused to provide medical care after the children became ill). In
State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1984), the court invalidated a prayer
treatment exemption to Ohio's child neglect law, explaining:
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Schooling laws and regulations, in contrast to immunization laws,
generally do not refer directly to groups of children who are covered
or not covered, but instead refer to groups of schools: public schools
versus private schools, or schools that receive state funding versus
those that do not, or religious schools versus all other schools.m
Reference to groups of schools, though, is in reality an indirect refer-
ence to groups of children, since children are effectively assigned to
particular schools through a cooperative exercise of power by the
state and their parents. Thus, prohibitions of sexist education that
apply to some types of schools but not to others discriminate among
readily identifiable groups of children-those whose parents have
chosen (or have been constrained to accept) one type of school versus
those whose parents have chosen another type of school for them.
The same basic question therefore arises in connection with this form
of discrimination as arose in Plyler v. Doe (the decision invalidating
denial of education to children of illegal immigrants)-namely, why
should any child suffer an educational deprivation because of her
parents' choices?
As is the case with vaccinations, the religious beliefs of a child's
parents are irrelevant to her inherent need for protection from sexist
treatment and instruction, as well as to her need for an education that
is in other ways beneficial rather than harmful.' In fact, in the
educational realm, just as in connection with immunization, children
of religious objectors arguably require greater state protection than
other children. For example, with respect to anti-sexism education
laws, being the daughter of parents who have a religiously grounded
belief that females are morally and socially inferior to males increases
a child's need for non-sexist schooling to correct as much as possible
From what started as a common childhood illness, from what started as a simple,
easily recognizable, well-known bacterial infection which responds to the most
basic of modem antibiotics, and at his home located within a few blocks of a
modem, well-equipped emergency hospital, which could have, in all likelihood,
saved his life, Seth Miskimens died. First came illness, then more serious illness,
then suffering, and then... after enduring for as long as he could the tremen-
dous pain inherent in the multiple diseases that were attacking him, and then
with a raging infection in his tiny chest, he weakened, he faltered, and he died.
Id. at 938.
222. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
223. Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,223 (1982) (stating that the" 'benefits of education
are not reserved to those whose productive utilization of them is a certainty' ") (quoting
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 581 n.14 (E.D. Tex. 1978)); Johnson v. Charles City
Community Sch. Bd, 368 N.W.2d 74,84,85 (Iowa) (noting that children of fundamentalist
Christians, unlike Amish children, "will have to compete with well-educated children" in
a complex society), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985).
1996] 1387
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the harmful effect of this aspect of the parents' religious instruction
of the child. A daughter of fundamentalist Christian or Orthodox
Jewish parents is just as susceptible to suffering diminished self-
esteem and the agony of thwarted life prospects as a result of sexist
socialization as is the daughter of any other parents.224 And because
she is likely to receive overt inculcation of sexist views at home from
her parents, her need for some counteractive instruction in the
opposing view that men and women are inherently equal is actually
greater than that of other girls.2"
With respect to the intended benefit of statutory prohibitions
against sexist schooling, therefore, a court would have to treat
children in the two classes created by those statutes-those in the
covered schools and those in schools not covered-as similarly
situated.' Likewise, regarding regulations designed to ensure that
children receive an adequate secular education, children whose
parents choose to send them to a religious school, in whole or in part
for religious reasons, arguably stand in greater need of state super-
vision than children attending a school that their parents chose for
them solely because they thought it provided a superior secular
224. This would be true even if the career expectations of all members of the religious
community are more circumscribed than those of persons outside the community, and even
if female members of the community can be expected to remain voluntarily within the
community without comparing their lives to those of persons outside it, since community
females would still evaluate their life prospects relative to those of community males and
according to community values, which by hypothesis are male-centric.
225. See Peterson & Lach, supra note 54, at 194-95 (summarizing research showing the
ability of non-sexist instruction to overcome ingrained gender stereotyped attitudes in
children, and showing a correlation between the amount of past exposure a child has to
sexism and the amount of counteractive instruction she needs to overcome her sex-
stereotyped outlook).
226. Subsection II.D.2 below considers whether the religious beliefs of parents renders
the situation of the two groups of children under either the vaccination or education laws
different in respects other than the underlying purpose of the laws. In particular, it
considers whether, because of the religious opposition of certain parents to vaccination or
to state regulation of their schools, state efforts to apply the laws to the children of those
parents might so disrupt family life that, on the whole, the children would be better off if
the state did not do so, thereby giving the state a legitimate and important interest in
creating the religious exemptions.
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education.'n The former case raises greater concern than the latter
that the school chosen does not provide an adequate education.
If the state action in question is encouragement of private
discrimination by providing state aid to religious schools that engage
in sex discrimination and sexist instruction, then intentional
discrimination is easily shown.' In that case, the discrimination
would be between children based on gender, rather than based on
their parents' religious beliefs. Demonstration that boys and girls in
these schools are similarly situated with respect to their need for self-
esteem and treatment as equal persons would also be easy. Several
lower courts have held analogously that racist aspects of the public
school curriculum or environment constitute violations of the Equal
Protection Clause, building on a premise that children of al races are
similarly situated with respect to their need for self-esteem and
treatment as equal persons.229
One must bear in mind at this point that the conclusion that the
classes of children created by religious exemptions are similarly
227. Of course, some parents send their children to a public school simply because they
cannot afford a private school, and some parents send their children to a religious school
solely because that school provides an academically superior, and perhaps safer, learning
environment than the local public school. In these cases, the parents' choices obviously
would not support the stronger conclusion that children in religious schools need greater
state protection. It would still be the case, however, that the children in the two types of
schools are similarly situated in their need for quality education. If the schools of some
religious communities are actually academically superior to public schools, and do not
inflict any of the harms that school laws aim to prevent, then they should have no difficulty
satisfying state quality standards. If they can do this without employing certified teachers,
then an exemption to teacher certification requirements that is tied to alternative measures
to ensure competent teaching might be appropriate, but their success cannot support a
blanket exemption tied solely to religious orientation.
228. If this approach to making out a claim is taken, and if the relief sought is a denial
of state aid to certain schools rather than an injunction requiring extension of anti-sexism
legislation to cover all schools, representatives for children would have to seek that relief
against specific schools and would have to show discriminatory practices in each of these
individual schools. Courts probably would not assume that all schools run by a particular
religious denomination engage in the discriminatory conduct and issue broadly applicable
injunctions. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,471 (1973) ("Relief on an assumption
that all private schools were discriminating, thus foreclosing individualized consideration,
would not be appropriate.... [T]he fact that some or even most may practice
discrimination does not warrant blanket condemnation.").
229. See, e.g., Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1151-55 (N.D. Miss. 1980)
(holding that state education officials' choice of textbook for public schools on basis of its
less favorable portrayal of blacks than available alternative text denied equal protection
to black students); Smith v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 316 F. Supp. 1174, 1176-77 (E.D.
La. 1970) (holding that display of Confederate flag in principal's office of recently
integrated public school denied equal protection to black students), aff'd, 448 F.2d 414 (5th
Cir. 1971).
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situated with respect to the underlying purposes of the child welfare
and education laws does not determine the constitutionality of the
exemptions. The discussion above raises concerns about religious
freedom, church-state separation, toleration of minority religious
practices, and possible adverse effects on children from forcing unwill-
ing parents to conform to majoritarian norms. These concerns might
support legitimate and important state purposes for having religious
exemptions. The question whether the state can justify its classifica-
tions, however, is a later part of the analysis, coming after a showing
that the classifications intentionally discriminate among persons who
are similarly situated with respect to the underlying purposes of the
laws. The discussion below seeks to answer that question.
C. Level of Scrutiny
Having established that children of religious objectors suffer from
intentional discriminatory state action, the next question is how
rigorously a court should scrutinize that state action. Are legislative
decisions entitled to substantial deference from the judicial branch in
these difficult areas of conflict between mainstream and minority
values? Or is the situation of the children involved, or the nature of
their interests that are at stake, such that courts should be especially
vigilant to protect them against unfavorable outcomes of the political
process?
"Level of scrutiny" refers to the burden of justification that
courts impose on the state once a plaintiff demonstrates
discriminatory state action. This is the most exhaustively discussed
element of equal protection jurisprudence because the degree of
burden that a court imposes controls the outcome in the vast majority
of cases.z0  The prevailing view today recognizes roughly three
230. Some members of the Supreme Court have asserted that the Court's equal
protection cases do not reveal clear-cut levels of scrutiny, but rather manifest a spectrum
of degrees of intensity of review. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, EQUAL
PROTECrION 8 (1995) (contending that the Court has developed a "sliding scale of
analysis"). Nevertheless, most members of the Court and most legal commentators today
continue to think about equal protection scrutiny in terms of levels or categories, perhaps
because it is more convincing to argue in terms of clear categories, while avowedly ad hoc
reasoning appears overly subjective and arbitrary. The discussion of this section follows
the purportedly more objective mode of arguing for application of a particular level of
scrutiny to the legislation at issue.
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levels of scrutiny 3 1 The most demanding, pro-plaintiff level is
"strict scrutiny," which proceeds from a presumption that the
challenged state action is unconstitutional and imposes on the state
the burden of showing that its action is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest3 2  States almost never win when strict
scrutiny applies?3 3 At the other extreme, the least demanding, most
pro-state level of scrutiny is "rationality review" or "rational basis
review." It proceeds from a presumption that the challenged state
action is constitutional and requires a person challenging that action
to show that it bears no rational relation to any conceivable,
legitimate state purpose.' Plaintiffs almost never win when
rationality review applies3 5
Between these two extremes lies the somewhat amorphous "inter-
mediate scrutiny." Some Supreme Court decisions suggest the exis-
tence of two levels of intermediate scrutiny. The more demanding of
the two, which has been called "heightened scrutiny," requires the
state to demonstrate that its action is substantially related to a state
interest that is both legitimate and "important''16 or "substan-
231. See Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis:
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of Educational Policy After Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Public Schools, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1078, 1087-89 (1989).
232. See, eg., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-32 (1969).
233. See WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1225 (7th ed. 1991);
MCWHIRTER, supra note 230, at 145.
234. See Heller v. Doe by Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637,2642-43 (1993); Kadrmas v. Dickinson
Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,463 (1988) (stating that "those challenging the legislative judgment
must convince us 'that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based
could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker,' " and
explaining that plaintiff bears the" 'heavy burden' of demonstrating that the challenged
statute is both arbitrary and irrational"); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,303-
04 (1976) (upholding city ordinance banning pushcart food vendors in French Quarter
unless they had operated there for at least eight years and stating "[I]n the local economic
sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand
consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the city could rationally have
decided newer businesses had less reliance interest in continued operation in certain area
and that older businesses could have become part of the local culture).
235. See LOCKHART Er AL., supra note 233, at 1211 (citing the few exceptions to this
rule); MCWHIRTER, supra note 230, at 145; Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and
Equal Protection's Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1, 40-41 (1992) (noting that
rational basis cases are commonly dismissed at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment
stage); id. at 66 n.362 (noting that the Supreme Court has decided in favor of a plaintiff
under rational basis review only once since 1985, but citing several recent pro-plaintiff
lower federal court decisions).
236. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724
(1982) ("[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of
their gender must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for
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tial." 7  The less demanding, which the Court has referred to as
"somewhat heightened review," requires the state to demonstrate that
its action is substantially related to a merely legitimate state
interest"z' s Unfortunately, some Supreme Court decisions are un-
clear as to whether they are applying one of these levels of intermedi-
ate scrutiny rather than mere rationality review, and as to what
factors trigger some form of heightened review. 9  At times the
Court has effectively applied intermediate scrutiny while claiming to
apply deferential rationality review.24°
The appropriate level of scrutiny depends on two factors: First,
whether the class of persons adversely affected by discriminatory state
action is a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class and, second, whether the
state action infringes upon a constitutionally-protected fundamental
right or an interest of the disadvantaged class that the Court has
deemed "important." Either a suspect class or a fundamental right
triggers strict scrutiny. 4 ' The Supreme Court has consistently ap-
plied some form of intermediate scrutiny when the class adversely
affected is one it deems quasi-suspect-for example, gender or illegiti-
macy.242 The Court has become less willing in recent years to apply
heightened scrutiny when an important interest is at stake but the
disadvantaged class is not one the Court has recognized as quasi-
suspect,243 although it has never explicitly foreclosed the possibility
that it will do so. When the affected class is neither suspect nor
the classification."); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-204 (1976) (invalidating state law
creating different legal drinking ages for men and women).
237. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1982).
238. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
239. See id. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) ("[T]he Court provides no principled foundation for determining when more
searching inquiry is to be invoked.").
240. See id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
241. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (stating that denial of
welfare benefits to new residents burdens fundamental right to travel and so triggers strict
scrutiny).
242. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
243. Compare Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,459-60 (1988) (declining
to apply heightened scrutiny to statutory scheme of fees for school transportation) and
Lyng v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers,
UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988) (declining to apply heightened scrutiny to denial of food
stamps to households of striking workers) with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982)
(applying heightened review to denial of free education to children of illegal immigrants).
But cf. Biegel, supra note 231, at 1098-99 (arguing that absence of perceivable harm in
Kadrmas likely motivated Court not to apply Plyler's heightened review approach).
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quasi-suspect and the state action neither infringes a fundamental
right nor impairs an important interest, rational review applies.44
1. Suspect or Quasi-suspect Class
In a suit directly challenging sex discrimination practices in
religious schools, on the theory that the state encourages these
practices, the class discriminated against is one based on gender.
Since gender is a quasi-suspect class, heightened scrutiny would
clearly apply. In a suit challenging religious exemptions to child
healthcare laws or the failure of states to extend important regulations
to religious schools, on the other hand, the class discriminated against
would be one based on parents' religious beliefs. Whether a class of
children identifiable by the religious beliefs of their parents constitutes
a group deserving of special judicial protection (that is, is suspect or
quasi-suspect) is an entirely novel legal question, because no one has
ever brought an equal protection suit on behalf of such a group.
Most likely, few, if any, people have ever considered this question
outside the context of litigation either. Yet, as shown above, state
and federal laws routinely discriminate in the provision of benefits on
the basis of such a classification, to the detriment of these children, so
it is a question that needs to be asked.
The discussion below reveals that such a classification does in fact
substantially satisfy all of the criteria on which the Supreme Court has
relied in the past to identify suspect and quasi-suspect clas-
sifications,245 a conclusion many will no doubt find surprising. Ac-
cordingly, if someone were to bring an equal protection claim on
behalf of children who do not receive vaccinations because of their
parents' religious objections, or on behalf of students in religious
schools, the courts should conclude that these children constitute at
least a quasi-suspect class and apply heightened scrutiny to laws that
single them out for lesser protection.
244. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461-70 (1981)
(upholding statute prohibiting sale of milk in plastic containers); United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,174-79 (1980) (upholding statutory provision denying
duplicate retirement benefits for persons who were no longer active railroad workers or
union members, but allowing them for those still active); New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587-94 (1979) (upholding city transit regulation excluding from
employment all persons receiving methadone maintenance treatment for heroin addiction).
245. For enumeration of these criteria, see infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has thus far designated as suspect only
classifications based on race or national origin2 6 and has expressed
reluctance to expand this designation beyond these two categories.247
The Court has expressly deemed quasi-suspect those classifications
based on illegitimacy or gender.' The courts' application of
heightened scrutiny to classifications based on illegitimacy is of
particular significance here, since it reflects judicial recognition of our
society's unjust tendency to visit suffering on children based on
conduct of their parents that society regards unfavorably-something
over which the children have no control. 49 The Court manifested
246. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("The
general rule [of rationality review] gives way.., when a statute classifies by race, alienage,
or national origin.... [T]hese laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained
only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest."); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (invalidating state law prohibiting interracial marriage); Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1948) (invalidating state law forbidding aliens ineligible
for American citizenship to acquire, own, occupy, lease, or transfer agricultural land).
247. See Matthew Poppe, Note, Defining the Scope of the Equal Protection Clause with
Respect to Welfare Waiting Periods, 61 U. CHi. L. REv. 291, 310, 314 n.158 (1994).
248. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461-65 (1988) (invalidating a state statute of
limitations requiring that legal actions to establish parentage of an illegitimate child must
be brought within six years of the child's birth); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7-18 (1983)
(invalidating state law requiring paternity suits to be brought within two years of birth);
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (stating that classification
based on gender must be substantially related to important governmental interest); Mills
v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1982) (holding that classification based on illegitimacy
must be "substantially related to a legitimate state interest"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objections and
must be substantially related to achievement of these objectives.").
249. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977) ("State may [not] attempt
to influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of
their illegitimate relationships."); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 336 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he immorality of the mother has no rational connection with the need of
her children under any welfare program."). In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972), the Court stated:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But
visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.
Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his
birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an
unjust-way of deterring the parent.
Id. at 175; see also Max Stier, Note, Corruption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the
Sins of the Parents Should Not Matter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 727 (1992) (arguing that the
principle that children should not have to suffer for the immoral or unlawful acts of their
parents is embedded in the United States Constitution, and that classifications of children
on the basis of such parental conduct should be subject to heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause).
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this same recognition in applying heightened scrutiny in Plyler v.
Doe'0 to a law adversely affecting undocumented alien children,
whom the Court described at one point as "children not accountable
for their disabling status."'" A major thrust of this Article is that
it is just as unjust to visit suffering on children based on their parents'
"pieties" as it is to visit suffering on them based on their parents'
"sins," since children are in both cases wholly unaccountable for their
disabling status.
The Court has reached its conclusions as to what constitutes a
suspect or quasi-suspect class by considering a number of factors: (1)
the likelihood that the defining characteristics could ever be relevant
to a legitimate state purpose, 2 2 (2) the presence of a history of
purposefully unequal treatment, 3 (3) the ability of the disad-
vantaged group to affect the political process,' and (4) whether the
defining characteristic of group members is something over which they
250. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
251. Id. at 223. Also note Justice Powell's concurrance, id. at 238, 239 n.3, contrasting
Plyler with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), which
upheld a state financing scheme that allegedly afforded children in certain districts a
poorer education, on the basis that "in Rodriguez no group of children was singled out by
the State and then penalized because of their parents' status. Rather, funding for
education varied across the State because of the tradition of local control." See also Flores
v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1362 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (finding that the deference courts
usually owe to federal policy regarding immigration is not appropriate when minors are
involved).
252. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985) (stating that
race, alienage, and national origin "are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or
deserving as others," while gender "generally provides no sensible ground for differential
treatment"); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 689
(1973) (plurality opinion) (invalidating on equal protection grounds federal statute
permitting males in armed services automatic dependency allowance for wives but
requiring servicewomen to prove their husbands dependent; "[W]hat differentiates sex
from such non-suspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability ... is that the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.").
But see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) ("Our heightened-
scrutiny precedents belie the claim that a characteristic must virtually always be irrelevant
to warrant heightened scrutiny."); id. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment):
That assertion suggests the Court would somehow have us calculate the
percentage of "situations" in which a characteristic is validly and invalidly
invoked before determining whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate. But
heightened scrutiny has not been "triggered" in our past cases only after some
undefined numerical threshold of invalid "situations" has been crossed.
253. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441, 448; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
254. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (stating that discrimination based upon race,
alienage, or national origin "is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means"); Plyler,
457 U.S. at 216 n.14; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
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have control.' 5  This Part explains how each of these factors is
present in the case of children of religious objectors.
a. Likelihood of Relevance
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly articulated the
relative importance of the factors it considers, an apparently essential
prerequisite for suspectness or quasi-suspectness is an extremely low
likelihood that a defining characteristic is relevant to proper legislative
purposes. The question whether the likelihood is high or low essen-
tially asks how often, or in how many types of situations, the class of
persons with the defining characteristic will be similarly situated to
persons not in the class. If different treatment of persons with a
certain characteristic will often be justifiable, because that characteris-
tic renders them dissimilarly situated with respect to the purposes of
some laws, then courts may reasonably operate on the basis of a
presumption in any given case that, in treating such persons different-
ly from others, a state has acted for proper reasons, rather than out
of ill-will or indifference toward them. Primarily on the basis of this
factor, the Supreme Court has declined to ascribe suspect or quasi-
suspect status to groups defined by old ag e 6 or mental retarda-
tion, 7 whose members may have significantly diminished capacities
that justify special legal treatment in many contexts."' Lower
courts have declined to treat handicapped children as a suspect class
for the same reason.29 In contrast, race is a suspect class in part
because it is almost never relevant to a proper legislative purpose.2"
The average person's intuitive response to the question whether
the religion of a child's parents is likely to be relevant to state
objectives in connection with education or medical care for children
255. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
256. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (upholding state law requiring
uniformed state police officers to retire at age 50); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976) (same).
257. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442, 446.
258. The Court has treated gender and illegitimacy as quasi-suspect rather than suspect
primarily because it has concluded that these characteristics may correlate with "real
differences" that may be relevant to proper legislative purposes in some cases. See Poppe,
supra note 247, at 312.
259. See Leah Hammett, Comment, Protecting Children With Aids Against Arbitrary
Exclusion from School, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1373, 1395 (1986).
260. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452-53 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that
discrimination in granting the franchise on the basis of skin color, height, or weight would
be utterly irrational, since "[n]one of these attributes has any bearing at all on the citizen's
willingness or ability to exercise that civil right.").
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might well be that it is very likely to be relevant. Parents' religious
beliefs often lead them to seek a non-standard form of up-bringing for
their child, in order to raise the child within their religious tradition
and to dispose the child to adhere to the parents' religion later in life.
It is important to recognize that this response rests on a misunderstan-
ding of the inquiry, insofar as it focuses on the desires of parents
rather than on the relationship between characteristics of the child
and the purposes of child welfare legislation. 1 Just as in the case
of race or illegitimacy, the focus must be on whether the defining
characteristic of members of the disfavored class makes them unlike
other persons with respect to their needs and innate abilities, not on
whether that characteristic leads other individuals to want to deny
them certain social benefits.
Like race, the religion of one's parents bears no inherent relation
to one's native ability to benefit from education and to develop into
a productive, self-sufficient, fulfilled adult human being. Nor does it
bear any inherent relation to one's susceptibility to disease or psycho-
logical harm from demeaning treatment.262 Like race, gender,
illegitimacy, and the criminality of one's parents, the way society
responds to this characteristic- for instance, by making it the basis
for denying opportunities for education and other aspects of well-
being-can effectively thwart development of one's native capacities,
and so impair one's ability to benefit from further education.2" The
relationship between a child's native potential and the defining
characteristic, however, must be the controlling factor.2'6 Indeed,
261. Cf Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("Government must exercise [its] powers so as not to discriminate between
[its] inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of
regulation.") (emphasis added).
262. See supra Part H.B.
263. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (describing how racial
segregation in schooling impaired the development of black children and handicapped
them for life).
264. Cf. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (rejecting as a justification for
dismissal of a gay midshipman from the United States Naval Academy the claim that
homosexuals are more susceptible to being blackmailed, because the policy of excluding
homosexuals from the military is itself the cause of this situation, not any inherent
characteristic of homosexuals). One commentator has observed that in Brown, the
Supreme Court
seems to have recognized, without explicitly stating as much, that a discriminatory
society had itself created any existing disparities in education ability. Catherine
MacKinnon has similarly argued that to require that women and men be similarly
situated before courts can intervene on women's behalf is to use the law to
perpetuate women's socially constructed inequality ....
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the central purpose of equal protection law is to eradicate socially
constructed impediments to individuals' development and use of their
native capacities.(
There may be a very limited set of circumstances, though, in
which the religious beliefs of a child's parents place the child in a
situation sufficiently different from that of other children to suggest
the need for different treatment for the sake of the child, because of
the unique nature of the parent-child relationship. The beliefs of
one's parents do not affect one's basic needs or native abilities, but
they may unavoidably affect the degree to which one's needs can be
satisfied or one's abilities successfully developed within a given legal
and social environment. In addition to medical care and education,
children also need an intimate, nurturing relationship with their
parents, 2 6 and for some few children this relationship might be
damaged by imposing on their parents certain state regulations
because of how the parents would react. As discussed further below,
in relation to possible justifications for parental religious exemptions,
some parents might become somewhat alienated from their children
were the children to receive medical care or instruction that the
parents regard as sinful. This in turn could impair the child's
psychological, emotional, intellectual, and even physical development.
Like mental retardation, then, some parents' religious beliefs may
render their children simply unable to benefit, on the whole, from
certain child welfare mandates.
Little evidence is available to suggest for how many parents in
how many situations this might be true. One would have to view
parental attachment to children in general as rather weak to say that
Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Note, Where Privacy Fails: Equal Protection and the Abortion
Rights of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 612 n.99 (1993).
265. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982):
In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural
heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront
to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmen-
tal barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of
individual merit.
See also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,729-30 (1982) (finding that
a university's policy admitting only women to nursing college "tends to perpetuate the
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job... and makes the assumption
that nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy").
266. In contrast, members of racial minorities do not have a fundamental need for
intimate relations with white persons, so how their race affects other people is arguably
less relevant to their own needs and abilities, and therefore not a proper consideration in
determining whether they should enjoy the same social and legal benefits that others
enjoy.
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any of the child welfare and education laws now on the books would
cause many parents to become alienated from their children if applied
universally. A conclusion that this concern would rarely, if ever, arise
finds support in the fact, discussed further below, that legislatures and
courts never predicate their support for religious exemptions to child
welfare and education laws on any concern for the developmental
interests of children, but rather endorse such exemptions solely out of
solicitude for the parents' religious desires. It also finds support in
the fact that religious groups have in the past proven doctrinally
adaptable to the legal environment in which they operate.267
b. History of Discrimination
The second factor in determining whether a class is suspect or
quasi-suspect-a history of purposeful unequal treatment-is less
obviously present in the instant situation than in the case of race or
gender. Surely there is a long history of discrimination against and
disrespectful treatment of children in general,268 but the class under
discussion here is not children generally but rather a subgroup of
children defined by their parents' non-mainstream religious views. By
some accounts, in previous centuries of our nation's history, parents
did not enjoy great freedom to depart from community norms
regarding child-rearing when they disagreed with those norms on
religious (or any other) grounds.2 69  Accordingly, children of
267. See infra note 416 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Lois G. FORER, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE
ELDERLY IN COURT 176 (1991) (noting that under the common law children "simply did
not have the right not to be abused"); id. at 195 (noting that exclusion of children from
legal rights reflects the status of children since the earliest period of recorded history);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child
as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1036-50 (1992) (describing how legal treatment
of children as property has persisted in this century); Christina Dugger Sommer, Note,
Empowering Children: Granting Foster Children the Right to Initiate Parental Rights
Termination Proceedings, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1200, 1204 (1994) (citing authority for the
proposition that "[e]arly American courts adopted the English common law view that
children possessed virtually no legal rights and were comparable to chattel or prized
possessions of their fathers").
269. See, eg., STEPHANIE COoNTz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN
FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 125-26 (1992) ("[T]he private, autonomous family
of mythical tradition was, paradoxically, largely a creation of judicial activism in the
nineteenth century and state regulation in the twentieth."); Developments in the Law-The
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1223 (1980) (noting that, in the
nineteenth century, American society regarded parents' custody of children as a delegation
of the State's responsibility for the well-being of children, and the "presumption of
parental custody was based upon the extent to which the parent successfully served the
state's interest in promoting the child's welfare").
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religious dissenters received the same (very minimal) protection from
harmful parental choices as did children of adherents to the majority
faith.
This situation changed dramatically in this century, however, as
the Supreme Court discovered in the Constitution a requirement that
states accommodate religious dissenter parents to some degree, and
as legislatures began including religious exemptions in child welfare
statutes. The Supreme Court's pro-accommodation stance originated
in the 1920s with Pierce v. Society of Sisters,.'0 which struck down
a state statute requiring all children to attend public schools, when
operators of Catholic schools challenged the law.271 It came into full
force in 1972 with Wisconsin v. Yoder,' which held that the Free
Exercise Clause requires states to allow isolated, traditional religious
270. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
271. Id at 534-35. The Court did not actually base its decision in Pierce on the parents'
religious beliefs, but rather on the school operators' liberty interests and on parents' more
generalized interest in being free to direct the upbringing of their children as they see fit.
Id. This decision thus established that states must defer to some degree to the choices of
parents, whatever their basis, with respect to whether their children will receive certain
state-provided benefits.
272. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see CooNrz, supra note 269, at 141-43 (noting that beginning
in the late 1960s, lower courts constricted states' control over families).
Between 1925 and 1972, the Court rendered two decisions declining to find in the
Free Exercise Clause a requirement that states exempt religious groups from child health
and safety rules. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court upheld a state
law prohibiting guardians from allowing their children to distribute literature in the streets
at night, against the religious objection of one child's guardian, who was a member of a
minority religion, the Jehovah's Witnesses. Early in its opinion, the Court endorsed the
general proposition that parents' or guardians' religious beliefs were not a permissible basis
on which to deny certain children the protection of child welfare laws, stating: "Parents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the
age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves." Id. at
170. Before closing, however, the Court backed away from this statement somewhat, by
suggesting that in some circumstances the state should accord special deference to parents'
choices when they are religiously motivated: "We neither lay the foundation 'for any [that
is, every] state intervention in the indoctrination and participation of children in religion'
which may be done 'in the name of their health and welfare' nor give warrant for 'every
limitation on their religious training and activities.' " Id. at 171 (alteration in original).
Twenty-four years later, the Court affirmed a state court decision that was based on a
principle like that enunciated in Prince-that is, that parents' religious beliefs do not
entitle them to make martyrs of their children. In King County Hosp. v. Jehovah's
Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (mem.), the
state court had upheld a juvenile court order of blood transfusions for children of
Jehovah's Witnesses when necessary to save the life of the children. The Prince and King
County decisions thus amount to a qualified judicial rejection of the notion that some
classes of children need not receive the protection of child welfare laws simply because
their welfare interests conflict with the religious preferences of their parents.
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groups like the Amish to keep their children out of secondary
school.2 73 Since then, lower courts have frequently invoked Yoder,
in contexts not involving the Amish or any similar group, to find that
states must exempt parents with religious objections from some child-
protective mandates.274 As discussed in Part I, legislatures in recent
decades have gone well beyond these court decisions to accommodate
the religious beliefs of parents and, correspondingly, to deny religious
objectors' children the benefits of many child welfare and education
laws.275
The history of discrimination against children of religious
objectors in this country thus may not be particularly long, at least in
comparison to the history of discrimination against racial minorities
and women. However, such discrimination has some history and, just
as importantly, it has a very strong present and, it seems, an even
stronger future. The fact that states are becoming increasingly
discriminatory against children of religious objectors, rather than less,
itself provides a reason for special judicial scrutiny of such
discrimination. For the courts to wait until this discrimination has
gone on for a couple of centuries before taking special notice of the
phenomenon and carefully examining justifications for it surely makes
no sense,276 particularly in light of the fact, discussed below, that the
273. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218-19. The Court found that the Amish religion requires its
adherents to cloister their children once they reach an age at which they might begin to
be influenced by mainstream culture and the religious beliefs of non-Amish persons. Id.
at 210-12.
274. See State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 (Ohio 1976) (invalidating school
regulations as applied to fundamentalist Christian schools); In re Green, 292 A.2d 387,390-
91 (Pa. 1972) (refusing to order surgery for child of Jehovah's Witness). They have done
so even though the Supreme Court emphasized the special circumstances of the Amish,
whose children, in the Court's view, could be expected to remain within the Amish
community (some obvious circularity here) and so need not receive such education as
would prepare them for full participation in mainstream American social and political
culture. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235-36; Dwyer, supra note 13, at 1389-1402.
275. See supra notes 60-75, 110-19, 146-60 and accompanying text. Most of the spiritual
treatment exemptions to neglect laws in place today were first enacted in the 1970s in
response to the federal government's directive to states, in the Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. § 5101-5107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), to create such
an exemption. Rosato, supra note 1, at 58-59. In the mid-1980s, over half the states in this
country enacted new legislation permitting parents to choose home schooling as an
alternative to public school attendance. Kara T. Burgess, Comment, The Constitutionality
of Home Education Statutes, 55 UMKC L. REV. 69, 69 (1986). Twenty-three states
repealed teacher certification requirements in the 1980s. Devins, supra note 9, at 819.
276. At least one judge has recognized the problem in its most general form. See
FORER, supra note 268, at 41:
The most alarming trend in the decade of the 1980s has been the tendency of the
courts to give the interests of society and the family precedence over the rights
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political process is unlikely to correct this trend. Girls in fundamen-
talist Christian and Jewish Orthodox schools today are already on
their way to joining their mothers as members of a social and political
underclass, and they deserve the state's protection now to ensure that
this does not occur.
In this regard, we should consider why a history of discrimination
elicits special judicial concern. Such a history appears to be relevant
because it reveals ingrained hostility and prejudice or a habit of
indifference to the interests of the disfavored group, which may have
the consequence of consigning this group to permanent second class
status.2" With respect to children of religious objectors, state indif-
ference to their interests is obvious from the reading of judicial opin-
ions deciding disputes between religious objector parents and the
states over the care and education of the children. Judges, reflecting
the nature of arguments put forward by state officials and parents,
consistently reason about these disputes as if the state (that is, the rest
of society) and the parents were the only parties with an interest in
the dispute, manifesting little or no recognition of the separate
personhood and distinct interests of children vis-a-vis their parents
and the primacy of the child's stake in the outcome of the dispute."
of women, children, and the elderly. This is a regressive movement. In the
Middle Ages the rights and obligations of the individual were subsumed in those
of the family.
Judge Forer makes no mention, however, of the particular manifestation of this problem
in the form of religious exemptions to child welfare and education laws. Judge Forer
argues that children should receive judicial recognition as a suspect class. Id. at 43.
277. Justice Stevens suggested that a history of discriminatory treatment is relevant
because it indicates a greater likelihood that a legislature used a particular classification
without pausing to consider its justification: "Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem
acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen,
legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our history there was the same inertia in
distinguishing between black and white." Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520-21 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also TRIBE, supra note 218, at 1516-19:
The goal of the equal protection clause is not to stamp out impure thoughts, but
to guarantee a full measure of human dignity for all. [Beyond] the purposeful,
affirmative adoption or use of rules that disadvantage [them], minorities can also
be injured when the government is "only" indifferent to their suffering or
"merely" blind to how prior official discrimination contributed to it and how
current official acts will perpetuate it.
278. See, e.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp.
81, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (describing a religious exemption to New York's vaccination law
as reflecting "a highly praiseworthy urge to minimize imposition of the state's inoculation
program upon adherents of religious belief systems whose teachings are at odds with"
immunization); Dalli v. Board of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Mass. 1971) (striking down
a narrow religious exemption to a state's compulsory vaccination law on Establishment
Clause and equal protection (for parents) grounds, describing the exemption as "an
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Furthermore, although children of religious objectors have not
incurred the same hostility that racial minorities have, judicial
opinions addressing parental religious exemptions do display a kind
of prejudice regarding these children. In many cases judges, and
undoubtedly legislators as well, appear to assume that children, no
matter how young, are already or will necessarily become adherents
of their parents' religion, and so attribute to the children the same
values, preferences, and choices that their parents articulate. For
example, the Supreme Court in Yoder unreflectively assumed that all
children of Amish parents would become members of the Amish faith
and want to remain within the Amish community.279 Historically,
children have tended to adopt the religious views and lifestyle of their
parents, but this tendency appears to be declining and, in any event,
a prediction on this score cannot permissibly be determinative of a
child's entitlement to equal opportunity. As the Supreme Court
stated in Plyler v Doe, the " 'benefits of education are not reserved
to those whose productive utilization of them is a certainty.' 5280
Indeed, such a prediction, particularly in deciding matters of
educational opportunity, suffers from being self-fulfilling. The likeli-
hood of children coming to adopt the views of their parents-such as
the belief that females are inferior to males-itself depends to a
significant degree on whether the state ensures them an education
that broadens their opportunities and their awareness of alternative
views and fosters in them the capacity for independent thought. In
presuming that certain children will not need the same education most
other children receive, the state effectively prevents the former from
entering the world in which that education is necessary. Clearly the
appropriate mark of deference to the sincere religious beliefs of the few which at the same
time created a minimal hazard to the health of the many," and urging the plaintiffs to seek
a broader exemption from the legislature). Such indifference is also characteristic of much
scholarly commentary on the subject of religious exemptions to child welfare and
education laws. See Dwyer, supra note 13, at 1399 n.104, 1410 n.162 (citing examples in
the academic literature).
279. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972); see also Moody v. Cronin, 484 F.
Supp. 270, 276 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (sustaining a parental free exercise objection to co-ed
physical education, the court stated that "daily exposure of the children to worldly
influences in terms of attitudes and values of dress contrary to their religious beliefs ...
interferes with the religious development of the Pentecostal children and their integration
into the ... Pentecostal ... community at the crucial adolescent stage of development");
Dalli, 267 N.E.2d at 222-23 (holding that a religious exemption to child immunization laws
violated the equal protection rights of parents not included within the exemption, and
giving no consideration to the health interests of these parents' children).
280. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569,
581 n.14 (E.D. Tex. 1978)).
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state may not discriminate by gender in the provision of benefits such
as education to children, based on an assumption that many or most
women are content being housewives who do not pursue careers
outside the home.s1 Similarly, an assumption about the future reli-
gious preferences of children, based on the religious preferences of
their parents, is an inappropriate basis on which to create legislative
classifications.'
c. Political Power
The third factor in the determination of suspect or quasi-suspect
status-ability to influence the political process in one's favor-has its
origins in the Supreme Court's earliest statement of the need for
heightened equal protection scrutiny in some circumstances, the
famous Carolene Products footnote." This suggests that this factor
is especially important to the determination of the appropriate level
of scrutiny.' So too does basic common sense; those members of
our society who require the greatest judicial protection from the
political process are precisely those who are least able to ensure that
that process adequately accounts for their interests. As Justice
Marshall expressed it, a group's political powerlessness is a critical
consideration because it points to "a social and cultural isolation that
gives the majority little reason to respect or be concerned with that
group's interests and needs."'  By affording such a group
281. Cf. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76,88 (1979) (finding that discrimination based
on gender in provision of aid to families was based on traditional but illegitimate presup-
position that the father rather than the mother is the primary breadwinner in any given
family).
282. One might also argue that no matter what belief system individuals adopt as
adults, they may benefit, or at least not suffer, from having received the full range of child
.welfare and education benefits before they reached the age of majority.
283. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (dictum)
(stating that exacting judicial scrutiny may be appropriate when legislation reflects
prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities," because such prejudice "tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities").
284. In concluding that homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
courts have emphasized their ability to participate in the political process and to attract
the attention of legislators. E.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990); Dahl v. Secretary of the Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324
(E.D. Cal. 1993) (invalidating discharge of homosexual man from Navy).
285. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Adult members of conservative religious groups in this
country generally make a deliberate effort to isolate themselves and their children from
the rest of society to a greater degree than do other persons. In LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452
N.W.2d 1, 3 (Neb. 1990), for instance, the court wrote:
1404 [Vol. 74
CHILDREN OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS
heightened protection, courts seek to ensure that a state's laws reflect
a regard for the interests of members of the group that is equal to
that given the interests of more powerful constituencies, and thereby
to secure for members of the group the standing as equal citizens to
which they are morally and constitutionally entitled and that they
would otherwise lack. s6
Of course, this factor counts in favor of children of religious
objectors at least as heavily as it does in favor of any other suspect or
quasi-suspect group. This factor is perhaps least supportive of
suspectness for race or gender, since today persons of all races and
both genders have equal formal rights to vote and run for political
office.' While the effective political power of women and
minorities may not be in full proportion to their numbers, it is
nevertheless quite considerable. Persons who cannot even vote, on
the other hand, such as aliens and illegitimate children, are obviously
less able to capture political power themselves. These groups thus
properly receive special solicitude when the outcome of the political
process is unfavorable to them.
Significantly though, it is likely that even aliens and illegitimate
children will have some representation in the political process, albeit
indirectly. In the case of aliens, there may be citizen relatives, em-
ployers, and/or immigrants' rights groups who can and are motivated
to vote and advocate in other ways for their interests. In the case of
illegitimate children, as with children generally, there is usually at
Members of the Jehovah's Witnesses religion are counseled strongly against
allowing their children to participate in sports activities with people outside their
congregation, and the children are discouraged from participation in organizations
such as Cub Scouts or Boy Scouts. Parents would be strongly counseled about
the dangers involved in being in those kinds of organizations.
See also ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 231 (1985) (noting that the
evangelical Christian church "separates its members off from attachment to the wider
society").
286. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (stating that the
"presumption of constitutionality and the approval given 'rational' classifications in other
types of enactments are based on an assumption that the institutions of state government
are structured so as to represent fairly all the people").
287. Poppe notes that "the political power of some traditionally suspect classes has
increased greatly in the past few decades without any effect on their status under the
Equal Protection Clause." Poppe, supra note 247, at 314. But see Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) ("It is true, of course, that when viewed in the abstract,
women do not constitute a small and powerless minority. Nevertheless, in part because
of past discrimination, women are vastly underrepresented in this Nation's decisionmaking
councils.").
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least one parent who has an interest in advocating on their behalf
against the state.2,
In contrast, not only are children of religious objectors unable
themselves to participate in the political process, but in addition, the
persons who ordinarily would indirectly represent their temporal
interests in the public sphere-their parents-cannot be expected to
do so in this specific context. In fact, their parents can be expected
to oppose their temporal interests in the political process in connec-
tion with those child welfare and education laws to which they have
a religious objection. In such cases, the parents' own preferences are
in conflict with those particular interests of the children that the laws
in question are designed to protect.' Accordingly, the political
power of these children with respect to these interests is not simply
nil; it could actually be characterized as effectively negative in value,
since there are identifiable persons who can be expected always to
advocate against those interests, while there is no one who can be
depended upon to advocate for their interests. 20
288. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment):
Statutes discriminating against the young have not been common nor need be
feared because those who do vote and legislate were once themselves young,
typically have children of their own, and certainly interact regularly with minors.
Their social integration means that minors, unlike discrete and insular minorities,
tend to be treated in legislative arenas with full concern and respect, despite their
formal and complete exclusion from the electoral process.
But see Stier, supra note 249, at 737 (pointing out that statutes punishing children for the
conduct of their parents are typically aimed at parents who are themselves relatively
politically powerless-such as aliens, unwed parents, and welfare recipients-or who have
interests in conflict with those of their children, such as noncustodial parents).
289. This is not to suggest any hostility or ill will toward children on the part of these
parents. The problem is that parents put their own views of their child's spiritual interests,
or about the will of God, before the temporal interests of their children. Witness the
comments of one man in New York in 1980 after being acquitted of manslaughter for
allowing his child to die for lack of medical treatment: The father stated that his son was
"a pioneer whose purpose was to establish the right of parents to make these decisions for
their children and to keep Governor Carey and his faceless bureaucrats out of the family."
Walter H. Waggoner, Boy, 10, in Laetrile Case Dies, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1980, at D13.
See note 163 supra for an explanation of the distinction between temporal interests and
spiritual interests.
290. The situation of these children would thus be somewhat analogous to that of
women, if they were unable to vote, with respect to spousal abuse legislation. The archaic
assumption that the husband represents the interests of a married couple in the public
sphere would obviously be perverse in that context. An assumption of parental
representation of "family interests" in connection with exemptions to child welfare
mandates is even more perverse, since children have even less of a voice than adults who
cannot vote, being generally unable even to understand and articulate a view contrary to
that of their parents.
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This discussion, one might object, begs the question of what the
interests of religious objectors' children are. Religious objectors
themselves would no doubt assert that they are protecting children's
spiritual interests. In considering the moral propriety and
constitutionality of a state's decision to exclude certain children from
the ambit of protective legislation, however, one must adopt the
perspective of the state, which is charged with the responsibility of
identifying and protecting the fundamental interests of in-
dividuals-particularly incompetent individuals. In carrying out this
responsibility, the state may not assume that children, or any other
persons, have spiritual interests. To do so would require the state to
take a position on an essentially religious issue, which the Establish-
ment Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, prohibits it from
doing.29 Moreover, the state may not simply defer to the judgment
of parents that their children have spiritual interests of a certain
nature and that those interests outweigh the children's material needs,
any more than it could permissibly defer to the judgment of one
group of adults as to the spiritual interests of another group of
adults.292 The state itself must determine what children's fundamen-
tal interests are and, in doing so, may only consider children's
temporal well-being.
Parents are not the only source of indirect political representation
in our society. Unlike persons who are mentally retarded, however,
children of religious objectors have no large and vocal third-party
constituency advocating for their interests.293 Significantly, no one
has ever filed a law suit challenging discrimination against them, and
no legislature has ever enacted a law specifically prohibiting
discrimination against them.294 State education and social services
291. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) (holding that
religious displays on government property are impermissible because "[t]he Establishment
Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief"); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (striking down a tax exemption benefiting only religious publications
because "the Constitution prohibits, at the very least, legislation that constitutes an
endorsement of one or another set of religious beliefs or of religion generally").
292. For example, if members of a religious group were to claim that, by setting fire to
abortion clinics, they were serving the spiritual interests of doctors who perform abortions,
the state could not accept this claim as true and make it the basis for granting the group
an exemption from arson laws.
293. One small, little known group in Massachusetts that does so is CHILD (Children's
Healthcare Is a Legal Duty), founded by Rita Swan, a former Christian Scientist.
294. In Clebume, the Court noted the increasing efforts of state and federal legislators
to outlaw unjustifiable discrimination against persons who are mentally retarded, as a basis
for deciding that they do not constitute a suspect class. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
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officials and legislators who once looked out for them to some degree
are increasingly giving up on these children, wearied by confrontations
with militant groups of religious parents. 295  Some medical or-
ganizations have in the past lobbied to eliminate religious objector
exemptions to child welfare laws, but their efforts also appear to have
waned, their attention turned to other concerns. Feminist scholars
and women's advocates have been conspicuously silent about the
sexist practices of conservative religious schools, as if oblivious to the
fact that the girls in these schools are incurring harm that is unques-
tionably worse than that incurred by girls in the average public school
or by women in many of the employment situations that they rightly
and vehemently condemn. As to this third factor, then, children of
religious objectors stand above all other groups in their need for
"extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process., 296
d. Control Over Defining Characteristic
With respect to groups of children in particular, the Supreme
Court has relied on the lack of control factor in finding the existence
of a quasi-suspect class. In Plyler v. Doe,297 the Court contrasted
the situation of the undocumented alien children with that of their
parents. The parents had chosen to enter the country illegally, and so
were properly subject to punishment for their actions. 29 The
children, on the other hand, had not chosen to enter the country.
They were being punished "on the basis of a legal characteristic over
which children can have little control."2' Children " 'can affect
neither their parents' conduct nor their own status.' "" The Court
thus held that imposing a burden on the children because of the
conduct of their parents "does not comport with fundamental
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,443 (1985) ("[L]awmakers have been addressing their difficulties
in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice."). The Court found that the
passage of numerous laws guaranteeing these persons equal rights or special benefits
demonstrated substantial public support for their interests. Id. at 445; cf Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding military draft registration applicable to males and
not females, and finding that wide-ranging debate on the issue belies suggestion that the
discrimination was just the result of traditional, stereotyped ways of thinking about
women).
295. See Devins, supra note 9, at 825-34; Rosato, supra note 1, at 59, 61 (noting the
successful lobbying efforts of Christian Scientists).
296. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
297. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
298. Id. at 220.
299. Id.
300. Id. (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).
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conceptions of justice., 30 1 In particular, doing so would be inconsis-
tent with" 'the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."3
301. Id.
302. Id (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)); see
also Aguayo v. Christopher, 865 F. Supp. 479, 491 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (striking down as
irrational federal law discriminating in grant of citizenship against "disfavored class, whose
only misfortune under the statute was to be born of citizen mothers instead of citizen
fathers"); Sonya C. ex reL Olivas v. A.S.D.B., 743 F. Supp. 700, 713 (D. Ariz. 1990)
(holding that denial of special educational services and social security payments to citizen
child unable to enter country because parents are not citizens violates the Equal Protection
Clause because it "in effect would penalize her for her parents' status"). MCWHIRTER,
supra note 230, at 106, writes:
Scholars have argued that the Equal Protection Clause should be interpreted to
mean, at a minimum, that, unless it has a very good reason for doing so, a
government should not make distinctions between groups of people based on
characteristics that people are born with and cannot do anything about.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Plyler, which current Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor, as well as former Justice White, joined, challenged the majority's
reliance on this factor. It stated that "the Equal Protection Clause does not preclude
legislators from classifying among persons on the basis of factors and characteristics over
which individuals may be said to lack 'control.' " Plyler, 457 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). It then alluded to mental health, mental illness, and country of residence as
examples of factors that may be a proper basis for legislative classifications and yet over
which persons have no control. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The first two examples,
however, are characteristics that may be a proper basis for classification only because they
are often correlated with special needs and abilities, the first factor considered above. The
dissenters seem mistakenly to imply that lack of control is the only factor that the majority
considered. As to the third example, adults who are residents of other countries are able
to avoid entering the United States, so their choosing to do so illegally may be a proper
basis for a legislative classification. Discrimination among adult or minor residents of
different countries for immigration purposes is also permissible, because non-citizen
persons who are not in this country do not enjoy the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Children who are residents of another country but are in the United States
illegally generally have not chosen to be here, and this does make problematic a
classification among children based on their country of lawful residence. The dissenters'
suggestion that "a state legislature is not barred from considering... relevant differences
between... the residents of different counties," id. at 245 (Burger, CJ., dissenting), simply
begs the question at issue in Plyler-whether there are relevant differences between
children who are lawful residents of the U.S. and those who are not, in light of the fact
that the members of neither group choose to be where they are.
The dissenters also pointed to Rodriguez, in which the Court found no quasi-suspect
class even though the children had no control over the school district in which they lived.
Id. at 245 n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973)). As the dissenters noted, however, "[t]here was no suggestion in that
case that a child's 'lack of responsibility' for his residence in a particular school district had
any relevance to the proper standard of review," id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting), so the Court
never addressed that issue. Moreover, the Court on a later occasion indicated an
important distinction between classifications based on personal characteristics or status and
those based on political or geographical area. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S.
450,462 (1988). The former type of classification is clearly more likely to reflect invidious
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These principles clearly apply to children of religious objectors as
well; they have no control over their parents' religious beliefs. To
ever predicate denial of statutory benefits to them on their parents'
religious beliefs thus plainly raises concerns about fundamental fair-
ness.
The lack of control factor is sometimes characterized in terms of
the immutability of the defining characteristic."° Race and gender,
for example, are for the most part immutable traits. Being the minor
child of persons with particular religious views is not an immutable
trait in the sense that persons who have it will always have it, since
most such children will eventually become adults. However, the
relevance of immutability to judicial review analysis appears to lie in
its relation to the moral concern just discussed-that it is unfair to
punish people for traits over which they have no control," 4 which
does pertain to these children, as well as to a practical or political
concern that also applies to these children. The latter concern is that
political majorities are most likely to discriminate against a group to
which they never have belonged and never will belong."0 The
discrimination and to be less susceptible to political correction than the latter. In
Rodriguez,the Court stated:
[A]ppellees' suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a
system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous class,
unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have
less taxable wealth than other districts. The system of alleged discrimination and
the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). The Plyler dissenters
also charged that the State was not thrusting any disabilities on the children "due to their
'status of birth,' " but rather due to their illegal presence in the country. Plyler, 457 U.S.
at 246 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters' position ultimately rests on the premise
that states" 'may take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and
this country,' " Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80
(1976))-in particular, that an alien does not legally belong in this country. Id. at 246,250
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). This premise does not apply to the case of discrimination among
groups of citizen children residing within the same political and geographical area based
solely on the religious beliefs and choices of their parents.
303. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. See. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
573 (9th Cir. 1990).
304. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) ("Moreover, since sex, like
race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident
of birth, the imposition of special disabilities ... would seem to violate 'the basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual respon-
sibility.' ") (citation omitted).
305. Poppe, supra note 247, at 314; cf Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) ("But even old age does not define a 'discrete and insular' group
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majority can heap disabilities on such a group without concern that
they will ever have to suffer those disabilities themselves, and is also
unlikely to be checked by empathy.
Of course, no adult need fear that she will become a member of
the disadvantaged class under discussion here. On the other hand, all
adults have been children at one time and so can empathize with the
plight of children up to a point. For most adults, though, that point,
however far it might reach in relation to children in general, is not
likely to reach the experience of children of members of the religious
minorities under discussion here. Most Americans probably have
little idea what it is like to grow up in a Christian Science household,
or to be raised by Hassidic Jews, fundamentalist Christians, or
conservative Catholics and receive schooling only in a church
school," 6 let alone what growing up in a reclusive religious cult such
as that of the Waco, Texas Branch Davidians is like. Those who had
such an upbringing themselves, moreover, are probably more likely
to identify with the religious views of parents rather than with the
secular interests of the children.
In addition, probably very few federal or state legislators were
once children of religious parents who wanted to deny them medical
care or a mainstream education (which is itself indicative of the
relative educational deprivation that children in these communities
suffer).3" They can thus blithely legislate away benefits for children
who are in such families today without fear and without pangs of
empathetic suffering, perhaps even believing that they are doing a
good thing because they are succoring the parents, with whom they
may empathize to a substantial degree simply because they are also
parents. This point is related, clearly, to that made above regarding
in need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' Instead, it
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span.") (citation
omitted).
306. Roughly one tenth of children enrolled in American schools attend religious
schools. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, MINI-DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1994, at 8-9 (1994) (showing that
approximately 11% of the 48.8 million children enrolled in grades K-12 in school year
1993-94 were in private schools); 1 COMPARING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 33
(Edward H. Haertel ed., 1987) (showing that roughly nine-tenths of private school
enrollment was in religious schools in the last year for which separate figures for religious
schools were available).
307. Cf. Stier, supra note 249, at 737 ("All adults, however, were not punished as
children for their parents' behavior. Few legislators are likely to have had experiences
while growing up that would enable them to be sensitive to the concerns of these
children.").
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the absence of any substantial voice for the interests of these children
in the political sphere today. We in mainstream American society so
easily abandon and forget these children and never come to know
their suffering.
In sum, children of religious objectors satisfy all of the criteria for
designation as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Their defining charac-
teristic is rarely if ever relevant to their need for and ability to benefit
from child welfare and education regulations. They have a history,
albeit not particularly long, of discrimination against them vis-h-vis
other children in our society. They arguably have less representation
in the political process than any other group in this country and they
have no control over their disabling characteristic. The only
significant element of suspect class analysis lacking in their case is
hostility toward them on the part of the majority. We in the
mainstream do not feel ill-will toward children unimmunized because
of the religious beliefs of their parents, or toward children who attend
fundamentalist schools (though we might when they are adults and
have acquired traits we try to prevent our own children from
developing). We do, however, manifest substantial indifference to
them, and we feel no force pressing on us to change our disposition
toward them, other than whatever altruistic concern we can muster,
while their parents' often militant opposition to state efforts to protect
them constitutes a powerful force in favor of maintaining our
indifference. Surely children of religious objectors have at least as
great a need for, and moral claim to, special judicial protection as do
women and illegitimate children. They should enjoy at least quasi-
suspect status, and legislation that denies them benefits accorded
other children should be subject to exacting judicial scrutiny.
2. Fundamental Right or Important Interest
The Supreme Court has identified a number of fundamental
rights that trigger strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment,
including rights that are not explicitly set forth in the Constitution but
which the Court has found to be either implicit in the enumerated
constitutional rights3°s or a necessary precondition to the exercise of
308. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,638 (1969) (right to travel), overruled
in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). But see Poppe, supra note 247, at 303-
04 (noting that "[tioday, the right to travel doctrine is vulnerable to severe limitation, if
not to outright reversal").
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constitutional rights.30 9 The Court has not decided whether there
is an implicit constitutional right to medical care. It is extremely
doubtful that the Court would find it to be so, since it has held that
there is no implied constitutional right to welfare benefits, even
though welfare support "involves the most basic economic needs of
impoverished human beings,' '3' nor to adequate shelter and peace-
ful possession of one's home'
The Court has, however, deemed medical care "a basic necessity
of life"312 and a vital government benefit for persons who cannot
afford to pay for it.3 3 Medical care would therefore appear to be
a good candidate for the category of interests important enough to
trigger intermediate scrutiny. In the due process context, the Court
has held that stricter constitutional standards apply when legislation
deprives individuals of benefits, even 'gratuitous' benefits, that are
necessary to sustain life.314
309. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to
invalidate state law imposing durational residency requirement for registration to vote);
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote).
310. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483
U.S. 587, 597 (1987) (holding that state welfare programs are subject only to rationality
review unless discriminating against suspect or quasi-suspect class).
311. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (upholding under rational basis due process
review state law permitting landlord to bring expedited eviction proceedings under certain
circumstances). The Court has also held that no fundamental right to serve as a judge
exists. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). Justice Marshall once offered this
explanation for the fundamental rights criterion for strict scrutiny:
Potentially discriminatory classifications exist only where some constitutional
basis can be found for presuming that equal rights are required. Discrimination,
in the Fourteenth Amendment sense, connotes a substantive constitutional
judgment that two individuals or groups are entitled to be treated equally with
respect to something. With regard to economic and commercial matters, no basis
for such a conclusion exists, for ... the Fourteenth Amendment was not
'intended to embody a particular economic theory .... ' As a matter of
substantive policy, therefore, government is free to move in any direction, or to
change directions, in the economic and commercial sphere. The structure of
economic and commercial life is a matter of political compromise, not
constitutional principle ....
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 470-71 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
312. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,259 (1974) (invalidating state
law imposing durational residency requirement for receipt of non-emergency medical care
at county expense).
313. Id. at 261.
314. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 522 nn.17-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing decisions).
But see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768 (1975) (upholding provision of federal law
denying death benefits to wives married to decedents less than nine months) (" '[W]hen
we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program...
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Regarding education, the Supreme Court expressly declared in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez315 that
equality of educational opportunity is not a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution." 6 The Court left open the possibili-
ty, though, "that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitu-
tionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of"
constitutional rights such as free speech and voting, and so is itself a
fundamental right triggering heightened equal protection review.17
In Rodriguez, the Court suggested that this "identifiable quantum of
education" includes "an opportunity to acquire the basic minimum
the Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a
patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.") (citation omitted).
315. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
316. Id. at 35; see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988)
(finding law requiring parents in certain school districts to pay user fee for child's
transportation to school not violative of Equal Protection Clause); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202,223-24 (1982). The Court apparently applied rationality review in both Rodriguez and
Kadrmas partly because the legislation at issue was economic in nature, rather than
addressed to substantive educational policy. In Rodriguez, for example, the state's system
of taxation and school finance was under attack, and the Court explained that " 'in
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in
classification.' ... The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a
statewide public school system suggests that 'there will be more than one constitutionally
permissible method of solving them,' and that, within the limits of rationality, 'the legis-
lature's efforts to tackle the problems' should be entitled to respect." 411 U.S. at 41-42
(quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940) and Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972)). In contrast, administration of a state taxation or complex
appropriations scheme is not at issue with respect to the religious exemptions under
discussion in this Article. The question of whether all children are entitled to vaccinations
and a non-sexist education is not a complex bureaucratic matter that must be left to
legislative expertise.
317. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36; cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)
("[E]ducation is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in
our open political system."); Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary and Secondary Educ. v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 883 (1979) (noting that Kentucky state constitutional delegates
"perceived that universal education might be required in order to prepare children of the
Commonwealth to intelligently participate as citizens in a democracy"), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 438 (1980). The Rodriguez Court did not have to decide this issue because it found
"no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an
education that falls short" of this standard. 411 U.S. at 36-37; see also Kadrmas, 487 U.S.
at 466 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court's decision "does not address
the question whether a State constitutionally could deny a child access to a minimally
adequate education"); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284-85,288-89 (1986) (holding that
disparities in amounts of state funding given to different school districts may violate equal
protection if not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose).
1414 [Vol. 74
1996] CHILDREN OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS
skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process."3 8
An argument that the failure of states to regulate religious
schools more rigorously effects a complete denial of education to
children in those schools would be implausible. Even girls in
fundamentalist Christian and Orthodox Jewish schools who are
subjected to sexist teaching can still develop basic skills such as
reading, writing, and the ability to do arithmetic. One might plausibly
argue, however, that systematic training for subordination effectively
deprives these girls of the opportunity to develop capacities such as
self-expression, and elements of psychological well-being such as self-
esteem, that are necessary for enjoyment of free speech and full
participation in the political process. The fact that one rarely if ever
sees women raised in either the fundamentalist Christian tradition or
the Jewish Orthodox tradition speak out on public affairs or run for
political office suggests that this is indeed the case.319 A court might
therefore reasonably find that denial of protection against sexist
318. 411 U.S. at 37. There is no indication that the Court intended this to be an
exhaustive explication of what a minimum level of education includes. In Papasan, the
Court suggested that a minimal education would include being taught to read and write
and receiving instruction in "the educational basics," but did not explain what those basics
might be. 478 U.S. at 286.
319. An episode in New York two years ago illustrates this point. A female member
of an Orthodox Jewish community spoke out against the curtained segregation of women
in a publicly-funded bus that regularly carries Orthodox Jews to and from work. She did
so after an incident one day in which the men on the bus needed to expand the section
they used for prayer and ordered her to give up her seat, resorting to threats when she
refused. Her community, and the rest of the world, were shocked that a woman in their
community would dare to speak out publicly. See Marianne Means, The Claim of a Jewish
Rosa Parks: Orthodox Woman Holds Her Ground Against Sex Bias, L.A. DAILY J., Oct.
7, 1994, at 6, col. 6.
Within the fundamentalist Christian ranks is a large women's organization, called
Concerned Women for America, that exerts behind-the-scenes political pressure and
supports litigation to further fundamentalist goals. The fundamentalist belief that women
should not assert themselves in the public realm, however, prevents even this group from
assuming a leading, or even visible, role in the political campaigns of the religious right.
See, e-g., STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS
RIGHT, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS 64, 102-07 (1993).
Bates documents the events leading up to the Mozert litigation in Tennessee, and reveals
that while objections to the public school curriculum and policies first arose among a small
group of fundamentalist Christian mothers, these women and the rest of the local Christian
community believed that the women themselves should not lead the efforts to change
school policy, and so they recruited a man, Mr. Mozert, to lead their political and publicity
efforts and a male lawyer to bring their claims to court. Id. at 66-68.
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education to a certain group of children does implicate a fundamental
right.' 20
It warrants mention here that the rationality of the Court's
constitutional rights standard for strict scrutiny is questionable. While
this standard may offer somewhat greater objectivity than a standard
based on the judiciary's judgment of the relative importance of
various interests, it results in the triggering of strict scrutiny to protect
interests that are arguably not really fundamental, since not
everything that the Supreme Court has deemed constitutionally
protected is of fundamental importance. At the same time, it also
leads the Court to eschew heightened scrutiny when some extremely
important interests are at stake. 2' This is especially evident in the
context of child-rearing. The Court has declared, for example, that
some parents have a fundamental constitutional right to deny their
children a secondary school education .3' There is something
terribly ironic, albeit not inconsistent, about deciding that a parent's
desire to deny his children a mainstream education gives rise to a fun-
damental right, while also deciding that a child's need to receive an
education does not. Clearly a person's need to receive an education
is more important than anyone's desire to prevent someone else from
receiving an education. Significantly, a number of state courts have
declared that under their particular state's constitution, education is
a fundamental right.3"'
Even if a court addressing a challenge to exemption of religious
schools from basic education regulations were not to find that a
fundamental right is at stake, it should find that a very important
interest is at stake. In Plyler, the Court applied heightened scrutiny
in part because of the importance of the children's educational
interest that the Texas law impacted, stating that education is not
"merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other
forms of social welfare legislation."324 For the Court, the impor-
320. See also Stier, supra note 249, at 735-36 (arguing that children have an implicit
constitutional right not to be punished for their parents' conduct that should trigger
heightened scrutiny).
321. See FORER, supra note 268, at 209-10 (observing that fundamental rights in equal
protection jurisprudence "have been judicially declared without reference to precedent,
societal conditions, or popular perceptions and beliefs as to which rights the public
considers fundamental").
322. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
323. E.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1263 (Cal. 1971); Salazar v. Honig, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 837, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that school transportation is a fundamental
right).
324. 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
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tance of education for equal protection purposes lay in its necessity
for "advancement on the basis of individual merit""m and for an
individual " 'to participate effectively and intelligently in our open
political system.' 326 Education is, in fact, the principal means by
which a traditionally subordinate group "might raise the level of
esteem in which it is held by the majority.""- As such, a law
denying a quality education to a discrete class of children tends to
create an underclass of persons unable to participate in and contribute
to society, and thereby runs directly counter to the central purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause.3" When the Plyler Court considered
the importance of education in conjunction with the fact that the
legislation before it, which extended the guarantee of an education to
some children but not to others, effectively imposed "a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their
disabling status,"" it concluded that it should subject such legis-
lation to heightened scrutiny and that the state must offer a substan-
tial justification for its discriminatory law.33°
325. Id. at 221-22.
326. Id. at 221 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221). Justice Brennan's opinion also
emphasized the benefits to society as a whole of ensuring that every individual is able to
lead an economically productive, self-sufficient life, and acquires our shared democratic
values. Id. at 221-23. The dissenting Justices pointed out, perhaps correctly, that the state
legislature, and not the Court, is the proper body to address these collective interests. Id.
at 248, 253 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 222.
328. The Plyler Court wrote:
The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social, economic, intellectual, and
psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual
achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a
status-based denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied
in the Equal Protection Clause.
Id.; see also Biegel, supra note 231, at 1089-95 (arguing that the Supreme Court has also
used heightened scrutiny in reviewing state action restricting educational rights under the
Due Process Clause and under the Education for all Handicapped Children Act, and citing
Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982)).
329. 457 U.S. at 223.
330. Justice Blackmun, who took a relatively restrained approach to employing
heightened Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, see Plyler, 457 U.S. at 231-34 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring), concurred in this conclusion, because of education's unique importance.
In my view, when the State provides an education to some and denies it to
others, it immediately and inevitably creates class distinctions of a type
fundamentally inconsistent with those purposes ... of the Equal Protection
Clause. Children denied an education are placed at a permanent and insurmoun-
table competitive disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied even the
opportunity to achieve.... In a sense, then, denial of an education is the
analogue of denial of the right to vote: the former relegates the individual to
second-class social status; the latter places him at a permanent political disad-
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On numerous other occasions as well, the Supreme Court has
affirmed the importance of education and the integral connection
between education and the primary purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause-to eliminate inequalities of opportunity in our society. In
condemning racial segregation in schools in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,331 for example, the Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education
to our democratic society. It is required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. 32
vantage.
Id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun appeared to rely, however, on the
fact that the law challenged in Plyler worked a "complete denial" of an education, and not
merely some diminution of educational quality. He distinguished Rodriguez, in which he
had sided with the majority in finding that deferential review was appropriate. lId at 234-
35 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Plyler majority, however, did not state that
intermediate scrutiny is appropriate only when a challenged law effects a complete denial
of an education. One might read the opinion as stating that any impairment to the
educational interests of a discrete class of children triggers heightened review.
331. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
332. 1d. at 493; see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 470 (1988)'
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("By denying equal opportunity to exactly those who need it
most, the law not only militates against the ability of each poor child to advance herself
or himself, but also increases the likelihood of the creation of a discrete and permanent
underclass."); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 329 (1983) (reiterating the Court's view
that education "is one of the most important functions of local government"). In
Kadrmas, the Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny to a state law permitting some
districts but not others to charge parents a fee for transporting their children to school.
487 U.S. at 459-60. The educational interests of the child were actually not at stake,
however, since the parents were able to afford the fee and, after refusing to pay it,
arranged an alternative means of transportation, as they were legally required to do. Id.
at 455, 461. The only interest at issue was that of the parents in not having to pay the $97
annual bus fee. Id. at 454-55.
Kadrmas is significant, however, because in it the Court expressed an intention to
limit the holding of Plyler to its unique circumstances. Id. at 459. The Court hinted at
what the salient aspects of the Plyler circumstances were by pointing out that the child in
Kadrmas had "not been penalized by the government for illegal conduct by her parents,"
as was the case in Plyler. Id. The Court also noted that the $97 bus user fee was not
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The conservative dissenters in Plyler did not dispute that educa-
tion is of vital importance for children in our society, but objected
that the majority "points to no meaningful way to distinguish between
education and other governmental benefits" such as food, shelter, or
medical care.333 This complaint, however, is both question-begging
and inaccurate. First, these other goods are in fact also quite
important, and if states undertake to guarantee a minimum of them
for all persons, but exclude a discrete subclass from the guarantee,
demanding a strong justification from the state for discriminating in
this fashion may well be appropriate. Simply reciting this list of
important goods does not begin to answer the question whether they
too should trigger intermediate scrutiny. Second, the Plyler majority
did in fact suggest a way to distinguish between goods that are
important enough to trigger heightened scrutiny and government
benefits that are not. The way it suggested connects the adoption of
heightened scrutiny with the core concern of the Equal Protection
Clause-whether denying a particular good to an identifiable group
is likely to result in the creation of a discrete subclass of persons
relegated to second-class status in our society.3" The majority
likely to promote " 'the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our
boundaries.' "Id. (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230). As noted above, Plyler and Kadrmas
are also dissimilar in that the statute challenged in the former discriminated among groups
of individuals, while the statute challenged in the latter-and in Rodriguez-discriminated
among local political units within a state and did not lead to any discrimination between
groups of individuals within any local jurisdiction. 14. at 462.
Children whose parents claim religious exemptions are effectively punished for the
conduct of their parents, conduct that is not illegal but that would be illegal but for the
statutory exemption. And the imposition of sexist doctrines on the daughters of
fundamentalist Christians and Orthodox Jews, as well as other repressive features of some
religious schools, do effect a denial of an important benefit and do promote the creation
and perpetuation of a subordinate class of persons in our society. See infra notes 337-38
and accompanying text. In addition, the religious exemptions do discriminate among
groups of children within the same jurisdiction, rather than denying a benefit to all
children within some given area. These exemptions are thus much more like the statute
in Plyler than that in Kadrmas. Cf Biegel, supra note 231, at 1096 (stating that Plyler
"cannot simply be dismissed as a unique confluence of theories when other decisions have
employed techniques of heightened review triggered at least in part by an express or
implied denial of equal educational opportunity").
333. 457 U.S. at 247-48 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent cited past decisions of
the Court holding that welfare benefits and housing are not fundamental rights, decisions
that preceded the Court's establishment of intermediate scrutiny and of the distinction
between important rights and mere government benefits. Id. at 247 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); see infra note 335.
334. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-22. The dissent never addressed this connection between
education and the underlying purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, it blithely
asserted that the political process, at the federal level, would ultimately, "albeit with some
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sensibly found that this is the case with respect to children's
education. The Court might also sensibly reach this conclusion with
respect to food, shelter, and medical care, at least in the case of
children who are unable to fend for themselves.3
A child in any state of this country today unquestionably can fail
to receive a minimally adequate education while attending a church
school, given the absence of meaningful state regulation of such
schools. As discussed in Part I, substantial evidence suggests that this
is in fact occurring.336 Female students in conservative religious
schools appear to suffer the greatest educational deprivation.
Arguably they need, more than any other children, an education that
emphasizes their equal personhood and makes a special effort to
prepare them for and urge them toward self-sufficient and self-
fulfilling lives, in order to counter the subordinating influences in their
world outside of school. Yet instead they receive schooling that
intensifies the subordinating process, increasing the likelihood that
they will come to form a discrete and permanent underclass of
persons substantially less able to participate in and contribute to
delay," yield the correct policy outcome and provide children who were not deported with
an education. Id. at 254 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent offers no basis for this
happy prediction. Perhaps Chief Justice Burger was thinking that Congress would be more
likely to protect these children than the state government because Congress has primary
authority over and responsibility for immigration, and because the federal government can
more easily bear the cost of educating these children. This seems a slender basis for his
prediction. Recent action by the House of Representatives-passage of a bill that would
authorize states to deny an education to illegal immigrant children-in fact seems to prove
that prediction wrong. See William Branigan & John E. Yang, House Makes a Stand at
the Schoolhouse Door, WASH. POST, March 21, 1996, at A6; Eric Schmitt, Bids to Cut
Legal Immigration Are Dropped From House Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, March 22, 1996, at A23.
In any event, that Congress might act within a decade or two is small comfort for a child
who is denied an education today, and the very purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
is to serve as a protection for vulnerable, powerless individuals against the vagaries and
shortcomings of the political process.
335. The Plyler dissent also contended that "the importance of a governmental service
does not elevate it to the status of a 'fundamental right' for purposes of equal protection
analysis." Id. at 247 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). This contention was, however, misplaced.
The Plyler majority did not conclude that education is a fundamental right, a strict scrutiny
trigger. It explicitly rejected this conclusion. Id. at 223. Instead the majority concluded
that education is an important interest that should trigger intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 221,
225. The dissent's language and the cases it cited in support (Rodriguez and Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972)), harken back to a time before the Court established
an intermediate level of scrutiny (the Court first introduced a third level of review in Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (see SALOMONE, supra note 42, at 117-18)), and so were
simply inapt.
336. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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society, relegated to second-class social status.337 Their schooling is
in its effects thus much more like the complete denial of education in
Plyler than the lesser funding of schools at issue in Rodriguez.3 s
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a state even attempting to argue
that the sexist practices in which many religious schools engage do not
impair a critical developmental interest of the girls subjected to those
practices. 339  The "inestimable toll" on the "social, economic,
intellectual, and psychological well-being"3 ° of these girls should be
337. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text. One should also note that sexist
socialization of both boys and girls in fundamentalist Christian and Jewish Orthodox
schools also perpetuates the existence of a minority of persons within our society that hold
values antithetical to core principles of our liberal democracy.
338. The harm that girls in some religious schools suffer is actually quite similar to the
harm African-American children have suffered in segregated public school systems, which
was the basis for the Court's condemnation of school segregation in Brown. In rejecting
the notion that these children could receive an adequate education in a separate, blacks-
only school, the Court emphasized the psychological harm that resulted simply from
implicit stigmatization as inferior persons. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). In both Brown and
Plyler, the Court drew a connection between diminished self-esteem and a lesser chance
for success. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222; Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that a sense of
inferiority diminishes a child's motivation to learn and thereby retards educational and
mental development and puts those who suffer it at a permanent disadvantage). See also
James P. Raffini, Student Apathy: A Motivational Dilemma, 44 EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Sept.
1986, at 53 (describing effects of competitive evaluation procedures in schools: "most
students conclude early.., that once below average, always below average.").
Likewise, girls subjected to sexist treatment and teaching are very likely to develop
an inferior self-image that undermines their will to succeed and to pursue their own self-
fulfilling projects. See PEGGY ORENSTEIN, SCHOOL GIRLS: YOUNG WOMEN, SELF-
ESTEEM, AND THE CONFIDENCE GAP (1994):
Girls with healthy self-esteem have an appropriate sense of their potential, their
competence, and their innate value as individuals. They feel a sense of
entitlement: license to take up space in the world, a right to be heard and to
express the full spectrum of human emotions .... We live in a culture that is
ambivalent toward female achievement, proficiency, independence, and right to
a full and equal life.... Too often we [females] deride our own abilities. We
denigrate our work and discount success. We don't feel we have the right to our
dreams, or, if we achieve them, we feel undeserving. Small failures may confirm
our own sense of inevitable failure, making us unable to take necessary risks.
Id. at xix; see also supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing the harmful impact
of sexist education).
339. One could characterize this as an interest in receiving an education of a certain
quality and/or as an interest in being treated as an equal person-an interest whose
importance is reflected in the Equal Protection Clause itself. Girls in these schools suffer
discrimination at two levels: the state discriminates against them in their regulatory
schemes vis-a-vis girls whose parents have different religious beliefs, and their schools
discriminate against them vis-a-vis boys. See also infra notes 447-64 and accompanying text
(suggesting a third level of discrimination, insofar as there may be unique and insurmount-
able procedural obstacles to prosecuting the constitutional rights of children whose
interests conflict with the religious beliefs of their parents).
340. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222.
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obvious to anyone aware of the role that self-esteem plays in child
development and education. One need not rely on one's own
opinions or personal distaste for sexism, nor on the abundant social
scientific evidence of its harmfulness,34' however, in order to chal-
lenge the failure of a state or the federal government to prohibit such
practices in religious schools. Where the state has enacted special
provisions prohibiting sex discrimination and sex bias in public
schools, or in all schools other than religious schools, it has itself
already decided that sexist schooling is harmful to girls. 42 As such,
it would not be in a position to contend credibly that such schooling
is actually not particularly harmful.
In sum, the case is extremely strong for applying heightened
scrutiny to the classifications among children based on the religious
beliefs of their parents that appear in child welfare and education
laws. These children clearly constitute a discrete and insular minority
whom the political process protects less than perhaps any other group
in our society. The interests at stake-protection from serious illness
and the guarantee of an adequate elementary and secondary
education-are indisputably of the highest importance, occupying a
fundamental position in the structure of human needs and bearing an
obvious relation to the central purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause: to ensure a rough equality of life chances for equally able
persons in our society. Legislatures are manifesting less and less
willingness to guard the interests of these children, thereby increasing
the likelihood that many of them will fail to flourish and instead
become members of a discrete underclass, and thereby also weakening
the case for judicial deference to legislatures in these areas.
The next section demonstrates that religious exemptions to child
welfare and education laws cannot survive heightened scrutiny, and
therefore should be invalidated. Since the Supreme Court has
become increasingly reluctant to find new categories of cases in which
it must apply strict or heightened scrutiny, however, the next section
also considers whether these exemptions would survive even the more
deferential rationality review.343 It concludes that they would not.
341. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
343. If a court declined to apply heightened scrutiny to these exemptions, it should at
least apply the so-called 'active' rational basis review that the Court applied to a
classification based on mental retardation in Clebume and that some lower courts have
applied to classifications based on homosexuality. See State Dep't of Health v. Cox, 627
So. 2d 1210, 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (applying standard rationality review to law
prohibiting adoption by homosexual couples) (citing cases), modified, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla.
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D. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Religious Exemptions
For religious exemptions from child welfare and education laws
to survive heightened scrutiny, a state would have to offer relatively
strong justification for discriminating against children of religious
objectors in this way. Specifically, it would have to show that those
exemptions are substantially related to a legitimate and important
state interest or purpose.3" The legitimacy criterion is the first
screen through which asserted state purposes must pass. Since this is
also an element of rational basis scrutiny, if a purported purpose
cannot pass through this screen, then it also could not form a basis for
upholding a religious exemption under that more deferential form of
judicial review.
1. Legitimacy of State Purposes
One might think that several legitimate reasons justify religious
exemptions to child welfare and education laws, and that the real
question is how important those reasons are, relative to the potential
for harm to the children. The legislatures that created these
exemptions, according to this view, may not have made the best
choice in all cases, but they did not act on the basis of improper
motives or inappropriate considerations. They had to strike a balance
between competing considerations and did the best they could. In
actuality, though, some of the purposes one might imagine support
these exemptions turn out to be constitutionally fllegitimate. We must
consider, then, precisely which of the purposes that legislatures
sought, or could have sought, to accomplish by creating these
exemptions are legitimate.
Intermediate scrutiny requires evidence that an allegedly legiti-
mating state purpose was an actual aim of the legislature that passed
a law containing a challenged classification.34 Under rational-basis
1995). This form of rational basis review places an evidentiary burden on the state to
prove a rational relation between a legislative classification and a legitimate state purpose,
rather than creating a presumption in favor of the classification that the plaintiff must
adduce evidence to overcome. Id.
344. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
345. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730 (rejecting a rationale asserted by the state in litigation
because the state had not shown that it was the actual purpose for the discriminatory
admissions policy); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227-30 (considering only asserted state interests in
excluding undocumented alien children from free public education); Califano v. Westcott,
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review, on the other hand, courts do not require the state to
demonstrate that a legitimate purpose actually motivated the
legislature; courts are willing to hypothesize purposes that could have
motivated the legislature.34 The party challenging a classification
under rational basis review instead bears the nearly insuperable
burden " 'to negative every conceivable basis which might support
it.' ,3' This Part considers first the actual purpose of religious
exemptions, and then conceivable, unarticulated bases for these
exemptions.
The Supreme Court "has not systematically articulated the
criteria that distinguish permissible from impermissible legislative
purposes," but it has "suggested a framework for analysis. ' 348  As
443 U.S. 76,86-88 (1979) (finding no evidence that purpose for legislative classification that
the State asserted was the actual purpose); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973).
346. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101-02 (1993) ("On
rational-basis review,... because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons
for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the
conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature."); Heller
v. Doe by Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993) ("[A] legislature that creates these categories
need not 'actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its
classification.' ") (citation omitted); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (stating that
under rationality review, "the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a
plausible policy reason for the classification"); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) ("It is, of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this
reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision,' because this Court has never insisted
that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.") (citation omitted).
347. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643 (citation omitted). The Court has, however, struck down
legislative classifications on rare occasions while purporting to apply rationality review,
after finding a classification so poorly fit to the conceivable legitimate purposes as to
suggest it is actually based only on illegitimate prejudice against some class. See Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 450; United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973)
(invalidating federal law denying welfare assistance to individuals living with other,
unrelated persons); cf. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2651 (Souter, J., dissenting) (indicating
conclusion of Justices Souter, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor that the legislation at
issue, which discriminated between mentally retarded persons and mentally ill persons in
according procedural protections prior to institutionalization, should fail rational basis
scrutiny).
348. Farrell, supra note 235, at 43. The Court has also identified a number of specific
state purposes that are legitimate. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 17 (neighborhood stability
and protection of property owners' reliance interests); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227 (fiscal
concerns, though this not sufficient standing alone); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53
(1977) (reliance on general rules as an administrative convenience); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976) (enhancing traffic safety); Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509
(1976) (administrative convenience) (upholding Railroad Social Security Act provision
basing right to benefits on dependency and according legitimate children and subclass of
illegitimate children presumption of dependency, in part because use of illegitimacy as
indicia of dependency was an acceptable administrative convenience); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970) (creating incentive to seek gainful employment,
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a basic prerequisite, a statutory classification must satisfy a test of
legislative impartiality; it must have a purpose other than simply a
naked preference for one group over another.3 49 A central aim of
the Equal Protection Clause is to root out legislative decisionmaking
on the basis of just such preferences"
The actual legislative purpose for religious exemptions to child
welfare and education laws is readily apparent. Adult members of
minority religious groups lobby government officials demanding as a
matter of parental authority and religious freedom that they not be
required to comply with one or another statutory obligation that they
find objectionable. Legislators acquiesce to this political pressure,35 '
and justify their actions, if at all, as appropriate deference to the
religious interests and rights of parents. 52 They make no pretense
avoiding discrimination between welfare families and families of the working poor, and
conserving scarce state resources); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969)
(preventing welfare fraud), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
349. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 180-81 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that a legitimate
purpose is one that, at a minimum, the court "may reasonably presume to have motivated
an impartial legislature. If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim
of the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect. If, however, the adverse impact may
reasonably be viewed as an acceptable cost of achieving a larger goal, an impartial
lawmaker could rationally decide that that cost should be incurred.") (emphasis added);
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 ("[A] bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest."); see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Thus, the word
'rational'-for me at least-includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always
characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially.").
350. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 CoLUM. L. REv.
1689, 1693-94 (1984).
351. Cf Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. School Dist., 718 F.2d
1389, 1406 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Legislatures in many states are notoriously vulnerable to
pressures from religious constituencies."), affd sub nom. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 474 U.S. 373 (1985).
352. See Devins, supra note 9, at 826, 831; see also Sherr v. Northport-East Northport
Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that religious
exemption to state vaccination law "seems to be designed specifically to advance the
interests of individuals who oppose vaccination on theological grounds. Such treatment
of religious interests can justifiably be seen as a reasonable accommodation of the
consideration more directly addressed by the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment."); Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 578 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) ("The
'treatment by spiritual means' defense, which is part of the statutory scheme, is intended
to accommodate the religious beliefs of those parents who rely on prayer in lieu of medical
care in treating a sick child."); Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary & Secondary Educ. v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Ky. 1979) (noting that state constitutional provision
protecting parental right to choose nonpublic education for children "represented the
position that.., the rights of conscience of those who desired education of their children
in private and parochial schools should be protected"); Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107, 110
(Md. 1982) (noting that state asserted purpose of religious exemption was to accommodate
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that their decision furthers any interests of the children involved. 53
No doubt most adult members of the public would likewise rationalize
these exemptions as appropriate marks of deference to parental
religious interests, perhaps invoking the value of religious toleration
as well, were they ever to consider why these exemptions exist.
The belief that protecting parents' religious liberty is an adequate
reason for the religious exemptions under discussion here, however,
is not as unproblematic as it might seem. Careful reflection on this
point may reveal that this legislative purpose is in fact illegitimate.
To determine if this is the case, it is useful to break down the
religious interests of parents into two parts, according to whether past
judicial decisions have deemed those interests constitutionally
protected. 4 If parents can claim, based on past judicial decisions,
the "religious concerns of Maryland's citizens"); id. at 112 ("In creating this exemption,
the legislature presumably saw fit to respect the religious beliefs of certain of its citizens
but not others."); Dalli v. Board of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Mass. 1971) (noting that
state legislature in adding religious exemption to vaccination law "recognized that it was
an appropriate mark of deference to the sincere religious beliefs of the few").
353. Indeed, from a child-welfare perspective, it is ironic that parents' secular beliefs
about what is best for the physical health of their child, or about what educational
approach is most conducive to their child's intellectual growth, carries little or no legal
weight, while parents' beliefs about what is necessary for their own salvation may be
determinative of their authority to control their children's lives. See, e.g., In re Christine
M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 612, 615-16 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (holding that a state's child
vaccination law is not susceptible to challenge on the basis of scientific evidence as to the
efficacy and necessity of a required vaccine; the plaintiff must show that his opposition
stems from sincerely held religious belief).
354. Part I found that parents enjoy no constitutional right to prevent their children
from receiving vaccinations. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text. On the other
hand, the prevailing judicial view is that parents whose religious beliefs oppose
conventional medical care do have a constitutional right to prevent their children from
receiving medical treatment for illnesses and injuries that are not likely to result in death
or permanent and severe impairment. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
Part I also found that all parents have a constitutional right to send their children to
private school, but apart from the Amish and similarly insular religious communities,
parents have no constitutional right to home school. See supra note 111. The Supreme
Court has yet to speak to the permissible scope of state control over the pedagogical
practices of religious schools, but it has indicated that it would uphold "reasonable" state
regulations. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. Presumably a regulation
designed to prevent significant harms to children is a reasonable one, so it is conceivable
that the Court would uphold a law prohibiting sex discrimination and sex bias that applied
to all schools, even though such a prohibition would conflict with religious belief about as
directly as any school regulation possibly could. (Importantly, though, it would not involve
the state in deciding religious questions, and so should not be deemed inconsistent with
the Establishment Clause. A statutory prohibition of sexism in education, though
preventing some groups from teaching one of their religious tenets to children in their
schools, would do so on the basis of a legislative judgment as to the temporal consequen-
ces of sexism, not on the basis of theological disagreement with those groups. Analoguos-
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a constitutional right to an exemption, then one might characterize
the state purpose for a religious exemption as compliance with the
federal Constitution. If, on the other hand, parents have no
constitutional authority for demanding an exemption, then the state's
purpose is simply to give a gratuitous benefit to the parents, by
satisfying their religiously grounded preferences.
a. Parents' Constitutional Rights
When the purpose of a statutory religious exemption is to satisfy
constitutional requirements, that purpose would seem unquestionably
to be legitimate3 5 The state should be able to assert as a complete
defense to a challenge to such an exemption that it had no choice
legally but to grant it. The locus of the responsibility for the
discrimination in that case would shift to the federal judiciary that has
interpreted the Constitution to require such an exemption for parents
who have religious objections to a law."6 This does not mean,
however, that these exemptions are unassailable, or that the children
who receive lesser medical care or education as a result of a judicially
mandated exemption have no recourse, for the court decisions
themselves are vulnerable to challenge as denials of equal protec-
tion.57 To secure equal treatment for these children, an advocate
ly, a court should not find an Establishment Clause violation when a law prohibits
involvement of children in ritual snake-handling, based on the potential for harm to
children's temporal interests rather than on a legislative judgment that snake-handling is
contrary to the will of God. Prevailing interpretation of the Establishment Clause might,
however, limit the means a state could adopt to try to enforce an anti-sexism mandate in
religious schools. The most intrusive means might constitute an impermissible en-
tanglement of the state with religious matters. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-
13 (1971).).
In addition, lower courts have held that states need not exempt religious schools from
licensing, teacher certification, reporting, and core subject requirements. See supra notes
88-91 and accompanying text. Moreover, state financial assistance to private schools is
clearly not, in the Supreme Court's view, constitutionally mandated. See Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973). On the other hand, courts might very well decide that
a law prescribing specific textbooks and other curricular materials for use in religious
schools, as many states now do for public schools, goes too far and violates the
constitutional rights of parents. See supra notes 86-107 and accompanying text.
355. Papasan v. Alkin, 478 U.S. 265, 289 (1986) (noting that "if the federal law is valid
and the State is bound by it, then it provides a rational reason" for the challenged
discriminatory state action).
356. Id. ("If, as a matter of federal law, the State has no choice in the matter, whether
the complaint states an equal protection claim depends on whether the federal policy is
itself violative of the Clause.").
357. Id. (stating that if federal policy mandating certain state action is itself violative
of equal protection, then courts may enjoin the state from implementing the policy);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948) (holding that judicial action is state action for
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
on their behalf could seek a reversal of decisions that have created for
some parents-those with particular religious beliefs-greater rights
to harm or withhold benefits from their children than other parents
possess.
Such a challenge to judicial interpretation of the First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause would find support in the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has
held in the latter context that courts should not interpret
constitutional rights so as to create legal inequalities among classes of
similarly situated persons, suggesting that equality is the most
fundamental principle in our constitutional order."' For example,
in finding that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant
in a private contract for sale of property violated the equal protection
rights of African-Americans, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
Constitution confers upon no individual the right to demand action by
the State which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to
other individuals., 35 9 Thus, although protection of property rights
is a fundamental principle in our constitutional scheme, it is trumped
by the constitutional principle that no branch of government should
support arbitrary social inequalities. The Equal Protection Clause
operates as a higher-order constraint on judges, and provides a means
for challenging interpretations of other constitutional provisions that
generate inequalities.
This same principle that judicial interpretation of constitutional
rights is subject to an equality constraint appears to have motivated
the Supreme Court's landmark Free Exercise decision in Employment
Division v. Smith.36 In that case, the Court set forth as a general
proposition that the First Amendment should not be interpreted to
grant any individuals exemptions from facially neutral and generally
applicable laws simply because of their religious beliefs. To do
otherwise would " 'permit every citizen to become a law unto
himsel,' " rather than all being subject equally to the laws of a
jurisdiction. 6' Unfortunately, and without plausible explanation, the
Smith opinion in dictum singled out as an exception to this general
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause).
358. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22.
359. Id.
360. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
361. Id at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)). See Al
McConnell, Note, Abolishing "Separate but (Un)Equal" Status for Religious Universities,
77 VA. L. REV. 1231, 1254-55 (1991) (citing authorities for view that close relation exists
between equal protection and the religion clauses of the First Amendment).
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rule the claims of parents whose religious beliefs conflict with child
welfare laws. 62 The Court failed to perceive the terrible irony of
this caveat. While denying that anyone should enjoy special license
to harm themselves (the law at issue in Smith prohibited use of
certain drugs), the Court adopted a position that would in effect grant
some persons a special license to harm their children despite the
unequal burden this places on the children of those persons.3" Yet
clearly the strength of the equality constraint on construction of
constitutional rights should be greater in the latter case. The Smith
Court simply failed to recognize the conflict between its special
solicitude for religious objector parents and the Equal Protection
Clause.
The analysis here thus generates the startling conclusion that the
entire body of judicial decisions upholding parental free exercise
rights is illegitimate and cannot support legislative parental religious
exemptions. That an important doctrine of constitutional rights could
develop and persist for decades, all the while being in direct conflict
with an over-arching principle of constitutional interpretation seems
remarkable. As noted in Part IMC above, however, courts have
typically arrived at these parental free exercise rights decisions with
little or no consideration of the implications for children. This is
partly because the affected children have not been parties to the
litigation and also partly because apparently no one involved in these
cases thought to raise the issue of equal protection for children. Were
the federal judiciary ever squarely to confront the conflict between its
parents' rights doctrine and the equal protection rights of children, it
should find itself constrained, at a minimum, to impose severe
limitations on the former-for example, by holding that courts may
find a parental right to control some aspect of a child's upbringing
only when doing so is consistent with the temporal interests of the
child.
b. Parents' Religious Preferences
If parental religious interests that courts have deemed strong
enough to give rise to a constitutional right ultimately cannot support
362. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
363. Justice Scalia's majority opinion actually cites only Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972), in connection with this caveat. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. The Supreme Court
might obviate the insidious implications of the caveat by finding in an appropriate case
that parents enjoy a constitutional right to exemption from neutral child welfare laws only
when this would not result in any harm to their children.
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a denial of equal protection to religious objectors' children, then
surely parental religious interests that courts have deemed not
sufficiently strong to generate a constitutional right also cannot
support such a denial. Since it is uncertain, however, how courts
would resolve a conflict between traditionally recognized parental free
exercise rights and novel equal protection claims on behalf of
children, we should consider independently whether a state purpose
to accommodate in gratuitous ways parents' religious preferences is
legitimate for equal protection purposes.
The answer to this question is clearly "no." The first principle of
equal protection jurisprudence is that the state may not base a
discriminatory legislative classification on a naked preference for the
interests of one group of persons over the interests of another
group." Usually the 'naked preference' at issue in an equal
protection case is between persons within a legislatively designated
class and persons not within that class. However, the same principle
should apply when the naked preference is between persons receiving
a special legislative benefit and persons who incur a corresponding
burden as a result of the others having that benefit. Thus, for
example, an exemption from rape laws for husbands who rape their
wives cannot permissibly be. based on a legislative favoring of the
interests of husbands over the interests of wives. Similarly, an
exemption from child welfare laws for parents with certain religious
beliefs cannot permissibly be grounded simply in a naked preference
for the interests of these parents over the interests of their
children.3
364. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 446-47 (1985)
("[S]ome objectives-such as 'a bare.., desire to harm a politically unpopular group'--are
not legitimate state interests.") (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)). A naked preference for one group's interests over another's is different
from a judgment that one group's interests are more important after giving equal
consideration to both and balancing them. Rather, it is a failure to give equal con-
sideration to the interests of all affected persons, and instead deciding to serve the interests
of one group even though they conflict with interests of another group that are equally or
more important, whether out of indifference to the latter group or simple favoritism for
the former. The discussion here assumes that courts and legislatures have not given
appropriate consideration to the distinct interests of children in creating special rights and
privileges for religious objector parents, and that children's fundamental interests in
medical care and education outweigh parents' desires to conform their children's lives to
religious precepts. For a fuller discussion of parents' religious interests, see Dwyer, supra
note 13, at 1439-42. The discussion below also considers whether it would be appropriate
to balance parents' and children's interests in these contexts.
365. Cf. Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinsky, J.,
dissenting) ("Each child is entitled to have key decisions as to its care made in light of his
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Another way to understand this restriction on permissible state
purposes is to view a naked preference for one group of persons over
another as effectively rendering the motives and actions of the former
group motives and actions of the state." Thus, if a state denied
only to homosexuals certain statutory protections against harmful
conduct by others, such as physical assaults, based on a legislative
choice to favor persons who want to assault homosexuals over persons
who are homosexual, the private motive for any assaults would cease
to be solely a private motive and would become also a governmental
motive. Similarly, denying equal protection to children whose parents
have particular religiously grounded child-rearing preferences, based
on a legislative choice to favor the interests of these parents over the
interests of their children, in effect makes the parents' preferences the
preferences of the state. Clearly, however, as a matter of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence, the state may not have religiously
grounded preferences of any kind regarding the upbringing of
children, let alone religiously grounded preferences to give some
children lesser protection from harm to their temporal interests than
other children receive. 67 The actual state purpose behind religious
exemptions to child welfare and education laws, which is also the
rationale most people would invoke in defense of these exemptions
-namely, to accommodate the religious wishes of parents-is thus
clearly not a legitimate purpose, regardless of whether these interests
are understood as parents' constitutional rights or simply as parents'
desire to control their children's lives.
own best interests, rather than to serve some collateral purpose."); Felton v. Felton, 418
N.E.2d 606, 608 (Mass. 1981) ("The critical literature warns against perverting a quest for
the child's best interests into one for the psychic comfort of the parents-a warning against
overvaluing the parents' constitutional liberties.").
366. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 ("It is plain that the electorate as a whole.., could
not order city action violative of the Equal Protection Clause, and the city may not avoid
the strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of
the body politic.") (citation omitted); Snyder, supra note 171, at 1086 ("The lesson of
Shelley, reaffirmed in Palmore, is simply that a private party is not entitled to have its
wishes enforced by the government when such enforcement would be unconstitutional.
The private motivation in such a case ceases to be private when it becomes the basis for
governmental action.").
367. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) (holding that
religious displays on government property are impermissible because "[t]he Establishment
Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief'); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987) (striking
down on Establishment Clause grounds a statute that forbade the teaching of evolution
in public schools where creationism was not also taught because the statute endorsed a
particular religious doctrine).
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Importantly, even if parents' religious interests were but one
consideration in legislative and judicial decisionmaking, and equal
consideration were given to the interests of children and then the two
sets of interests balanced, serving the parents' religious interests
would still be an inappropriate state purpose in the special context of
equal protection.' It is no more appropriate to deny equal protec-
tion of the laws to religious objectors' children based on a balancing
of the children's interests against the religious preference of other
persons (even though they are the children's parents) than it would
be in the case of any group of adults. If, for example, a certain
minority religion encouraged husbands to beat their wives if they
engage in unorthodox behavior, a religious exemption to domestic
abuse laws based on a balancing of the religious interests of men in
this religious community against the health and safety interests of
women in the community would clearly be inappropriate. 69 To
satisfy equal protection strictures, a law that discriminates between
two similarly situated groups of persons must further aims of the state,
not merely the interests of some third group of persons.
368. Of course, legislatures regularly balance the interests of different groups in
fashioning legal rules, including important social legislation. This is permissible insofar as
all similarly situated persons receive equal treatment. When laws create discriminatory
classifications in the imposition of substantial burdens or the conferral of important
benefits, however, the state must have some purpose for doing so that is tied to the
characteristics of the disfavored class and an interest of the state. It cannot attempt to
justify discrimination between similarly situated persons by pointing to the interests of
third parties. Thus, for example, in fashioning rules for the sale of property, a legislature
may fairly balance the interests of buyers as a class against the interests of sellers as a
class. It may not, however, create rules giving minority buyers fewer rights than white
buyers based on a purpose of protecting the financial interests of property owners (sellers
and potential sellers) in all-white neighborhoods. Such a purpose would be illegitimate in
an equal protection context. In contrast, a purpose of avoiding lost revenue from property
taxes should property values in fact fall might be a legitimate purpose, because it addresses
an interest of the state rather than an interest of a particular constituency, though it would
certainly not be a sufficiently compelling purpose to justify such racial discrimination. The
discussion below considers whether religious exemptions to child welfare and education
laws serve analogous aims of the state.
369. Likewise, if a religious group believed it had a moral obligation to seize homeless
persons from the streets and brainwash them into becoming adherents to their faith, a
legislature could not carve out an exemption to kidnapping or assault laws to cover such
cases for the purpose of accommodating the religious interests of that group. Because that
is an illegitimate purpose in an equal protection context, it would be an improper factor
to balance against the interests of homeless persons.
For a similar reason, notions of toleration are misplaced in the context of religious
child-rearing. Religious toleration means allowing individuals to govern their own lives
by their own lights, even if these are unpopular. It is closely tied to the value of self-
determination. Religious toleration does not mean allowing individuals, in accordance with
their religious beliefs, to depart from norms regarding treatment of other persons.
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Since the actual purpose of the religious exemptions is an
impermissible one, courts applying heightened scrutiny need proceed
no further in their analysis in order to conclude that these exemptions
violate the equal protection rights of the children of religious
objectors and are therefore constitutionally invalid. Courts should
therefore strike down all parental religious exemptions, thereby
requiring that states extend all important child welfare and education
laws universally or eliminate them entirely (if they could do so
consistently with the Due Process Clause). One result of such judicial
action would likely be to bring to the forefront of public attention the
situation of groups of children that have previously been largely
ignored, and thereby to generate open public discussion of the needs
and interests of these children and their claims to the protections of
the larger society. This particular result should be salutary not only
for these children, but also for their parents and for our society as a
whole.
Other consequences of eliminating parental religious exemptions,
however, might not be so salutary. The remainder of Part II
considers whether possible adverse consequences of extending child
protective laws universally might constitute conceivable, legitimate
justifications for states' failure to do so. Such justifications might
allow the religious exemptions to survive rational basis scrutiny if a
court, despite compelling arguments against doing so, were to apply
this more deferential form of review rather than heightened scrutiny.
As stated above, under rational basis review a court may speculate in
this way about conceivable alternative bases for discriminatory
classifications.37
c. Alternative State Purposes
In speculating about alternative state purposes for religious
exemptions to child welfare and education laws, one must keep in
mind that the exemptions are tied to religious belief, rather than more
generally to parental choice. Indeed, if the latter were the case-that
is, if parents were exempt from a legal responsibility whenever they
370. One might argue that, at least when hostility to a disfavored class of persons does
not appear to have motivated discriminatory legislation, courts should be willing to
consider any conceivable justifications that are tied to the interests of the "disfavored"
class regardless of the level of scrutiny it is applying. If the ultimate concern is the
protection of the children, then invalidating legislation that on the whole is beneficial to
them, simply because the legislature's actual purpose in singling them out for different
treatment was not to serve their best interests, would seem irrational.
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chose not to fulfill it, the laws would be vacuous. Any hypothesized
purpose for these exemptions must therefore relate in some way to
religious belief.371
i. Promoting Family Relationships
The state purpose that a court would be most likely to
hypothesize, or that a state defendant would be most likely to offer
as a post-hoc rationalization, in support of parental religious
exemptions is the aim of promoting close family relationships. 72 As
a general matter, supporting family ties is indisputably a legitimate
state purpose, in light of the importance of these relationships to the
temporal well-being of all persons and to the functioning of our
society. This purpose might bear some relation to religious
exemptions to child welfare and education laws. Specifically, parents'
ability to act on the basis of their religious beliefs might promote
peaceful stability within the family. Parents thwarted in their religious
preferences might, for instance, become very upset and react in a way
that disturbs the tranquility of the home and the bond between parent
and child. Avoiding this outcome might appear to be a legitimate
state purpose because it protects interests of the children and interests
that the children share with the parents, rather than interests of
parents that are at odds with those of the children.37
Along these same lines, a state might assert as a justification the
purpose of avoiding the substantial enforcement costs that would arise
were it to extend child welfare and education laws universally. No
doubt many parents would vehemently and violently resist such
extension of the laws. Although not a stated actual purpose for
existing exemptions, enforcement problems no doubt played an
important causal role in the creation of many of them, particularly in
the education context.
While the general aims of promoting close family relationships
and conserving state resources are legitimate ones, however, the more
specific aim at work here-that of avoiding adverse parental reactions
to ensuring children equal protection of child welfare and education
371. Subsection II.D.3 infra considers whether the religious beliefs of parents bear a
rational or substantial relation to the hypothetical alternative purposes posited here.
372. The Supreme Court recognized "promoting family life" as a legitimate state
interest in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536 n.6 (1971) (upholding intestate succession
law that gave collateral relatives priority over illegitimate children).
373. Cf. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776,800 (D.C. 1982) (Newman, C.J., dissenting) (noting
that purpose of racial matching provision in adoption statutes is not to advance interests
of adult blacks "but simply to protect the best interests of the child").
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laws-is not legitimate. The Supreme Court has held on numerous
occasions that states may not consider, in determining whether to
implement and enforce the constitutional rights of some class of
persons, the possibility that private parties will have negative reactions
to or resist such state action. Palmore v. Sidoti74 is instructive in
this regard. In that case, the Supreme Court unanimously invalidated
a state court award of child custody to a father because the award was
based solely on the fact that the Caucasian mother had remarried an
African-American man. The Court duly noted the "risk that a child
living with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a variety
of pressures and stresses not present if the child were living with
parents of the same racial or ethnic origin."" The Court held
unanimously, however, that this was an impermissible basis for
denying custody rights to the mother even under a 'best interest of
the child' analysis:
The question, however, is whether the reality of private
biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permis-
sible considerations for removal of an infant child from the
custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty
concluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot
control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. 76
Palmore upheld the parental right of the mother despite the
potential for harm to her child. In other cases, the Court has upheld
the constitutional rights of persons despite the likelihood of harm to
themselves as a result of public resistance to enforcement of those
rights. For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center," the Court considered the potential for neighborhood
resentment toward the mentally retarded inhabitants of a proposed
group home, and concluded:
[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are
374. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
375. Id. at 433.
376. Id The Palnore holding is "not generally considered controversial." Snyder,
supra note 171, at 1086. Similarly, courts have determined that protecting a child from
community prejudice is not a proper justification for laws prohibiting cross-racial adoption
or adoption by homosexual couples. R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 789-90 (cross-racial adoption);
State Dep't of Health v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1220 n.10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(adoption by homosexual couples), modified, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
377. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally
retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple
dwellings, and the like. It is plain that the electorate as a
whole... could not order city action violative of the Equal
Protection Clause, and the city may not avoid the strictures
of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of
some fraction of the body politic.37
The Court likewise dismissed concerns about private resistance to
school desegregation in the 1950s"79 and to desegregation of other
areas of social life such as public parks3" and restaurants"' in the
1960s, when the harm from resistance would have fallen primarily on
the individuals whose equal protection rights were at stake, and
secondarily on the government agencies that would have to enforce
the laws.38
378. Id. at 448 (citation omitted).
379. In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (reversing district court order suspending
desegregation efforts in public schools of Little Rock, Arkansas), the Court stated:
The constitutional rights of [the children] are not to be sacrificed or yielded to
the violence and disorder which have followed upon the actions of the Governor
and Legislature .... "[limportant as is the preservation of the public peace, this
aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or
protected by the Federal Constitution."... [difficulties with implementation] can
also be brought under control by state action.
Id at 16 (citation omitted); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)
("But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot
be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.").
380. See Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963) (rejecting the claim of a city's
officials that desegregation of the city's parks should proceed slowly to "prevent interracial
disturbances, violence, riots, and community confusion and turmoil," and stating that
"constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or
exercise").
381. See Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284,293 (1963) (reversing conviction of African-
American men for "disturbing the peace" by peacefully playing basketball in a public park,
the Court stated that "the possibility of disorder by others cannot justify exclusion of
persons from a place if they otherwise have a constitutional right (founded upon the Equal
Protection Clause) to be present"); see also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917)
(invalidating a state law forbidding African-Americans from buying homes in Caucasian
neighborhoods, and stating that the aim of preventing race conflicts and thereby promoting
public peace "cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or
protected by the Federal Constitution").
382. See also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,725 (1982) ("[I]f the
statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are
presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself
is illegitimate."); Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (invalidating dismissal of
midshipman from Naval Academy because of his homosexuality, the court stated that "a
cardinal principle of equal protection law holds that government cannot discriminate
against a class in order to give effect to the prejudice of others"); Dahl v. Secretary of the
United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1334 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that a court may not
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Consistent with these long-standing precedents, a court would
have to hold that states may not exclude some children from the
protection of immunization and anti-sexism laws merely because the
children's parents might be very upset about and resist application of
the laws to them, even though these reactions may have adverse
effects upon the children.3" These precedents appear to rest on
certain implicit and quite plausible assumptions: that securing for
individuals, even especially vulnerable ones, their constitutional rights
is more important than protecting them from social friction, that
states have alternative means available for protecting individuals from
the adverse reactions of private parties to state enforcement of their
rights,3" and, perhaps most convincingly, that states would create
perverse incentives if they backed down in the face of resistance to
the enforcement of constitutional rights.3"
give effect to "illegitimate fears and biases reflected in government policy").
In a very different context, a federal appellate court has held that concern about what
a parent might do to a child in reaction to a denial of welfare benefits is not a permissible
basis for granting the parent greater due process rights in relation to those benefits.
P.O.P.S. v. Gardner, 998 F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The fact that some parents take
their financial frustrations out on their children does not afford them extra protection
under the Due Process Clause.").
383. It bears mention that courts have dealt with numerous cases of parents who were
adamantly opposed to vaccination but were not covered by a legislative religious
exemption. E.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp.
81, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[A]lthough the Sherrs are clearly genuinely opposed to
immunization, the heart of their opposition does not in fact lie in theological con-
siderations."). None of the published opinions arising out of these cases contains any
discussion of possible harm to the child, as a result of parental opposition, if vaccination
were ordered.
384. Somewhat analogous in this regard are cases in which the Court has disapproved
of states denying benefits to children in order to influence the behavior of their parents,
because of the unfairness of punishing children for the conduct of their parents, and in
which the Court has pointed out that states have alternative means for influencing the
parents' behavior. See, eg., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76
(1972) (invalidating state law that limited worker's compensation death benefits to
legitimate and recognized illegitimate children).
This rationale may be least applicable in the case of intra-family interactions, since
state control of parents' behavior toward their children would be extremely difficult. The
difference between this situation and, for example, Cleburne is, however, one of degree.
States also cannot control very easily how neighbors treat one another, and in both cases
the state may be able to pursue various strategies to minimize any negative impact-public
education programs to encourage new attitudes, fora for the disgruntled to air their views
and receive a compassionate response, and counseling for the vulnerable groups to help
them understand the reactions of others, to name just a few possibilities.
385. See, eg., Steffan, 8 F.3d at 68 ("Even if the government does not itself act out of
prejudice, it cannot discriminate in an effort to avoid the effects of others' prejudice. Such
discrimination plays directly into the hands of the bigots; it ratifies and encourages their
prejudice."). In addition, although preservation of public resources is as a general matter
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An additional concern regarding family relations, though, is more
difficult to dismiss. A court might find that some parents would
unavoidably become alienated from their children, viewing their
children as different or separate from them, or as morally tainted or
impure, as a result of the state ordering treatment and education of
the children in ways antithetical to the parents' religious world view
and self-conception. For example, Christian Science parents whose
children receive immunizations might perceive and feel about their
children differently than they would if the children remained
spiritually "pure" from the perspective of the parents' religion. As a
consequence, parents might become less attached to their children and
less nurturing.38
6
With respect to this concern, as in the case of parental resistance,
religious exemptions may further the shared interests of parents and
children. In this context, too, the specific aim is to avoid a particular
reaction on the part of parents, but here the feared reaction and a
state aim to avoid it do not appear as objectionable. A court wishing
to distinguish this aim from that addressed in Palmore, Clebume and
the desegregation cases might argue that opposition to enforcement
of the legal rights of others is, in a sense, beyond the constitutional
pale; a willingness to abide by the law and to respect others as equal
citizens is a basic condition for membership in our democratic
community, so states simply should not brook such opposition. In
contrast, the court might contend, emotional attachment to another
person, including one's child, does not have this political dimension.
It is not something the state can presume to exist or demand as a pre-
requisite of citizenship.3" As such, it may be appropriate for the
a legitimate state interest, in the context of securing individuals' constitutional rights,
avoiding high enforcement costs is clearly not a legitimate reason for failing to do so. That
a state may have to expend additional resources monitoring parental compliance and
intervening to force compliance by recalcitrant parents in and of itself is no proper basis
for denying equal protection to the children of these parents.
386. See O'REILLY & GREEN, supra note 23, at 51 (noting that in an Arkansas state
court case involving religious objections to vaccination "there was doubt whether the
[plaintiffs'] children would be welcomed back into the household after the vaccination
because the purity of the body had been violated").
387. The state might presume such attachment to exist when adults first agree to serve
as primary care-takers for a child, and might reasonably demand a strong emotional
commitment as a condition for enjoying the privilege of serving in this capacity. However,
once a parent-child bond is formed, the state cannot end it without substantial cost to the
child, so for the child's sake the state must be cognizant of how its actions might
undermine parental commitment.
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state to take cognizance of and attempt to avoid discouraging such
attachment.
If this reasoning is sound, a state purpose of avoiding parental
alienation from children might be a legitimate hypothetical purpose
for some parental religious exemptions. If so, examination of whether
it is a sufficiently important purpose and sufficiently related to the
legislative classification is necessary. Subsection IIIC below under-
takes this examination. One should note, though, that lower courts
addressing the federal government's ban on gays in the military have
uniformly deemed illegitimate the analogous rationale that the
presence of a person who is homosexual in a military unit can destroy
the bond among members of the unit that is essential to its proper
functioning." In that context, as well as in the one under discus-
sion here, concerns arise about indulging less-than-admirable attitudes
and creating an incentive for persons to manifest such attitudes.
ii. Promoting Children's Religious Interests
Another post-hoe rationalization that a state might offer for
parental religious exemptions is that they protect children's religious
interests. Before assessing the legitimacy of this hypothetical purpose,
we must identify clearly what the nature of those interests might be,
if any such interests in fact exist. One might understand them to
include a need to grow up within a religious belief system, following
the rules and joining in the practices of a religious community.
However, the state may not assume that children have religious needs
of this sort; to do so the state would have to assume the truth of
particular religious beliefs, which the Establishment Clause prohibits
it from doing.389
388. E.g., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Dam v. Secretary of the
U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1331-32 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (observing that even if homosexu-
als threaten "unit cohesion," this can only be because of "(1) heterosexual dislike of
homosexuals for moral or other reasons; (2) heterosexuals' apparent fear that they will be
victimized, threatened, or harassed by homosexuals; and/or (3) the notion that
homosexuals are uniquely incapable of controlling their sexual desires," all of which
amount to "illegitimate prejudice" that cannot be used to justify government action).
Presumably conflict within a unit would adversely affect the homosexual members as well
as the heterosexual members, though concern for the well-being of the homosexual
members was probably not a motivating concern for those who created the ban.
389. See Zucco v. Garrett, 501 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986):
To award custody of Shawn to respondent under these circumstances is to
conclude that providing a religious environment is per se beneficial to a child's
welfare. We believe, however, that the intrinsic benefits, if any, of an "upbring-
ing in religion" are beyond the power of a civil court to comprehend. It is for
this very reason that religion, in and of itself, must play no role in judicial
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One might instead understand children's religious interests not as
a need for a religious up-bringing, but rather as an interest in religious
liberty. Individual religious liberty is an interest that the First
Amendment protects, so a state purpose to protect it through
legislation is, as a general matter, clearly a legitimate one.39
Moreover, a purpose to secure the religious liberty of religious
objectors' children would not present the same problems that a
purpose to secure the religious liberty of parents presents,39 since
the children's religious interest would be a characteristic that renders
them not similarly situated to other children. It would not be a third-
party's interest.
Religious exemptions to child welfare and education laws,
however, are in almost all cases tied to the religious beliefs of parents,
not children, so an argument that they are intended to protect
children's religious liberty would be implausible. On the contrary,
these exemptions, particularly in the area of education, may effec-
tively prevent many children from developing capacities that would
determinations as to child custody.
Id. at 880. Courts are prohibited even from considering whether religious practice and
belief generates secular benefits for a child, since basing a decision on a judgment that it
does would advance religion, in contravention of the Establishment Clause. See Zummo
v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990):
[T]he prohibition on preferring some religion to none, may not be avoided by
suggesting that religion or religious stability is only being considered because of
the secular rather than spiritual benefits expected to arise from protecting the
stability of a child's religious beliefs. We are aware of the wide body of research
which suggests that religiosity may be linked to various physical, intellectual,
emotional, and moral benefits.... [But] the First Amendment as construed by
the United States Supreme Court nonetheless precludes a preference for some
religion over none, regardless of the secular benefits presumed to be at stake.
The exclusion of the benefits of stability in religious inculcation and of religiosity
in general are apparently part of the price which must be paid for religious
freedom ....
Id at 1151-52 (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)). One might
reasonably question the fairness or coherence of precluding judges from considering the
secular benefits of religion, while allowing them to take into account the secular harms
some religious instruction or practice might occasion. See supra note 105 and accom-
panying text. The last sentence of the just-quoted passage suggests that the reason for this
incongruity may be a concern that legislators and judges would be more likely to favor
religion under the guise of finding secular benefits than they would be to disfavor religion
under the guise of finding secular harms.
390. Under Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), a child's interest in
religious liberty would not require the state to exclude him from the coverage of facially
neutral and generally applicable child welfare and education laws. It might, however,
provide a legitimate basis for the state voluntarily doing so, depending on one's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
391. See supra notes 364-69 and accompanying text.
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allow them to think freely and independently about religious matters,
since they enable parents to enroll their children in schools that stifle
intellectual autonomy and critical thinking and shield children from
knowledge of alternative belief systems.3 2 Moreover, even if the
exemptions were tied to children's beliefs, or even if one could
assume that parents' beliefs are always an adequate proxy for their
children's beliefs, this supposed purpose could not salvage the
exemptions.
Courts have wisely determined that attributing an interest in
religious liberty to children who have not reached a stage of develop-
ment at which they are capable of exercising independent judgment
regarding religion is inappropriate,3 93  particularly when the
expressed preferences of children in relation to some religious matter
are contrary to their temporal developmental interests. The principal
reasons why an individual benefits from enjoying substantial personal
freedom are that she is generally the best judge of her own unique
interests or, if not, will best develop as a person if left to make
mistakes and learn thereby, and that frustration of a person's deeply-
embedded commitments causes her great suffering.394 These reasons
are largely absent in the case of young children, who lack the
cognitive abilities, knowledge, psychological and emotional indepen-
dence, and self-control necessary for successful life-planning and
autonomous development, and who have not yet made a conscious
392. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
393. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1149. In invalidating a lower court order prohibiting a
non-custodial father from taking to Catholic services children aged three, four, and eight
who were being raised in the Jewish faith by their mother, the court stated:
Commonly, parents and religious leaders define a child's religious identity under
the rules of the religion they practice. Often such rules impose a presumed
religious identity upon a child without requiring the child's consent or understan-
ding, on the basis of the parent's religion .... The First Amendment forbids civil
courts to ... give any weight or consideration to religious rules or customs in
such matters.... In order to avoid arrogating to itself unconstitutional authority
to declare orthodoxy in determining religious identity, courts only recognize a
legally cognizable religious identity when such an identity is asserted by the child
itself, and then only if the child has reached sufficient maturity and intellectual
development to understand the significance of such an assertion. Though no
uniform age of discretion is set, children twelve or older are generally considered
mature enough to assert a religious identity, while children eight and under are
not. With those ranges as a starting point, judges exercise broad discretion on
a case by case basis in determining whether a child has sufficient capacity to
assert for itself a personal religious identity.
Id. at 1148-49.
394. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 54-56 (1859) (Elizabeth Rapaport ed.
1978).
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commitment to a belief system or way of life. 95 Moreover, placing
on children the burden of making momentous decisions regarding
their medical care and education could be quite traumatic for them,
and would no doubt induce parents to take coercive measures to
ensure that their children made the 'right' choice. 96 Surely it would
not serve the interests of young children to place them in the position
of declaring to state officials whether they want to attend a school
employing teachers who are not certified, or a school that professes
sexist religious views.
Children at an age when immunizations are generally given
-birth to age six-are clearly below the stage of development at
which independent judgment regarding religious belief and practice
is possible.397 Children in the first few grades of elementary school
395. Cf. Alison M. Brumley, Comment, Parental Control of a Minor's Right to Sue in
Federal Court, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 333, 352 (1991) ("Psychiatrists have identified five key
elements of the ability to give fully informed consent: access to relevant information,
capacity to understand, actual understanding (including ability to anticipate possible
outcomes and consequences of the decision), freedom to choose, and ability to make a
reasoned choice and express it clearly."). Other reasons would be present in this case-for
example, the danger of putting too much power in the hands of the state and skepticism
regarding the state's ability to determine what is best for individuals. The alternative in
the case of children, however, is different than in the case of adults. Ascribing religious
liberty vis-a-vis the state to young children would not in practice leave them to govern
their own lives. Rather, it would effectively leave parents to control their children's lives;
young children's religious liberty would just be a proxy for parental religious liberty. And
there is at least as much reason to be suspicious of parental tyranny and incompetence as
there is to be wary of state tyranny and incompetence. These arguments for liberty are
thus severely weakened in the case of children.
396. Cf In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 655-58 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1970) (declining to
leave the decision whether to have surgery to a fifteen year-old boy when his mother had
religious objection to blood transfusion because continued psychological harm to the boy
was too great to risk further delay of surgery to correct a facial disfigurement).
397. See ALLEN BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS
OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 220-23 (1989) (discussing research showing that
children below age 12 are likely to see the locus of control regarding significant decisions
as external to themselves, even when they are asked to make the decision, because they
lack the skills necessary to view themselves as having a position independent from
authority figures). A few states have 'mature minor' legislation that explicitly authorizes
unemancipated minors to consent to medical treatment if they are of sufficient maturity
and intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the treatment. Walter
Wadlington, Medical Decision Making For and By Children: Tensions Between Parent,
State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 323 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602(7)
(Michie 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(h) (1993)). In addition, the courts have
developed a mature minor doctrine that makes a minor's interest in or desire for treatment
controlling in certain highly sensitive areas, such as substance abuse, sexually transmitted
diseases, birth control, and abortion. Id at 323-24.
With respect to medical care, one might argue that compelling immunization or
treatment for illness may conflict with the religious views the child will have when he
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are below this level as well. Courts have treated children between
ages eight and thirteen as falling within a grey area in which some
children may have moved to the higher developmental stage while
others may not have.398 Children who grow up in a conservative,
authoritarian religious household, though, are decidedly more likely
to be among the children in this age group who have not yet reached
the relevant stage. Research has demonstrated that such an up-
bringing retards development? 9
9
A court should therefore conclude that, at least with respect to
elementary school children, protection of children's interest in
religious liberty is not a legitimate state purpose that could justify
parental religious exemptions. From the state's perspective, no such
interest exists, and furtherance of an interest that does not exist
cannot be a legitimate state purpose. Moreover, since what is at stake
in the context of education is a child's development toward intellec-
tual independence, it would be particularly improper for a court to
find that children have a religious interest that conflicts with
regulations designed to further their intellectual growth. To make a
child's expressed preference to forgo a statutory benefit controlling
would be perverse if that preference is itself a reflection of the very
developmental deprivation that the statute aims to avoid.
Rather than liberty in the present, though, one might interpret
children's religious interest to mean their interest in the future, when
they do commit themselves as adults to a religious belief system, in
not having gone through experiences as children that are inconsistent
with that belief system. For example, a state might assert that, even
if an infant child of Christian Science parents does not have an
interest in present religious liberty, he has an interest in not receiving
medical care inconsistent with the faith he will likely adopt as an
adult. Wholly apart from doubts about the coherence of the notion
that a person can be harmed by medical care or instruction inconsis-
becomes an adult. This argument would have to rest on speculation about an individual's
future that no court is in a position reasonably to undertake (although the Court in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), did precisely that), and also on a claim that
compulsion to act now in ways that will be contrary to religious views later in life conflicts
with an individual's religious liberty, a claim that is simply incoherent.
398. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
399. See Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children: Psychological Risks and
Benefits, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 21, 27 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds.,
1983); June Louin Tapp & Gary B. Melton, Preparing Children for Decision Making:
Implications of Legal Socialization Research, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT,
supra, at 225-26.
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tent with his future beliefs, this argument would be undercut by the
problem of justifying assumptions about a person's beliefs in the
distant future. The Plyler v. Doe" Court wisely looked with
disfavor on state speculation as to the likelihood that certain children
would in the future have no need for or make no use of benefits
denied to them in the present.4°1 No court should accept such
speculation as a legitimate state rationale for denying medical or
educational benefits to children.
Finally, one might understand a child's religious interests to mean
an interest in avoiding confusion or disorientation as a result of
witnessing a clash of values and authority between her parents and
the larger society, or as a result of being forced to receive medical
care or instruction that is in conflict with the religious beliefs her
parents have taught her. This is another aspect of the problem
considered in the preceding subsection regarding how state coercion
affects the family, the focus now being on the child's reaction rather
than the parent's.
Certainly, potential for emotional harm to children is a permis-
sible state consideration. However, courts have consistently rejected
contentions that exposure to competing belief systems is harmful to
children.' In fact, such exposure may be a valuable learning
400. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
401. The Plyler Court rejected the state's argument that denying an education to
undocumented alien children would allow it to conserve its resources, by efficiently
spending money on education only for those children likely to become permanent
members of the local community:
Even assuming that such an interest is legitimate, it is an interest that is most
difficult to quantify. The State has no assurance that any child, citizen or not,
will employ the education provided by the State within the confines of the State's
borders. In any event, the record is clear that many of the undocumented
children disabled by this classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and
that some will become lawful residents or citizens of the United States. It is
difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting
the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries,
surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.
Id. at 230; see also id. at 222 n.20 (" '[B]enefits of education are not reserved to those
whose productive utilization of them is a certainty.' ") (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp.
569, 581 (E.D. Tex. 1978)).
402. Such contentions frequently surface in disputes between divorced parents over
parenting practices and in parental challenges to elements of instruction in public schools.
The Pennsylvania court in Zummo, a post-divorce dispute between parents, considered this
argument at some length. It concluded that
"exposing a child to more than one religion ... does not, by itself, cause [the
child] emotional stress or identity confusion.. . ." What little empirical evidence
exists regarding the generalized trauma or "marginality" of children of
intermarriage presumed to result from their exposure to conflicting religions
[Vol. 741444
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experience for children. 3 Confronting the more liberal values of
the larger society may also be for a child a salutary antidote to
repressive and subordinating treatment incurred at home. Although
a court may consider hypothetical state purposes under rational basis
review, it may not accept entirely fanciful purposes, such as avoiding
a harm that does not exist. A state purpose of preventing children
from being exposed to conflicting beliefs about medicine or about the
status and role of women in society therefore would not be legitimate.
At the same time, the proposition that forcing a child to do
something that he believes will cause him to spend eternity in hell can
be emotionally harmful to the child is indisputable. No court has ever
held the contrary. It is difficult to imagine how some education
regulations-for example, requiring certified teachers and prohibiting
sexist teaching-could ever have this result if imposed on religious
schools, unless parents went to extraordinary lengths to make these
changes appear frightening to the children (at which point the
and/or conflicting value systems suggests an absence of generalized trauma and/or
"marginality."
574 A.2d at 1156 (quoting JUDY PETsONK & JIM REMSEN, THE INTERMARRIAGE
HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR JEWS AND CHRISTIANS 298 (1988)). Accordingly, in custody
disputes in which parents have divergent religious beliefs,
courts have rejected speculation by parents and by experts as to potential future
emotional harm to a particular child based upon the assumption that such
exposure is generally harmful. Likewise, parental attributions of current child
disturbances or distress as the result of a religious conflict, rather than the
divorce generally or other causes, have similarly been rejected.
Id. at 1155 (citations omitted).
The Zummo court granted that "exposure to parents' conflicting values, lifestyles, and
religious beliefs may indeed cause doubts and stress. However, stress is not always
harmful, nor is it always to be avoided and protected against. The key, is not whether the
child experiences stress, but whether the stress experienced is unproductively severe." Id.
And contrary to one prominent, but unsupported view that children must see their parents
as "omniscient and all-powerful," JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 9 (1979), the Zummo court concluded from a review of child
development literature that" '[t]he process of a child's maturation requires that they view
and evaluate their parents in the bright light of reality. Children who learn their parents'
weaknesses and strengths may be able better to shape life-long relationships with them.' "
574 A.2d at 1155 (quoting Fatemi v. Fatemi, 489 A.2d 798, 801 (Pa. Super. Ct 1985)). In
sum, the court concluded,
[R]esearch reveals there is no objective basis to support either parental or expert
predictions of future harm to a particular child based upon an assumption that
such exposure is generally harmful. The caselaw, commentaries, and empirical
studies all suggest, if not compel, an opposite conclusion-that while some may
suffer emotional distress from exposure to contradictory religions, most do not.
Id. at 1157.
403. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1155 n.45 ("Some courts have explicitly stated that bi-
cultural/bi-religious exposure would be beneficial.").
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discussion of parental resistance above would become relevant).
These regulations do not require children to do anything; they only
constrain the behavior of teachers and school administrators. State
prescription of the textbooks to be used in church schools might
present a different case, at least with respect to any selected books
that promote views inconsistent with parents' religious beliefs.
Children are likely to become aware of parental beliefs that certain
school books contain sinful views and should not be read, and so to
experience great anxiety about having to read those books. Here too,
though, the possibility of creating a perverse incentive should give
courts pause before they find that this is a legitimate basis for an
exemption.
With respect to medical care, this concern would not arise in
relation to any child too young to understand the idea of religious
commandments, so it would not generate a legitimate state purpose
for exemptions to compulsory infant immunization and medical care.
With respect to medical care for children aged five or older, however,
avoiding emotional harm from forced treatment may very well be a
legitimate state purpose. If so, then it is appropriate to assess the
importance of this purpose and how closely it is served by a clas-
sification of children according to the religious beliefs of their parents.
iii. Promoting Cultural Diversity
Consistent with the Establishment Clause, states may not inten-
tionally promote religion, so that aim cannot serve to justify parental
religious exemptions. States, may, however, promote cultural
diversity, or at least foster conditions in which a variety of cultural
communities and belief systems can thrive free of government
impediment.' 4  Doing so makes possible what John Stuart Mill
termed "experiments in living," which can lead to the discovery of
better ways of life for many individuals or whole societies. °0 It may
also better enable individuals to find a social environment well-suited
to their individual character, values, and tastes. These are secular
goods shared by all, so if pursued in a manner neutral as to religion
404. The Supreme Court recognized promotion of social diversity as a legitimate state
interest in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990).
405. MILL, supra note 394, at 54. The Supreme Court's Yoder decision was motivated
in part by a solicitude for threatened minority communities, whose extinction would
constitute a diminution of cultural diversity in our country. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 218, 223, 234 n.22 (1972).
14-46 [Vol. 74
1996] CHILDREN OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS
no problem of establishing religion or preferring one group over
another arises.4 6
Fostering diversity thus constitutes an additional conceivable
legitimate state purpose for some religious exemptions. While only
a very strained argument could show that denying vaccinations or
other medical care to children promotes cultural diversity, permitting
parents to choose non-mainstream forms of education for their
children would appear to be conducive to an increased variety of
cultural communities in our society.
To summarize the conclusions of this subsection: The actual
legislative purpose for parental religious exemptions-deference to the
religious interests of parents-is not a legitimate state purpose. These
exemptions therefore cannot survive heightened scrutiny. Were a
court to subject these exemptions only to rational basis review,
however, it might find several conceivable legitimate purposes for
such exemptions. These include (1) promoting parental attachment
to children, (2) sparing children from the trauma of having to undergo
treatment or instruction that they believe to be contrary to the will of
God and their parents, and (3) promoting cultural diversity. With
respect to anti-sexism school regulations, the third of these purposes
is a facially plausible rationale for a religious exemption, while all
three might apply to a regulation prescribing textbooks or courses that
affirmatively promote gender equality. With respect to immunization
and other medical care, the first is a facially plausible rationale for
exemptions regardless of the age of a child, and the second is a
facially plausible rationale with respect to children old enough to
understand what it means to violate a religious rule, while the third
is not even facially plausible regardless of the age of the children.
Other purposes that a state might assert, on the other hand, are
not legitimate: avoiding parental resistance to enforcement of child
welfare and education laws, satisfying children's "need for religion"
or (at least in the case of children under fourteen) interest in religious
liberty, sparing a child from exposure to beliefs inconsistent with
those of his parents, and promoting minority religions. The next two
subsections evaluate the importance of the legitimate purposes
identified and the closeness of the relation between them and
classifications among children based on the religious beliefs of
parents.
406. Subsection I.D.3 below addresses the problem that exemptions tied to religious
belief, ipso facto, are not neutral as between religious and other forms of cultural diversity.
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2. Importance of Interests
Under rational basis review, courts do not review the importance
of the interests underlying a legitimate state purpose, but instead
leave judgments of importance to the legislative branch.4° This Part
nevertheless briefly addresses the importance of the legitimate state
purposes just identified, because a court might, based on some slender
evidence, hold that one of them was an actual purpose for a particular
parental religious exemption. In such a case, a court applying
heightened review would have to proceed to consideration of the
importance of that purpose, as well as the closeness of its relation to
the legislative classification.
As with legitimacy, the Supreme Court has not set forth clear
criteria for evaluating the importance of state interests or pur-
poses. 408 Some members of the Court have recommended a balanc-
ing test, under which the state goal purportedly justifying imposition
of a legislative burden on a particular group must be a "public
purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disad-
vantaged class."'  Where the legislative purpose is to protect the
interests of a class of persons unable to do so themselves, one
member of the court has suggested a type of substituted judgment
approach, whereby judges would assess whether members of the
vulnerable class, if able rationally to assess their situation, would
407. They must, however, find a rational relation between the purpose and the clas-
sification. See infra notes 437-44 and accompanying text.
408. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976):
How is this Court to divine what objectives are important? How is it to
determine whether a particular law is 'substantially' related to the achievement
of such objective, rather than related in some other way to its achievement?
Both of the phrases are so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial
preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation ....
Id at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court has rendered judgments as to the
relative importance of several particular state purposes, none of which are directly relevant
here. E.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980) (refusing to
find administrative convenience to be an important state purpose under intermediate
scrutiny); Craig, 429 U.S. at 198 ("Decisions following [Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)]
similarly have rejected administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently important
objectives to justify gender-based classifications."); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
634, 642 (1968) (holding that administrative objectives of facilitating planning of welfare
budget, simplifying criteria, minimizing fraud, and encouraging work ar6 not compelling
interests that would satisfy strict scrutiny).
409. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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approve of the legislative choice made on their behal 410 In other
words, courts would balance the costs and benefits running to the
same persons as a result of the legislative classification.
The harm to children from not receiving vaccinations can be
quite severe.41 ' The state purpose for exemptions to compulsory im-
munization laws should therefore be extremely important to outweigh
the potential for harm to children.4"' The harms children incur as
a result of receiving an inferior education, as may occur when
teachers are not qualified or repress intellectual independence, or as
a result of sexist teaching, may not be as obvious as, for example, a
case of whooping cough, but they are nevertheless severe. These
harms include diminished self-esteem, lesser chances for success in
careers, frustration of ambitions, and lesser self-fulfillment.4 1 3 These
consequences are substantial and long-term. Accordingly, a state
purpose that justifies these harms must likewise be extremely
important.
The purpose of fostering cultural diversity is easily dismissed.
One has difficulty imagining a state arguing, or a court accepting, that
it may impose the costs of educational deprivation on children in
order to pursue such a diffuse and intangible public benefit.4 4
410. Justice Stevens suggested this standard in Cleburne when he wrote: "I cannot
believe that a rational member of this disadvantaged class could ever approve of the
discriminatory application of the city's ordinance in this case." Id. at 455 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also Brumley, supra note 395, at 354 (noting that in cases adjudicating an
unemancipated minor's right to have an abortion, when the minor is found not to be
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself, "courts apply the doctrine of
substituted judgment").
411. See supra note 143.
412. This conclusion is borne out by the numerous judicial decisions finding that a
parental interest in religious freedom, which courts treat as a fundamental interest, is not
sufficiently important to outweigh children's need for immunization. See, eg., Brown v.
Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979) (protecting school children against the horrors of
crippling and death "is the obvious overriding and compelling public purpose of [the
compulsory immunization law]. To the extent that it may conflict with the religious beliefs
of a parent, however sincerely entertained, the interests of the school children must
prevail."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980).
413. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
414. Of course the Supreme Court in effect did just that in Yoder, in approving the
Amish parents' request to keep their adolescent children out of school, motivated in large
part by a fear that the Amish culture might disappear if the children in the community
received a mainstream education. However, the Court refused to acknowledge that the
children would be harmed in any way, and its special solicitude for threatened minority
cultures was ostensibly just a subtext to a decision based on the constitutionally protected
religious interests of parents. 406 U.S. 205, 229-30 (1972).
According to the standard interpretation of classical utilitarianism, that theory would
sanction the sacrifice of the fundamental interests of a group of children if the attendant
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Whatever gain might flow from the richness of our social environment
as a result of parental religious exemptions to education laws, it
certainly cannot be sufficiently important to outweigh the attendant
harms to unconsenting, innocent children. The Supreme Court has in
several contexts, including the context of child welfare, indicated an
appropriate hostility to legislation that treats politically less powerful
persons instrumentally as means to serve collateral social ends. 41
It is also worth noting that greater standardization of schools in
this country would hardly threaten cultural diversity. For the past
several decades roughly nine-tenths of all children have attended
public schools, yet one could hardly maintain that whatever cultural
diversity exists in this country resides principally among the one-tenth
of the population that attended non-public schools. In fact, the effect
of conservative religious schooling is generally to standardize children
within a given religious community, and to deny them access to a
benefits from cultural diversity, though small on a per-person basis, reached such a great
number of people as to produce a net gain in aggregate utility. See R.G. Frey,
Introduction: Utilitarianism and Persons, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS 3, 6-7 (R.G. Frey ed.,
1984). Making such calculations in practice is notoriously difficult. It seems unlikely,
however, that this country has enough people to enjoy the purported benefit of the
marginal increase in cultural diversity arising from the educational deprivation of several
million children, such that the aggregate effect on utility would be a net gain. Many
contemporary utilitarians, and most non-utilitarians, on the other hand, endorse a notion
of individual rights that precludes such a trade-off between the fundamental interests of
individuals and diffuse social benefits. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY xii (1977); JUDITH JARviS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 166-67 (1990).
The Supreme Court has manifested such a philosophy itself in its fundamental rights
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634,642 (1969) (holding that
social interests in minimizing welfare fraud and in encouraging work cannot justify
burdening individuals' fundamental right of interstate travel).
415. E.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982):
[E]ven if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring
some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must support
its selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of
educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are "basically
indistinguishable" from legally resident alien children.
Id. at 229 n.25 (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 589 (E.D. Tex. 1978)); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that
a state may not single out "those least well represented in the political process to bear the
brunt of a benign program."); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,.525 (1970) (Marshall,
J., dissenting):
The State's position is thus that the State may deprive certain needy children of
assistance to which they would otherwise be entitled in order to provide an
arguable work incentive for their parents. But the State may not wield its
economic whip in this fashion when the effect is to cause a deprivation to needy
dependent children in order to correct an arguable fault of their parents.
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diversity of cultural practices and belief systems, with the result that
they have less opportunity to find a social environment and belief
system best suited to their individual dispositions than do children
who receive a mainstream, liberal education. Therefore, since cultural
diversity was the only one of the three conceivable legitimate
purposes identified above that might support most of the religious
exemptions to school regulations, including exemptions from
prohibitions of sexist teaching and instructional materials, these
exemptions would fail heightened review even if a court found that
fostering cultural diversity was an actual purpose of these exemptions.
Whether we deem the two other state purposes identified
above-preserving parental attachment and protecting children from
anxiety-important ones may depend on the level of generality at
which we define them. Both involve protecting developmental
interests of children, and as an abstract matter such a purpose is not
only important, but is in fact compelling. If one defines these
hypothetical state purposes in a manner more closely related to the
actual effects of the exemptions, however, they do not seem so
important.
With respect to the parent-child relationship, any diminution in
parental attachment to children as a result of compulsory medical care
or exposure to liberal views would surely be only modest. Religious
objector parents would not leave their children by the roadside if the
children were to receive immunizations or blood transfusions, or if the
children were to learn in school that most people think women are
morally and politically the equal of men. Significantly, religious
minorities such as the Jehovah's Witnesses whom courts have ordered
to do certain things inconsistent with their beliefs have manifested a
doctrinal adaptability to the legal environment in which they live,
deeming even adult members of the sect absolved of moral respon-
sibility for receiving blood transfusions when under a court order to
do so.416 Furthermore, a court might reasonably question the value
for a child of a continued relationship with any parent who would
care less for the child because of a belief that the child had become
spiritually impure. Finally, one might also speculate that a modest
psychological detachment of parent from child would actually be a
good thing in these cases. The children involved in these disputes
might be better off if their parents came to see them to a greater
416. See, e.g., In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000,1007
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286,288-89 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987).
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extent as distinct persons, rather than as appendages, reproductions,
or property of the parents. With this revised perspective, parents
might feel less inclined or less entitled to sacrifice the children's
temporal developmental interests for the sake of religious principles.
These considerations suggest that concern regarding the parent-
child bond is not sufficiently substantial to give rise to an important
state purpose that could justify any parental religious exemptions.
The child's need for protection from disease and from subordinating
schooling must certainly outweigh this insubstantial concern.
A prediction that some children will experience anxiety as a
result of receiving medical treatment or instruction contrary to their
parents' beliefs is less speculative. Indeed, one problem associated
with some forms of religious upbringing, from a secular perspective,
is that they set children up to experience excessive anxiety, by
predicting divine punishment for violation of moral strictures that may
be difficult to satisfy.417 Such anxiety in the medical context may be
particularly acute in some cases, at least when compounded with the
anxiety children experience simply from receiving shots, entering
hospitals, and being subjected to invasive medical procedures. One
might expect, though, that any decent parent would attempt to
mitigate this problem in a medical or educational context by telling
the child he is not responsible for things that the state compels.4"
Moreover, a child who does not receive immunization, or medical care
when ill or injured, is likely to experience great anxiety from the
prospect of future suffering, illness, and death. With respect to
education, female students in conservative religious schools might very
well experience some relief from anxiety as a result of learning that
the larger society espouses the view that women and men are equal
and that women should be able to pursue whatever career suits them.
In short, for children of persons who oppose medical care or gender
equality on religious grounds, anxiety is probably inevitable regardless
of what the state does. By intervening, the state may create new
anxiety but may also alleviate existing anxiety.
417. See, e.g., MEEHL, supra note 58, at 42-44, 77, 85 (relating testimonies by former
Catholic school students); PESHKIN, supra note 71, at 120 (relating instruction by
fundamentalist school teacher about a man "whose refusal to heed God's call to the
mission field led to his young wife's death, his girlfriend's rape, and his own brains being
blown out"), 152, 181, 208-09, 219, 229, 231 (relating story by student in fundamentalist
school about a close friend whom God killed because he had sexual relations with his
girlfriend), 246, 286; RosE, supra note 71, at 101.
418. As noted above, cases involving Jehovah's Witness parents have revealed a
parental inclination to do this. See supra note 416.
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Even if a parental religious exemption results in a net reduction
in anxiety for children in some cases, however, this does not in and of
itself establish that the exemption serves an important state purpose
in those instances. As noted above,419 a court applying heightened
scrutiny should balance such benefits against other costs of the
religious exemption, to determine whether the exemption furthers
children's temporal interests on the whole. A judge might approach
this determination as a substituted judgment for the child, a judgment
about what a child in the situation under review might rationally
prefer as the outcome for her medical care or education, if fully
informed and capable of making a considered, independent choice.
The cost for children, in terms of physical suffering and the
potential for lasting impairment or death as a result of not receiving
immunizations and other medical care, as already noted, can be quite
severe, and would by itself appear to outweigh any net increase in
anxiety on the part of the child in almost all instances. It is significant
in this regard that courts that have considered constitutional challen-
ges to compulsory vaccination laws have not even mentioned a
possibility of psychological trauma to the children involved. This
suggests that neither the courts nor the parents involved in these cases
perceived this to be an important consideration, relative to the
physical health of the child and the parents' interest in religious
freedom. The balance of considerations thus points in favor of
making compulsory immunization universal and ordering medically
advisable care except in truly minor cases.
With respect to education, as discussed above, unregulated church
schooling may substantially impair a child's cognitive development
and may inflict severe psychological harm. While these harms may
not be as obvious or intense as a serious illness, they are real and
well-documented4 and should weigh heavily in the balance. On
the other side of the equation, a child's anxiety about reading books
condemned by her parents or hearing things her parents say are
blasphemous might be substantial, but is unlikely to be as intense as
the anxiety that a religiously proscribed medical intervention like
surgery or vaccination can cause. This judgment rests partly on
assumptions that parents of religious school pupils have a positive
attitude toward the schools their children attend (in contrast to
419. See supra note 410 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 71, 76-84, and accompanying text; see also MENENDEz, supra note
71, at 4 (arguing that fundamentalist Christian schools use textbooks that "create a
permanent ghetto of the mind for their students").
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hospitals where they might be ordered to bring their children) and
that the children have a well-established relationship with their
teachers (in contrast to surgeons or medical personnel who give
vaccinations) that is, on the whole, positive and nurturing.4 t These
factors would surely blunt the effects of any conflict between state
mandates and parents' religious beliefs. A "best interest of the child"
or "substituted judgment" analysis in the context of laws governing
the content of instruction, including those requiring sex equity in
textbooks and instruction, should therefore also yield the conclusion
that sparing children from anxiety is not a sufficiently important state
interest to justify a denial of the statutory benefit to any child.
In sum, then, none of the hypothesized legitimate state purposes
for religious exemptions to child welfare and education laws are
important in an equal protection sense. None are sufficient to
outweigh the harms that children now suffer or are at risk of suffering
as a result of the statutory exemptions. Thus, even if a court were to
deem one or more of them to be the actual purpose for the
exemptions, the exemptions should not survive heightened scrutiny.
The only way a court might uphold one or more of these exemptions
would be if it determined that only rational basis review should be
applied to them.
3. Substantial Relation to Interests
This final subsection considers the closeness of the connection
between a legislative classification among children based on the
religious beliefs of their parents and the legitimate state purposes
identified above. Although the analysis above shows that none of
these purposes is an actual purpose for the exemptions and that, in
any event, none are important purposes, this subsection considers
whether these purposes are substantially related to the classification,
in order to 'cover all the bases.' It also considers whether the
legitimate purposes are rationally related to the classification, to
determine what the outcome should be if a court applied only rational
basis review.
The Supreme Court has explained the substantial relation
element of heightened scrutiny as follows:
If the State's objective is legitimate and important, we next
determine whether the requisite direct, substantial relation-
421. In education contexts, as in medical contexts, we can reasonably expect that
parents will seek to minimize their children's sense of responsibility for doing things that
are legally mandated.
1454 [Vol. 74
CHILDREN OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS
ship between objective and means is present. The purpose
of requiring that close relationship is to assure that the
validity of a classification is determined through reasoned
analysis rather than through the mechanical apof
traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions 
....
To ensure that a legislature's analysis is sound, courts applying
heightened scrutiny require the state to supply factual evidence of a
close relationship between classification and purpose.4 They then
"evaluate the rationality of the legislative judgment with reference to
well-established constitutional principles" that rise" 'above the level
of the pragmatic political judgments of a particular time and
place.' 424 In other words, a state cannot satisfy intermediate
scrutiny by simply asserting that a legislative classification reflects the
best judgment of the legislature as to the benefits likely to flow from
the disparate treatment of the classes it created.4' The classification
must actually reflect a sound, well-supported judgment that it will
closely serve the state's objective. Plaintiffs may dispute the
substantiality of the relation between a statutory classification and a
legislative purpose by showing that the classification is either over-
broad426 or under-inclusive.4 7 In doing so, "the party challenging
422. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982).
423. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,228-30 (1982) (finding lack of evidence to support
any of state's purported justifications; unsubstantiated speculation that illegal immigrants
are drawn to the U.S. by the possibility of a free education for their children is not
sufficient); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 88 (1979) (finding no evidence that
discrimination in aid to families based on gender of unemployed parent served the
purported legislative purpose of discouraging paternal desertion); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 199 (1976) (requiring state to supply factual support for policy decision underlying
classification). Courts may also have to allow the party challenging a classification to
submit rebuttal evidence. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683-84 (1973).
424. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.16 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 299 (1978)).
425. Cf. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99:
[I]ncreasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the
home rather than in the "marketplace and world of ideas" [have been] rejected
as loose-fitting characterizations incapable of supporting state statutory schemes
that were premised upon their accuracy. In light of the weak congruence
between gender and the characteristic or trait that gender purported to represent,
it was necessary that the legislature choose either to realign their substantive laws
in a gender-neutral fashion, or to adopt procedures for identifying those instances
where the sex-centered generalization actually comported to fact.
426. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,394 (1979) (invalidating law requiring
parental consent to adoption from unwed mothers but not from unwed fathers, because
it was based on overbroad presumption that unwed fathers are more difficult to locate);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 650 (1974) (invalidating school board
policy requiring pregnant schoolteachers to take unpaid leave beginning five months before
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the constitutionality of the particular line [the legislature] has drawn
has the burden of advancing principled reasoning that will at once
invalidate that line and yet tolerate a different line separating some
[persons] from others."4"
With respect to cultural diversity and unregulated private educa-
tion, a state would be hard-pressed to demonstrate the requisite
substantial relationship. It would have to provide evidence that
allowing a minority of the school children within its border to receive
an education in unlicensed schools from unqualified teachers, or an
education that inculcates sexist attitudes, is conducive to a richer,
more heterogeneous social environment. Apart from the mind-
boggling difficulty of identifying and gathering evidence for such a
proposition, the proposition is to a great extent counter-intuitive.
Requiring that all private schools be licensed, hire only certified
teachers, and comply with standards of educational quality would
admittedly raise the costs of operating a religious school to a level
beyond the means of some that now operate. The likely result would
be fewer sectarian schools in operation. It is unlikely, though, that all
schools of any particular religious denomination would go out of
business. More to the point, though, children schooled by inferior
teachers, particularly teachers who impose an ideology that is
repressive of independent thought and/or that reinforces the subor-
dination of half the student body, are surely less likely to contribute
expected due date because based on overbroad presumption about physical abilities during
pregnancy). The Court's hostility to irrebuttable presumptions in the due process context
is analogous and related to the overbreadth doctrine in the equal protection context. See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121 (1989) (upholding state law establishing
irrebuttable presumption that child born to a married woman living with her husband is
child of the marriage) ("[O]ur'irrebuttable presumption' cases must ultimately be analyzed
as calling into question not the adequacy of procedures but ... the adequacy of the 'fit'
between the classification and the policy that the classification serves."); LaFleur, 414 U.S.
at 650 (invalidating school board rule requiring that pregnant teachers take unpaid leave
beginning five months before expected date of birth because it created conclusive
presumption that every such teacher is physically incapable of teaching); United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973) (striking down provision of federal
statute excluding from food stamp program any household including member of majority
age claimed as dependent, because it created irrebuttable presumption that such
households are not needy); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (striking down
state's irrebuttable statutory presumption that all unmarried fathers are unqualified to raise
their children).
427. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227 (noting that in durational residency requirement cases,
states have asserted a legitimate interest in conserving state funds, but have lost because
they were unable to provide explanation why new residents were singled out to bear the
cost of serving this purpose).
428. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976).
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positively to our cultural fabric than children who receive a high
quality education that encourages creative and critical thinking and
that treats all children as equals.
Alternatively, in challenging the failure of the federal and state
governments to extend their school regulations to religious schools,
one might argue that the law's classification is under-inclusive with
respect to the purpose of fostering cultural diversity. If allowing
schools greater freedom to operate in whatever manner they like does
in fact promote cultural diversity, then why not leave all private and
public schools unregulated? Many local communities would like to
experiment with different educational approaches in their public
schools. Why are children in religious schools singled out to incur the
risk of an inferior, subordination-producing "education" in order to
promote the supposed public good of increased diversity?429
The relation between religious exemptions to child medical care
or education laws and parental attachment is also highly speculative;
a state could not likely produce any evidence to support a prediction
of parental alienation should it eliminate all religious exemptions to
such laws.43 Unsurprisingly, the reported court decisions in these
two areas mention no claims by parents that they would no longer
accept, love, or nurture their children if the children were to receive
medical care or instruction that the parents opposed on religious
grounds. In fact, scaling back parents' rights over their children might
actually have a very salutary effect on parent-child relations; a bond
between parents and child based on the parents' perception of the
429. Cf. Plyler.
[E]ven if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of barring
some number of children from the schools of the State, the State must support
its selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of
educational cost and need, however, undocumented children are "basically
indistinguishable" from legally resident alien children.
457 U.S. at 229; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978)
(Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (concluding that a state may not single out "those least well represented
in the political process to bear the brunt of a benign program"); supra notes 171-86 and
accompanying text (arguing against the relevance of a public/private distinction in the
context of children's education).
430. It may well be that parents' enjoyment of decisionmaking authority with respect
to the health care and education of their children enhances their commitment to and
assistance with children's health and learning. Even so, this would not support a
conclusion that partially restricting the scope in which parental authority operates would
substantially undermine parental commitment. Children of religious objectors, moreover,
might actually be better off on the whole if their parents became somewhat less involved
in their health care and education, since the parents' involvement has negative as well as
positive consequences.
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child as an object of their rights (that is, as their property or
appendage) may not be best for the child or the parents, 43 1 while
inducing parents to see their child as a person in his or her own right
might clear the way for formation of a different, more mutually
rewarding bond.
Moreover, even if some religious objector parents would become
alienated to a substantial degree from their children if the latter
received medical care or instruction contrary to the parents' religious
beliefs, such parents are certainly very few in number. A court would
therefore have to deem religious exemptions from child medical care
mandates or school regulations grossly over-broad in relation to a
state purpose of avoiding such alienation. At the same time,
individualized determinations would clearly be inappropriate, if for no
other reason than the fact that such an approach would create an
incentive for religious objector parents to demonstrate a willingness
to abandon their children. States have at their disposal alternative
means, both punitive and assistive, to deal with those few parents who
might be inclined to abandon or otherwise neglect their children
simply because the children received medical care or disapproved
forms of instruction, and they should use those means rather than
sacrificing the well-being of millions of children.432
The relationship between religious exemptions from child medical
care laws and avoiding trauma to children aged five and older is
significantly stronger. When parents believe that medical care violates
divine law and their children are old enough to understand the
concept of violating a religious command, the children are likely to
have the same belief and so the potential for anxiety is undeniably
increased. In this area, though, both over-breadth and under-
inclusiveness problems arise. As discussed in the previous subsection,
only rarely will a child whose parents object on religious grounds to
431. See Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L. REV.
151, 162-63 (1988) (arguing that the courts' emphasis on parents' rights may encourage
parents to be self-concerned, rather than concerned about the well-being of their children:
"Thinking in terms of rights encourages us to ask what we may do to free ourselves, not
to bind ourselves. It encourages us to think about what constrains us from doing what we
want, not what obligates us to do what we ought."); see also FORER, supra note 268, at 188
("The belief that a man's wife and children are his possessions to do with as he pleases is
embedded in the common law.").
432. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,637 (1969) (noting that preventing welfare
fraud is a legitimate purpose, but procedures other than a one-year waiting period are
available for dealing with fraud). As indicated supra note 306, nearly five million school-
aged children in this country attend religious schools. For figures on parents claiming a
religious exemption to vaccination laws, see supra note 147.
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immunization or medical treatment suffer so much anxiety about the
religious implications for them of receiving the care as to outweigh
the harm that would result from not receiving the care. In-
dividualized determinations are necessary in an area such as this, in
which the danger of physical harm is so real and in which the persons
who will be harmed are themselves relatively unable to make a fully
informed, rational evaluation of their situation and to form indepen-
dent preferences.433 In such proceedings, hearing officials should
take care to avoid creating an incentive or opportunity for parents to
manipulate their child in order to enhance the showing of anxiety.
At the same time, exemptions limited to religious objectors, or
even more narrowly to members of particular religious denominations,
are also under-inclusive with respect to this purpose, insofar as
children of parents who object to immunization or medical care but
are not covered by a particular state's exemption probably also
experience anxiety when compelled to receive certain care. Equal
protection challenges to immunization laws that such parents have
brought reveal that parental opposition can be quite strong even when
not motivated by what are generally considered religious beliefs.4'
It bears repeating, though, that none of the relevant cases suggest that
this is a real concern with respect to any children, and that this could
never be a plausible concern in the context of immunization of
infants.
Similar reasons militate against finding a close relationship
between the purpose of avoiding anxiety in children and religious
school exemptions to regulations prescribing use of particular
textbooks or teaching of particular values such as gender equality and
critical thinking. Such exemptions are over-broad with respect to this
purpose because the concern regarding children's anxiety would
probably not be significant in the case of the majority of religious
schools. Half of religious school enrollment in this country is in
Catholic schools, and these schools are much more mainstream in
their orientation than the fundamentalist Christian schools that have
433. Cf Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) ("[T]o give a mandatory preference to
members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination
of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden
by the Equal Protection Clause ....").
434. See, e.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp.
81, 94-97 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F. Supp. 1259, 1265-66 (S.D. Ohio 1985);
Kleid v. Board of Educ. of Fulton, 406 F. Supp. 902, 904 (W.D. Ky. 1976); Davis v. State,
451 A.2d 107,109-10 (Md. 1982); In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606,611 (N.Y. Fain. Ct.
1992).
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fought vehemently against state regulation in recent years. 435 These
exemptions are also under-inclusive, since there are many children
attending public schools in this country whose parents are strongly
opposed on religious or other grounds to their children reading books
that promote mainstream values.436  General parental opt-out
provisions for public schools would cure the under-inclusiveness
problem, but might exacerbate the over-breadth problem (and cause
chaos in the schools as well).
Finally, we must consider whether any of the hypothesized
legitimate state purposes could survive rational basis review-that is,
whether classifications among children based on the religious beliefs
of their parents bears a rational relation to any of these conceivable
state purposes. Though children of religious objectors satisfy all of
the criteria for heightened scrutiny, the notion that they are a suspect
class is an entirely novel one, and courts may be resistant to
concluding that laws designed to accommodate the beliefs of minority
religious groups pose a threat to important interests of children.
Many of these laws, however, should fail even the most deferential
form of review.
Under rational basis review a state generally need not place in
the record any evidence to show the rationality of its statutory
classification-that is, the connection between the legitimate ends of
the legislation and the classifications that the state has drawn in such
a way as to achieve that end.437 Rather, a party challenging those
choices "must convince the court that the legislative facts on which
the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be
435. See NCEAGANLEY'S CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN AMERICA 13 (Mary Mahar, ed., 22d
ed. 1994). A recent national conference of Catholic School educators produced a
"directional statement" to the effect that "Catholic education works toward the elimination
of sexism.., in its own structures and curricula, in the Church and in society." GRANT,
supra note 85, at 238-39. Fundamentalist Christian schools are second in enrollment,
Lutheran schools (which are also much more mainstream in orientation than fundamental-
ist schools) are third, and Jewish schools fourth. JAMES & LEVIN, supra note 306, at 33.
436. See, e.g., BATES, supra note 319 (describing fundamentalist Christian parents'
crusade to keep their children from reading certain textbooks in public school).
437. See Heller v. Doe by Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637,2642-43 (1993) ("[A] classification 'must
be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.' ") (quoting FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993)); Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. at
2098 (concluding that legislature may base its choices "on rational speculation unsupported
by evidence or empirical data"). But see Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(contending that under Cleburne, classification based on mental disability must be
supported by state-proffered rationale and evidence).
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conceived to be true by the governmental decision-maker."438 That
the hypothetical factual basis is actually untrue does not itself render
legislative reliance on it unreasonable.439 Moreover, the fit between
legislative means and ends need not be a close one.' ° Under
rationality review, courts do not review legislative choices for their
" 'wisdom, fairness, or logic.' ""' Even under rationality review,
however, a court "must find some footing in the realities of the
subject addressed by the legislation" to justify the classification the
legislature chose." The classification may not be "wholly arbitrary"
438. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979).
439. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463-64 (1981); Vance, 440
U.S. at 111.
440. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643 ("[Courts are compelled under rational-basis review
to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means
and ends."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (stating that under rationality review
courts must accord states "substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly
approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns
both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the
State to remedy every ill"); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179
(1980) ("[T]he fact the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter
for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration."); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970):
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are
imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend
the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."
Id. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
441. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2642 (citation omitted); see also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749, 777 (1975):
Under [rationality review] standards, the question raised is not whether a
statutory provision precisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the
factual position which generated the congressional concern reflected in the
statute. Such a rule would ban all prophylactic provisions .... Nor is the
question whether the provision filters out a substantial part of the class which
caused congressional concern, or whether it filters out more members of the class
than nonmembers. The question is whether Congress, its concern having been
reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to
avoid, could rationally have concluded both that a particular limitation or
qualification would protect against its occurrence, and that the expense and other
difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a
prophylactic rule.
442. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643. A statutory classification will fail rationality review if
it" 'rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.' "Id.
at 2645 (citations omitted). Whether the classification serves a legitimate purpose must
at least be "debatable." Id. at 2646. In Cleburne, one of the few decisions to strike down
legislation under this deferential form of review, the Supreme Court held the zoning
ordinance prohibiting group homes for the mentally retarded unconstitutional because the
statutory classification appeared entirely arbitrary and based solely on prejudice. City of
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or based solely upon irrational prejudices. 3 "Otherwise, rationality
review would be tantamount to no review at all-a result manifestly
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. '
With the greatest of deference to state legislatures, a court might
find some footing in reality, however meager and speculative, on
which to conclude that a legislative judgment that religious
exemptions to child immunization and medical neglect laws serve the
purposes of parental attachment and diminished childhood anxiety is
not wholly arbitrary or irrational."5 That this judgment is wrong or
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985); see also New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479,486 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding no
rational relation between mental retardation and need to detect which school children
carry hepatitis-B virus), aff'd on other grounds, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979). The Cleburne
Court suggested that a bad fit between legislative means and purported ends should raise
a suspicion that some other purpose or prejudice that is illegitimate actually underlies the
law. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450; see also Farrell, supra note 235, at 37 (stating that when
a state "is unable to explain why a particular group has been singled out to bear the entire
burden of a law, a suspicion arises that the purpose of the law may bear some relation to
the group singled out").
443. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 63 (1993).
444. Id.
445. Under rational basis review, courts have also sanctioned a one-step-at-a-time
approach to dealing with social problems, excusing states for imposing costs on or
distributing benefits to some persons but not others who are similarly situated when
limited resources constrain the legislature to proceed incrementally, or when a state is
experimenting with new programs. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976) ("Legislatures may implement their program step by step in ... economic areas,
adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete
elimination of the evil to future regulations."); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 39 (1973) ("Of course, every reform that benefits some more than others may be
criticized for what it fails to accomplish."); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87
(1970) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all."); Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("[R]eform may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative
mind."). This excuse would not be available in the case of religious exemptions to child
welfare and education laws, since states would not incur significant direct costs as a result
of eliminating these exemptions. It costs the state nothing formally to extend its child
welfare mandates universally. Cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,229 n.25 (1980) ("Nor does
the record support the claim that the educational resources of the State are so directly
limited that some form of 'educational triage' might be deemed a reasonable (assuming
that it were a permissible) response to the State's problems."). The cost of enforcing these
mandates is a different matter, and one that should not affect a determination as to dejure
discrimination. Other, indirect costs would arise from having to provide some mandated
services (e.g., vaccinations for families who cannot afford them, increased enrollment in
public schools if some private schools are forced to close).
Moreover, rather than reflecting a series of affirmative steps to address more and
more of a problem, parental religious exemptions, which in most cases were enacted after
the basic child welfare law was already in place, actually mark a retreat rather than an
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greatly outweighed by competing considerations would be irrelevant
under rational basis review. Were a court to apply "active"
rationality review, and require a state to proffer evidence supporting
such a judgment, however, these exemptions might well fail the test.
These supposed justifications do not appear readily susceptible to
convincing evidentiary demonstration one way or the other, so the
outcome would likely depend on where the initial presumption lay.
On the other hand, for any court applying even standard rational
basis review to uphold a legislative excusal of sexist teaching in
religious schools because a legislature could rationally conclude that
this promotes cultural diversity and healthy parent-child relationships
or reduces children's anxiety would be shocking. Exemptions from
some other school regulations, such as one prescribing use of
textbooks and other curricular materials that explicitly promote
gender equality or critical thinking on moral issues, may not be quite
so difficult to tie to the aims of diversity, parental attachment, and
avoiding anxiety in children. A court would stand on firmer ground,
however, in holding that all existing exemptions in state school codes
are arbitrary means of pursuing those aims.
4. Conclusion
Applying the heightened scrutiny test to religious objector
exemptions has yielded the following conclusions: The actual purpose
of all these exemptions-satisfying the religious preferences of
parents-is an illegitimate one. All the exemptions therefore fail this
test. Even if a court were to find that one or more of the three best
candidates for a legitimate state purpose for these exemptions was an
actual purpose in a given case, it would have to find that none of
advance in addressing the needs of children. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107, 115
(Md. 1982) (noting that Maryland's immunization law was first enacted in 1872, and a
religious exemption was added in 1969); Dalli v. Board of Educ., 267 N.EX.2d 219, 223
(Mass. 1971) (noting that a religious exemption was added to Massachusetts' compulsory
vaccination law in 1967). Cf. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 39 (endorsing the step-by-step
rationale but emphasizing that "every step leading to the establishment of the system
Texas utilizes today.., was implemented in an effort to extend public education and to
improve its quality," and that "the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and refor-
matory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the
nature of the State's efforts"). In addition, these exemptions do not reflect an effort to
address the most acute phases of a problem first, leaving the less urgent for later. As
noted in Part II.B, the children left unprotected by the immunization laws and anti-sexism
laws are actually the children who stand most in need of the laws' protection. Nor are any
of the child welfare and education laws discussed in this Article experimental in nature,
such that a state might be said to be trying them out to see if they are beneficial before
extending them to all children.
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them is an important purpose-at least not sufficiently important to
outweigh the harm to children that the exemptions allow. Finally,
even if a court were to find that one or more of these hypothetical
legitimate state purposes was an actual purpose and an important
purpose, it should find that the legislative classification on the basis
of parents' religious beliefs is not substantially related to that purpose.
In the case of two of these purposes-promoting cultural diversity
and avoiding some modicum of parental detachment-the relationship
is highly speculative and, in any event, not a close one. With respect
to the third supposed purpose-avoiding anxiety in children-the
relationship is not so speculative, but the classification is both over-
and under-inclusive. Children too young to understand what violation
of a religious stricture means should not be included. For older
children, case-by-case determinations of the child's best interests
should be required whenever any parent, for any reason, opposes a
recommended course of medical treatment, and parents should have
to show that they cannot alleviate their child's anxiety other than by
exposing the child to risk of serious illness. In sum, then, a court
applying heightened scrutiny should find that all of the blanket
religious exemptions to child welfare and education laws discussed in
Part I are unconstitutional violations of the equal protection rights of
the children of religious objectors, and should therefore invalidate
them."
Were a court to apply only the rational basis test to parental
religious exemptions, despite the compelling arguments for heightened
review adduced above, it would still have to find that the failure of
states and the federal government to extend their prohibitions of
sexist education universally is unconstitutional. The exclusion of
religious schools is not rationally related to any legitimate purpose.
The same outcome should befall exemptions to other school
regulations, such as school licensing and teacher certification, that do
not directly require children to read or hear anything contrary to their
parents' religious beliefs, provided that a party challenging these
exemptions could present evidence that they result in some harm to
children in religious schools. Religious exemptions to medical care
laws and to school laws requiring teaching of values objectionable to
conservative religious groups would stand a better chance of surviving
446. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (stating that the preferred course
when courts find that statutes providing benefits are under-inclusive is to extend the
benefits to the previously excluded class, rather than to nullify the whole statutory
scheme).
[Vol. 741464
CHILDREN OF RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS
rational basis review, though a court could quite reasonably conclude
that they too are unconstitutional.
III. PRACrICAL OBSTACLES TO CHALLENGING RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS
Regardless of one's view of the soundness of the foregoing
analysis of the substantive legal issues that parental religious
exemptions raise, one might, regard that analysis as a purely
theoretical exercise. An equal protection claim on behalf of the
affected children might never receive a judicial hearing on the merits,
given the potential practical obstacles to advancing it. This Part
briefly considers those obstacles and how an advocate for these
children might overcome them.
A. Finding a Plaintiff
In the first place, an obvious procedural difficulty arises from the
fact that this would be a suit that enjoyed the support of none of the
affected parties. The defendant in the suit would be the federal
government or a state government, which presumably would not
support a constitutional challenge to its own statutes, and might not
even have the authority to do so. 7  Religious objector parents,
though not defendants, have interests of their own at stake, in
addition to being the general guardians of their children, and would
certainly oppose abolition of a statutory exemption that they presently
enjoy. And the children themselves, in all likelihood, would not only
fail to voice support for such a claim on their behalf, but if old
enough to respond would in fact be likely to express opposition to the
claim if asked, at least after their parents had a chance to discuss the
matter with them. The reality of the situation is therefore such that,
if the equal protection rights of religious objectors' children were ever
to be vindicated, it would have to be at the behest of some outsider
concerned for the welfare of these children. Courts, however,
447. The courts are divided as to whether a state can challenge the constitutionality of
its own laws in judicial proceedings. State v. Chastain, 871 S.W.2d 661, 662-66 (Tenn.
1994) (holding that Tennessee Attorney General may challenge a state statute only when
that statute is directly in conflict with another statute upon which the state relies in a
criminal prosecution). Courts that have found that a state's attorney general may not
challenge the state's own laws argue that "a statute, presumed to be constitutional, has the
right to an advocate for its validity." IL at 663. Courts that have reached the opposite
conclusion emphasize the obligation of an attorney general to uphold the Constitution and,
somewhat problematically, to promote the interests of the state when its laws are in
conflict with its interests. Id. at 663-64.
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generally do not entertain suits by persons who are not themselves
interested parties.'
A procedural mechanism is available, however, for avoiding
problems of standing in cases involving minors not sufficiently mature
to determine and advance their own best interests. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(c) provides for appointment of a "next friend" to
bring suit on behalf of a minor in federal court. 9 The next friend
may be" 'anyone who has an interest in the welfare of an infant who
may have a grievance or a cause of action,' "" and may file any
type of claim that a competent person would be permitted to file on
her own behalf 4"' The next friend would not be the real party in
interest in the litigation, but rather would act as the representative of
the minor, who would be the real party in interest and who would
have the requisite stake in the outcome to satisfy standing re-
quirements.
448. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,99 (1979) (finding that
to have standing to complain of deprivation of a right, plaintiff must show he personally
suffered harm as a result of that deprivation).
449. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a
general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the represen-
tative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An
infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative
may sue by next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented
in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection
of the infant or incompetent person.
FED. R. Ctv. P. 17(c) Historically, 'next friend' has referred to the representative of a
minor plaintiff, while 'guardian ad litem' has referred to the representative of a minor
defendant, so the difference between the two is purely formal; the duties and powers of
the representative are the same in either case. Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 137 n.10
(3rd Cir. 1989). Courts today often use the terms interchangeably, ignoring the historical
technical distinction between the two. E.g., N.O. v. Callahan, 110 F.R.D. 637, 648 n.6 (D.
Mass. 1986). States typically have analogous provisions in the laws governing their own
courts. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 373 (West 1973); FLA. R. Civ. PROC. § 1.210(b)
(1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201 § 2 (West 1994); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 1201,
1202 (McKinney 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-1-3 (1993). This Part focuses on
federal court procedure, since challenges to a state's laws on federal constitutional grounds
are most likely to be brought in federal district court.
450. Ad Hoc Comm. of Concerned Teachers v. Greenburgh #11 Union Free Sch. Dist.,
873 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593, 599 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (finding ACLU lawyer with no prior connection to plaintiff-children to be an
appropriate next friend)); In re Zawisza, 73 B.R. 929, 936 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
451. Zawisza, 73 B.R. at 935.
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Appointment of a next friend lies within the discretion of the trial
court judge,452 but the decided cases enunciate a presumption that
such appointment will occur whenever a minor is not sufficiently
mature to act on her own behalf and the minor's general guar-
dians-typically, her parents-have a conflict of interest with the
minor in connection with the litigation.453 The case for appointment
of a next friend is thus particularly strong in a suit challenging a law
that grants parents power over some aspect of their children's
lives.4" Although a judge might be uncomfortable in attributing to
religious objector parents an interest contrary to the well-being of
their child, the conflict that must be shown for Rule 17(c) purposes
is a purely formal one, which arises simply from the appearance of
adverse legal positions on the face of a complaint and reflects no
judgment about the motives or child-rearing approach of the parents
or about the merits of the substantive claim.455 This presumption in
452. Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1984); Developmental Disabilities
Advocacy Ctr., Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281,285 (1st Cir. 1982); Chaudhary v. O'Neil, C-
93-20967 RMW, 1994 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 6637, *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 1994), affid, No. 94-
15408, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS 35313 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 1995); M.K. v. Harter, 716 F. Supp.
1333, 1335 (E.D. Cal. 1989); N.O., 110 F.R.D. at 648.
453. E.g., Adelman, 747 F.2d at 989 (noting that Rule 17(c) dictates that "as a matter
of proper procedure, the court should usually appoint a guardian ad litem"); M.S. v.
Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 175-76 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that appointing parents as
guardians ad litem for minor seeking access to state-provided contraceptives without
parental consent was inappropriate); Swift v. Swift, 61 F.R.D. 595, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
(indicating the necessity of appointing a guardian ad litem because of the "diversity of
interest" between a minor and her father); see also Gardner, 874 F.2d at 138 (holding that
person appointed to represent mentally retarded teenager in state court litigation could
not serve as the teenager's representative in federal court action in which that person was
a defendant and therefore had conflict of interest with the teenager); Zawisza, 73 B.R. at
937 ("[W]e are reluctant to heed the claims of an adverse party that the standing of one
purporting to act on behalf of an incompetent is lacking."). Moreover, application of Rule
17(c) when a minor is a party in interest in litigation is mandatory, so that if a court does
not appoint a next friend or guardian ad litem, it must determine that the minor's interests
are otherwise adequately protected. Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir.
1989); Gardner, 874 F.2d at 140; Adelman, 747 F.2d at 988-89 (holding that when complaint
alleges conflict of interest between incompetent person and guardian, trial court must
determine whether incompetent person's interests would be adequately protected if
represented by guardian rather than next friend); Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 11 (6th Cir.
1974) ("[Tlhe failure to consider the necessity for a guardian ad litem and to make a
determination appointing one, or finding that the minor's interests were protected without
one, is fatal to the judgment rendered under such circumstances."); see also Brumley, supra
note 395, at 334 (finding that Rule 17(c) "establishes a strong presumption in favor of
protecting the legal rights of the child litigant").
454. Wermers, 557 F.2d at 176.
455. See Gardner, 874 F.2d at 140:
The purpose of Rule 17(c) is to further the child's interest in prosecuting or
defending a lawsuit, or at least to allow an evaluation of the merits of the suit
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cases of conflict lends support for an argument that courts should be
willing to appoint a next friend who can bring a constitutional claim
on behalf of young children who fail to receive protection from
disease or harmful pedagogical practices because of legislation that
grants their parents special powers or privileges.
At the same time, though, none of the decided cases has ad-
dressed a situation precisely like the hypothetical one here, in which
all interested parties would express opposition to the proposed
litigation and to the appointment of an outside representative for the
children involved. The most closely analogous cases have involved an
outside advocate seeking representative status to bring a claim on
behalf of minors unable to express any preferences, against the wishes
of parents and the state. In those cases, judges have been resistant to
making the appointment and to letting the claim go forward. 56
They sometimes have manifested concern that such an outsider is a
political crusader more interested in using the minors to advance
some ideological cause than in the well-being of the individual
children involved.457 The traditional presumptions that parents have
relative to the child's best interests.... Rule 17(c) was not intended to be a
vehicle for dismissing claims on a summary judgment motion.
See also Adelman, 747 F.2d at 988:
[T]he courts have consistently recognized that they have inherent power to
appoint a guardian ad litem [or next friend] when it appears that the minor's [or
incompetent person's] general representative has interests which may conflict
with those of the person he is supposed to represent ..... Taken at face value,
the complaint showed a conflict of interest between [the incompetent named
plaintiff] and [the plaintiff's guardian].
(quoting 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL, § 1570, at 774 (1971) (emphasis added)); Noe, 507 F.2d at 12
("[S]ince the respective legalpositions of the child and guardian are adverse in this lawsuit,
it cannot be said that the plaintiff is 'otherwise represented' in the action as provided in
Rule 17(c).") (emphasis added); cf. Wermers:
When there is a potential conflict between a perceived parental responsibility and
an obligation to assist the court in achieving a just and speedy determination of
the action, parents have no right to act as guardians ad litem .... Parents should
not be appointed to act as guardians ad litem in litigation challenging a grant of
parental veto power.
557 F.2d at 175-76 (emphasis added).
456. E.g., Melton, 689 F.2d at 285-86 (declining to appoint advocate for rights of
disabled persons as next friend for institutionalized mentally retarded minor still under
guardianship of his mother, who opposed the proposed suit on his behalf); Weber v. Stony
Brook Hosp., 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (N.Y.) (dismissing proceeding seeking to compel
surgery for newborn with spina bifida over objection of parents and in violation of state
statutory scheme intended to protect children), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983).
457. See, e.g., Weber, 456 N.E.2d at 1188 (emphasizing that suit was initiated "at the
behest of a person who had no disclosed relationship with the child, her parents, her
family, or those treating her illnesses" and who had no "direct or personal knowledge of
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a right to control the lives of their children and that parents are the
best protectors of their children's interests also color judges' judgment
in such cases, even when the Rule 17(c) motion alleges a conflict of
interest between parent and child.458
In the few cases in which courts have appointed a next friend to
bring a claim adverse to both parents or guardians and the state, the
minors involved themselves initiated, or at least supported, the suit
and the courts emphasized that fact, stating that any person who
believes her rights have been violated should have some means for
seeking judicial redress.4 9  For example, Child v. Beame,4 60 which
challenged New York City's foster care system, was led by ACLU
lawyers and involved the appointment of Dean Monroe Freedman of
the facts relating to the child's condition, the treatment she is presently receiving or the
factors which prompted her parents to adopt the course they have"); cf Ad Hoc Comm.
of Concerned Teachers v. Greenburgh #11 Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 25,31 (2d Cir.
1989) ("We would not sanction any attempt to assert the legitimate rights of children as
a mere pretext for advancing ulterior political or economic aims.").
458. See, e.g., Melton, 689 F.2d at 286 n.12 (distinguishing case in which parents had
"abandoned all interest" in institutionalized children (quoting Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp.
593, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1976))); Weber, 456 N.E.2d at 1188 (invoking "the most private and
most precious responsibility vested in the parents for the care and nurture of their
children"). Similarly, a federal district court rejected the claim of defendant school
superintendents that it should appoint a guardian ad litem for the children of parents
alleging, on behalf of themselves and their children, that state laws governing home
schooling were unconstitutional. Jeffery v. O'Donnell, 702 F. Supp. 513, 516 (M.D. Pa.
1987). The defendants pointed out that the parents' preferences regarding their children's
schooling, which were motivated by religious beliefs, might not be what was best for the
children. Id. at 515. In response, the court concluded that parents have a constitutional
right to direct the religious upbringing and education of their children, and gave no
independent consideration to the interests of the children. Id. at 515-16 (noting also the
governmental interest in the assurance that children simply receive "an education"
(emphasis added)). It did, however, leave open the possibility that a conflict of interest
might arise later in the litigation and that appointment of separate representation for the
children would then be appropriate. Id. at 516.
459. E.g., Wermers, 557 F.2d at 175-76 (involving a minor who brought suit to vindicate
her right to obtain prescription contraceptives without parental consent); Noe, 507 F.2d at
12 (stressing the "very real need of a 14-year-old plaintiff to have her own personal rights
and interests protected"); Child, 412 F. Supp. at 597-99 (rejecting claim that children's
involvement was involuntary and noting that children had significant right of access to
courts); cf. Melton, 689 F.2d at 286 n.12 (distinguishing Child on the basis that in the case
before it the minor involved did not consent to litigation on his behalf). Courts have also
appointed persons who were not parents or other guardians as next friend for minors suing
the state in cases in which there was no opposition from parents. E.g., Ad Hoc Comm. of
Concerned Teachers, 873 F.2d at 31 (holding that a group of teachers should be allowed
to proceed as next friend of students who were no longer in custody of natural parents in
order to sue school district for violating the students' right to a learning environment free
of state-sanctioned racial discrimination).
460. 412 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Hofstra Law School, who had no prior contact with the children, as
next friend. The children who were the named representatives of the
class of children in foster care consented to the litigation and to
representation by the ACLU and by Dean Freedman.46' In endor-
sing appointment of Dean Freedman as next friend, the court
emphasized that the children clearly embraced the purpose of the
lawsuit, which was to secure for them a permanent home placement,
and had authorized Dean Freedman to serve as their represen-
tative. 2 The court also worried that denying the children represen-
tation in the matter would deny a right of access to the courts to
"those who feel they are aggrieved."" These cases also involved
children who were either no longer in the custody of their natural
parents or in their teens and seeking to free themselves from parental
control.46 Courts would undoubtedly be less willing to appoint a
representative for young children still in the care of their natural
parents who do not believe themselves to be aggrieved.
Thus, vindication of the equal protection rights of children of
religious objectors could require courts to extend application of Rule
17(c) into a realm where they have never before ventured. One
might reasonably predict that few judges would be willing to break
new ground in this area unless they felt compelled to do so-that is,
unless declining to appoint a next friend for these children would
appear clearly at odds with well-established legal principles and basic
tenets of justice. Convincing judges that this is in fact the case would
require some creative lawyering, but it should not be impossible.
As an initial matter, an outside observer seeking appointment as
next friend for children of religious objectors should emphasize that
such appointment does not itself decide the substantive claim, nor
even decide that the substantive claim will be advanced. It would
simply allow a court to hear and decide a constitutional claim on
behalf of the children, and only if the appointed representative
determined that it would, on the whole, be in the children's interest
to advance the claim on their behalf. In this connection, the outside
advocate should provide sincere assurance to the court that as next
461. Id. at 597-98.
462. Id. at 599.
463. Id. (emphasis added).
464. M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 173 (8th Cir. 1977) (indicating that plaintiff was
a 15-year-old who wished to represent a class of all minors denied contraceptive services
or supplies because of lack of parental consent); Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 10 (6th Cir.
1974) (indicating that plaintiff was a 14 year old who was in state's custody); Child, 412 F.
Supp. at 596 (indicating that the plaintiff class consisted of children in foster care).
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friend he would make decisions solely on the basis of the children's
best interests, rather than using his position to establish a legal
principle or to attack a religious group, with no concern or only
secondary concern for the interests of the children.4' To this end,
the advocate should emphasize that the substantive claim does not
rest on his own idiosyncratic view of what is best for children, but
rather on the defendant state or federal government's own judgment
about what is best for children, as reflected in its statutes, combined
with the fundamental constitutional principle of equality.
Additionally, the would-be next friend should emphasize that if
these children are in fact suffering a violation of their right to equal
protection, and if they would be better off if someone sought judicial
redress of this constitutional wrong, then failure to appoint a next
friend for them causes them further harm, since in practice no
alternative means is available for redressing that wrong. A well-
established principle in our legal system holds that some effective
means should exist for securing the constitutional rights of every
person.46  When judicial procedural requirements preclude
prosecution of the legitimate constitutional claims of some class of
persons, they themselves create a denial of equal protection of the
laws, and a further substantive constitutional violation. Thus, absent
appointment of an outside party to represent the children who suffer
the forms of discrimination described in Part I, they will suffer
inequality at yet another level, further reinforcing their impotence and
marginalization-traits relevant to treating persons as members of a
suspect class deserving of special judicial protection.
465. Cf. Child, 412 F. Supp. at 599 ("Those who propose to speak for the plaintiffs have
manifested an interest in their welfare and should... be allowed to proceed."). A person
is not disqualified from serving as next friend, however, simply because he is also
interested in establishing a constitutional principle. In re Zawisza, 73 B.R. 929, 936 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987); Child, 412 F. Supp. at 599. Nor does a lack of prior contact with the
persons to be represented disqualify a person from serving as next friend. Zawisza, 73 B.R.
at 936.
466. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,643 (1979) (plurality opinion) (concluding
that states may not impose undue burdens on minor's exercise of constitutional rights); Ad
Hoc Comm. of Concerned Teachers v. Greenburgh #11 Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d
25, 31 (2d Cir. 1989) (" 'The right of access of courts by those who feel they are aggrieved
should not be curtailed; and this is particularly so in the instance of children who, rightly
or wrongly, attribute such grievances to their very custodians.' ") (quoting Child, 412 F.
Supp. at 599); Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[A]ccess to the
courts by aggrieved persons should not be unduly limited, particularly ... where an
incompetent person raises allegations of violations of his rights attributable to his
custodians, and further alleges a failure to act on the part of his legal guardian.").
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Finally, an advocate for the interests of religious objectors'
children should seek appointment as next friend and advance an equal
protection claim on their behalf in such a way as to minimize the
impact of the judicial proceeding itself on the children's lives. They
should strive to convince the court that it can appoint a next friend
and adjudicate the claim without harming the children and without
interfering directly in family life. The potential for harm would lie
principally in generating anxiety in the children. Rule 17(c) in fact
appears to require, quite appropriately, that in deciding whether to
appoint a next friend for a minor, a court consider whether the
potential harm from appointing a next friend and/or from litigating
the underlying claim would outweigh the potential benefit for the
minor from making the appointment.467
Significantly, the equal protection claim articulated in Part II
would not involve much, if any, discovery into the individual situation
of any child, at least so long as it sought only injunctive and
declaratory relief and not also damages. Such a claim would
challenge de jure, rather than de facto, discrimination by the state in
provision of benefits, and so would not require extensive factual
inquiry such as "disparate impact" cases typically involve. Moreover,
to establish that the children discriminated against are harmed, a
court should be able to proceed on the basis of evidence or
presumptions regarding the costs for broad classes of children from
failing to receive the statutory benefits. For example, in a challenge
to religious exemptions to immunization laws, a court could presume,
without needing to inquire into the medical or family situation of
individual children, that any child who does not receive certain
vaccinations is at risk of suffering substantial harm.4" Resolution
of this challenge would therefore involve consideration primarily of
legal, rather than factual, issues, so individual parents and children
would not necessarily have to play any role in the litigation. In
addition, to the extent that parents wished to play a role in opposing
467. The Rule provides that a court "shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order
as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person." FED. R. Civ. P.
17(c) (emphasis added).
468. As noted in Part I, compulsory immunization laws typically contain an exemption
for children whose doctor attests that all or some of the required vaccinations would be
medically inappropriate for them. See supra note 146. With respect to immunization, the
children on whose behalf the equal protection claim analyzed in Part II would be brought
would be those who fail to receive vaccinations solely because their parents claim a
religious exemption.
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such a suit, they could do so collectively through their religious
organizations and thereby distribute the costs of doing so among
many people.
Further, an advocate for religious objectors' children should seek
to avoid making the children's consent to appointment of a next
friend or to prosecution of the constitutional claim relevant to the
case. Imposing the burden of making such a decision on young
children in the types of cases being considered here could be harmful
to them, placing them under extreme pressure and possibly causing
significant disruption to their lives.' 9 In practice, young children
would most likely simply express whatever preference their parents
instructed them to express regarding a legal issue beyond their ken.
This alleviates any concern about creating conflict within the family
but also renders the children's consent, or lack thereof, meaningless.
A child advocate seeking next friend status should therefore stipulate
at the outset that the children would oppose the appointment and the
proposed litigation on their behalf if asked, and request that the court
not attempt to elicit the children's views, in light of the harm that
doing so might cause them. At the same time, the advocate should
point out that the consent or opposition of the children is irrelevant
because underlying Rule 17(c) is a presumption that children are not
competent to decide such matters for themselves. This is borne out
by past court decisions appointing a next friend or guardian ad litem
to make decisions for minors in connection with litigation even when
the minors had strong views on the matter at hand.4 The pater-
nalistic principle that the state may override the preferences of insuf-
ficiently mature minors-even those in their teens-when necessary
to protect their interests is well-established.7  Courts should
469. See Sommer, supra note 268, at 1222 (noting authority for view that "involving
children in these critical and emotionally-charged decisions might harm them
psychologically"). This is not to deny that, as a general matter, involving children in
decisionmaking regarding their own lives is conducive to their healthy development. The
point here is simply that these cases would be so highly charged, triggering adamant
opposition by parents, that the children at issue would be better off if left out of the
dispute as much as possible.
470. E.g., Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 782-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that 11-year-old who filed petition for termination of his parents' custodial rights
may not proceed on his own behalf, because "[c]ourts historically have recognized that
unemancipated minors do not have the legal capacity to initiate legal proceedings in their
own names").
471. See, e.g. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635, 650 (1979) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that states may require parental consent for abortion of unemancipated
minor's child unless minor can show she is of sufficient maturity or that abortion is in her
best interest, and noting that states "may require a minor to wait until the age of majority
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therefore make a Rule 17(c) determination solely on the basis of the
interests of the children involved, counting the stipulated opposition
of the children to the appointment of a next friend and to litigation
on their behalf simply as one of the interests affected.
An additional strategy for minimizing the impact of the litigation
on the children would be to diffuse attention to individual parents and
children by bringing the equal protection claim as a class action suit
on behalf of all similarly situated children, and seeking appointment
as next friend to the class.472 Class certification may not be neces-
sary to protect all members of the class, since a suit on behalf of an
individual child could result in invalidation of a statutory provision
that denies equal protection to a whole class of children. Federal
rules do permit a class action approach, however, when the relief
sought would be declaratory and/or injunctive and the state action
complained of is "generally applicable" to many persons, without
significant difference in their individual situations.473 Such a suit
could proceed without reference to or involvement of any individual
children, at least following appointment of the next friend.474
B. What Relief.
In addition to this procedural obstacle remains the practical
difficulty of fashioning a remedy that does, on the whole, make the
children involved better off. The expected opposition of parents to
before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently"); M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d
170, 177 (8th Cir. 1977) (Henley, J., dissenting) ("lit is well established that the activities
of children may be more highly regulated than those of adults. In particular, a state may
determine that a child is not possessed of full capacity for individual choice.") (citations
omitted).
472. Courts frequently appoint a next friend under Rule 17(c) in class action suits
involving a class of children or other incompetent persons, after certification of the class.
See N.O. v. Callahan, 110 F.R.D. 637, 648 (D. Mass. 1986) and cases cited therein.
473. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 663-66
(5th ed. 1989) (discussing requirements for class certification under FED. R. Civ. P. 23).
The class action approach is also advisable because parents might be able to take action
to thwart a suit brought on behalf of only one or a few children. For example, some
Christian Scientist parents might be willing to immunize their child in order to render
moot a claim on the child's behalf, justifying their actions as a necessary sacrifice for the
greater good of their church. Cf. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)
(articulating as requirements for the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception
to mootness doctrine that a plaintiff show that the duration of the dispute is "too short to
be fully litigated" before its natural expiration and that there is a "reasonable expectation
that the same [plaintiff will] be subjected to the same action again").
474. See, e.g., Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (noting that five
children who initiated class action suit, and for whom next friend was appointed, were
referred to in court documents by a collective pseudonym).
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invalidation of special privileges and rights they have-enjoyed, while
not a legitimate justification for the exemptions in the context of an
equal protection analysis, is something courts will and should consider
in drafting an order of relief in these cases, should the equal
protection claim succeed. Legally, courts would have to find that the
religious exemptions now in place are constitutionally invalid because
they deny important protections to a certain class of children. They
might, however, be able to recommend alternative regulatory schemes
that would give parents some satisfaction, while still giving the
children the protection they deserve.
In the medical care context, possible compromises are readily
imaginable. With respect to immunization, a court might recommend
that a state require that all children receive vaccinations against those
serious diseases and infections that a child in this country has a
realistic chance of contracting, while allowing religious objector
parents to withhold any vaccinations whose medical value for any
given child is highly questionable. With respect to medical treatment
for illness, a court would have to invalidate spiritual treatment
exemptions to neglect, reporting, and criminal laws, but could urge or
even order the state to explore effective alternative treatment
procedures that do not conflict with the views of various groups of
parents. Members of the medical profession have, for example,
developed alternatives to blood transfusions in procedures for treating
certain illnesses, in response to conflicts with Jehovah's Witnesses.47
Finally, with respect to physical examinations, a court might suggest
that a state fashion legislation allowing parents in all cases to have
their child examined by a certified doctor of their choice, rather than
by a nurse or doctor employed by the child's school. While these
compromises may give small comfort to parents, they at least avoid
handing the parents a complete defeat and conveying the impression
that the court has no respect whatsoever for them or their views.
In the realm of schooling, a court could first distinguish between
regulations that are intended to protect children from harm or ensure
them a high quality education, on the one hand, and those regulations
that, on the other hand, principally reflect a legislature's view of ideal
citizenship or that are a response to a situation that is present in
public but not in private schools. The court could then find that only
the former type need be extended to religious schools. A regulation
requiring, for example, volunteer community service as a condition for
475. Abraham, supra note 127, at 966.
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graduating might fall into the latter category, as might a school
uniform mandate imposed to counter unruliness in public schools.
Unfortunately, with respect to the former category of school
regulations, conceiving of appropriate compromises is difficult. No
alternative to state certification can adequately ensure the quality of
teachers.476  Nor does any compromise on the issue of sex
discrimination and sex bias in programs, curriculum, and counseling
suggest itself. For children born to parents holding sexist religious
views, their schooling should provide a corrective to the subordinating
socialization they receive at home. It certainly should not reinforce
that socialization.
As was the case with desegregation, militant resistance would no
doubt follow court-ordered extension of these regulations to religious
schools, and states would try to effect their own compromises
informally through the enforcement procedures they adopt. In the
case of desegregation, initial hopes that over time people's expec-
tations would change and integration would eventually be accepted
and accomplished have been disappointed, in large part because of
the ability of white parents to move to predominantly white school
districts or to enroll their children in private schools.477 In the case
of regulation of religious schools, such hopes might be more realistic,
since parents would have no legal alternative to the desired state of
affairs and nowhere to run (unless they were prepared to leave the
country). Parents might mount sufficient resistance to prevent the
present generation of children in religious schools from receiving all
of the educational benefits that the law should ensure them, but when
these children become parents they may be more accepting of state
regulation of the schools to which they send their own children.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mainstream American society has for several decades been in the
throes of a struggle to effectuate its ideal of equality before the law.
This ideal is far from being realized, but such significant steps have
been taken that today the most debated question is whether historical-
ly under-privileged groups are now over-privileged, at least in regard
476. Cf Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 492-95 (8th Cir. 1987)
(describing elements of teacher certification training program in Iowa, which are
" 'essential if one is to become a good teacher' ") (quoting Fellowship Baptist Church v.
Benton, 620 F. Supp. 308, 316 (S.D. Iowa 1985)).
477. See DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE
LAW 176-80 (1995); JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 2-4 (1991).
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to higher educational opportunities and employment. This struggle
and its successes, however, have not included all disadvantaged
groups. The state has denied some groups of children equal protec-
tion of the laws to an increasing, rather than decreasing, degree, and
few persons have noticed, because these children cannot speak for
themselves and their parents do not seek equal treatment for them.
We in the legal profession should pause from our discussions of
affirmative action hiring of law professors and corporate managers to
ask whether these children deserve our immediate attention and our
efforts to secure equal treatment for all.
This Article has endeavored to explain why religious exemptions
to child welfare and education laws violate the Equal Protection
Clause and constitute an injustice to children of religious objectors.
The legal conclusions strongly support elimination of these
exemptions. The discrimination is clear and clearly intentional on the
part of legislatures. The purpose of the exemptions is obvious and
obviously illegitimate, as a naked preference for the interests of
parents over the interests of children. The real obstacle to reversing
this history of discrimination against children of religious objectors lies
in finding a judge who can conceive of a child as a person distinct
from her parents, with independent interests and no real commitment
to any religion, and who understands that the religious preferences of
parents should be relevant to the legal treatment of children only
insofar as frustrating those preferences might unavoidably adversely
affect children's temporal well-being.
The world in which all children enjoy equal protection of the laws
would be a significantly different world from the present one. One
difference that some might mourn is that this "ideal" world would
have little place for certain types of religious commitment and
religious community-specifically, those based on unreflective,
unchosen, inherited religious faith. Proponents of strong parental
rights or of toleration of minority religious practices often raise this
concern, although these persons themselves are typically not among
the persons who have that kind of faith or who belong to that kind of
community. Their motivation seems principally the satisfaction they
derive from living in a diverse social environment and in a tolerant
society.
We must recognize that such satisfaction hardly counts as any
justification, let alone an important one, for denying medical care and
equal educational opportunity to some children. Liberals and
conservatives alike should begin to think less about what kind of
world they want to live in when they discuss children's upbringing and
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more about what kind of world is best for a child born today whose
parents have religious views opposed to the types of benefits that we
collectively have decided children need. That child alone has
fundamental interests in her health and education, and that child is
therefore whom the law should put first.
